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WHO’S AFRAID OF SECTION 1498? A CASE FOR 
GOVERNMENT PATENT USE IN PANDEMICS AND OTHER 
NATIONAL CRISES 
Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan* 
 
COVID-19 has created pressing and widespread needs for 
vaccines, medical treatments, PPE, and other medical technologies, 
needs that may conflict—indeed, have already begun to conflict—
with the exclusive rights conferred by United States patents. The 
U.S. government has a legal mechanism to overcome this conflict: 
government use of patented technologies at the cost of government-
paid compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. But while many have 
recognized the theoretical possibility of government patent use 
under that statute, there is today a conventional wisdom that § 1498 
is too exceptional, unpredictable, and dramatic for practical use, to 
the point that it ought to be invoked sparingly or not at all, even in 
extraordinary circumstances such as a pandemic. 
 
Yet that conventional wisdom is a recent one, and it conflicts 
with both history and theory. This Article considers the role of 
§ 1498 in the context of national crises and emergencies like 
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COVID-19, a context so far not addressed substantially in the 
literature on the statute. We find that government patent use is not 
nearly as exceptional as it is commonly made out to be, and indeed 
has been not only used but expanded through statutory amendment 
over the last century. Review of the development and use of the 
statute during both world wars and the post–September 11 period 
reveals widespread acceptance of government patent use as a tool 
for addressing imminent national problems, and it illuminates 
particular features of government patent use that become especially 
pertinent in times of crisis. In the United States, government patent 
use and national emergencies have a close and special relationship; 
each has shaped the other. 
 
Drawing from the lessons of history and analysis of the statute, 
we develop a novel framework for comparing § 1498 to other policy 
tools, including prizes, research grants, and patent buyouts. Under 
this framework, four features of § 1498 stand out: speed of 
invocation, flexibility in the scope of its use, post-crisis 
determination of compensation, and use of an impartial adjudicator. 
Whenever these four features are advantageous—which will be true 
in most national emergency situations, as we demonstrate—the U.S. 
government should strongly consider government patent use over 
patent buyouts and other policy tools. We show the advantages of 
these four features in a case study: government patent use to expand 
supply and access to the COVID-19 treatment remdesivir. 
Accordingly, and contrary to the conventional view of § 1498, we 
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Among certain patent lawyers, one number generates some awe 
and trepidation: 1498. It is the section number of a statute in Title 
28 of the United States Code, a law that provides the U.S. 
government with the power to manufacture and use any patented 
invention at the cost of “reasonable and entire compensation for 
such use and manufacture.”1 This seemingly unremarkable statutory 
language has sat on the books for over a century. Yet 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498 and government patent use are regularly characterized in the 
language of extremity. Commentators describe the statute as 
“breaking” patents,2 “seizure” of rights,3 “stealing,”4 “expropriating 
private property,”5  “taboo,”6  “a radical change,” 7  a “specter,” 8  a 
 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Other current laws, most notably the march-in rights 
provision of the Bayh–Dole Act, provide alternate pathways for the government 
to make use of patented inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); see also 16 U.S.C. 
§ 831r (Tennessee Valley Authority power to use patented inventions); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2183(b)(2) (Atomic Energy Commission power to use and license patents). See 
generally Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1513–16 
(2015). 
2 E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Breaking Patents, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 461, 465 n.15 
(2011) (noting use of phrase “for hyperbolic effect”). 
3 Michael Lehr, Federal Seizure of Patented Inventions: A COVID-19 Response, 
DUNLAP BENNETT & LUDWIG (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.dbllawyers.com/
federal-seizure-of-patented-inventions-a-covid-19-response; see Chris Katopis, 
Recognizing the Limits of Government Procurement in the Pharmaceutical 
Industries, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://cpip.
gmu.edu/2018/12/20/recognizing-the-limits-of-government-procurement-in-the-
pharmaceutical-industries. 
4  E.g., Elizabeth Wright, Stealing Patents Won’t Bring Down Drug Costs, 
CITIZENS AGAINST GOV’T WASTE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cagw.org/
thewastewatcher/stealing-patents-won%E2%80%99t-bring-down-drug-costs; 
Charles Sauer, Government May Attempt to Steal COVID Vaccine, REALCLEAR 
HEALTH (June 17, 2020), https://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2020/06/17/
government_may_attempt_to_steal_covid_vaccine_111060.html. 
5 James Edwards, A Protection, Not a Weapon, CONSERVATIVES FOR PROP. RTS 
(May 27, 2020), https://www.property-rts.org/post/a-protection-not-a-weapon. 
6 Natalie Shure, Force Drug Companies to Lower Prices, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/force-drug-companies-to-lower-
prices. 
7 Adam Houldsworth, New York Times’ Seizure Call Shows How Far the Tide Is 
Turning Against Pharma IP, IAM (July 13, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/
law-policy/new-york-times-pharma-patents. 
8 Joel Wallace, Mad Dash to Coronavirus Vaccine May Face Legal Hurdles, 
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“nuclear option,” 9  and equivalent to eminent-domain 
condemnation.10 Even supporters of invoking the law sometimes 
characterize use of § 1498 as exceptional.11 And the COVID-19 
pandemic, despite having elicited numerous calls to invoke 
 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/03/12/mad-
dash-coronavirus-vaccine-may-face-legal-hurdles/id=119790. 
9  E.g., Michael Rosen, Running Roughshod over Intellectual Property Rights 
Won’t Lower Drug Prices, AEIDEAS BLOG (July 24, 2018), https://www.aei.org/
technology-and-innovation/intellectual-property/running-roughshod-over-
intellectual-property-rights-wont-lower-drug-prices; Valerie Bauman, 
Government May Have Ownership or Rights to Coronavirus Vaccines, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-
life-sciences/government-may-have-ownership-or-rights-to-coronavirus-
vaccines. 
10 In addition to the literature that analyzes § 1498 under a takings framework, see 
infra note 20, there is significant commentary that invokes eminent domain 
largely for rhetorical effect. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Sean O’Connor & Evan 
Moore, Proposal for Drug Price Controls is Legally Unprecedented and 
Threatens Medical Innovation, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Nov. 5, 
2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/11/05/proposal-for-drug-price-controls-is-
legally-unprecedented-and-threatens-medical-innovation; Henry Grabowski, 
Government Appropriation of Breakthrough Drug Patent Rights Would Deter 
Biopharmaceutical R&D and Innovation, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160620.055440/full. 
11 See, e.g., Letter from Bernard Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Robert A. 
McDonald, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs 1 (May 12, 2015), https://www.
sanders.senate.gov/download/051215-letter (calling for Department of Veterans 
Affairs to use § 1498 “to break the patents” on certain drugs); Joel Dodge, The 
Government Can Legally Commandeer Drug Patents, PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/10/02/the-
government-can-legally-commandeer-drug-patents (quoting Sen. Bill Cassidy on 
use of § 1498 to “commandeer” the drug industry); George Abi Younes et al., 
COVID-19: Insights from Innovation Economists, 47 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 
(2020) (describing “implementation of compulsory licensing” as “challenging but 
a real option on the table”); Editorial Bd., How the Government Can Lower Drug 
Prices, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/
opinion/prescription-drug-costs-naloxone-opioids.html (describing § 1498 as “a 
sort of eminent domain”). In their authoritative analysis of § 1498 in the 
pharmaceutical context, Brennan, Kapczynski, Monahan, and Rizvi advocate use 
of § 1498 but conclude that the tool should be used relatively sparingly, 
“suggest[ing] that the government only invoke its § 1498 power where drug 
pricing has created sizeable deadweight loss.” Hannah Brennan et al., A 
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for 
Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 319 (2016). The authors also argue that, “[a]s 
with eminent domain, where the government often purchases land on the private 
market despite having the power to take it, so too should government use of 
patents be invoked in the exceptional rather than routine case.” Id. 
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§ 1498,12 has not changed the views of many that government patent 
use is a destabilizing intervention, tantamount to “throw[ing] our IP 
system out the window.”13 
To be sure, § 1498 can be used in bold, interventionist ways. 
For example, Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, along 
with the New York Times editorial board, have called for the use of 
§ 1498 to discipline the pricing of certain vital and best-selling 
prescription drugs.14 Though the United States has not used § 1498 
in this dramatic way, there is much merit to such bold use, which 
could save billions in public and private drug spending.15 
 
12 See, e.g., Michael Liu et al., March-in Rights and Compulsory Licensing—
Safety Nets for Access to a COVID-19 Vaccine, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 6, 
2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200501.798711/full; 
Amy Kapczynski, Paul Biddinger & Rochelle Walensky, Remdesivir Could Be in 
Short Supply. Here’s a Fix, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/28/opinion/remdesivir-shortage-coronavirus.html. 
13  Adam Houldsworth, IP Is Crucial to Finding Breakthrough Covid-19 
Medicines, Novartis Policy Head States, IAM (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.iam-
media.com/coronavirus/ip-crucial-finding-breakthrough-covid-19-medicines-
novartis-policy-head-states (quoting Corey Salsberg, Head of IP Affairs at 
Novartis); see also Tom Giovanetti, Attempts to Degrade Drug Patents are 
Counterproductive in This Pandemic, TOWNHALL (June 1, 2020), https://
townhall.com/columnists/tomgiovanetti/2020/06/01/progressive-activists-want-
to-keep-meritless-obama-era-lawsuits-alive-n2569704 (invoking § 1498 during 
pandemic “is to do away with the IP system for good”); Bauman, supra note 9; 
Matt Rizzolo et al., What If Gov’t Allows Patent Infringement For COVID-19 
Drugs?, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1258739/
what-if-gov-t-allows-patent-infringement-for-covid-19-drugs. 
14 See Sanders, supra note 11; Maia Anderson, EpiPen, Humira Among Drugs 
Warren Wants to Regulate, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.
beckershospitalreview.com/pharmacy/epipen-humira-among-drugs-warren-
wants-to-regulate.html; Editorial Bd., supra note 11; see also Letter from Ro 
Khanna, Member of Cong., House of Representatives, to Alex Azar, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://khanna.house.gov/sites/
khanna.house.gov/files/Final%20Letter%20-%20signed.pdf. 
15 See, e.g., Christopher J. Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 280–81; Brittany S. 
Bruns, The Pharmaceutical Access Act: An Administrative Eminent Domain 
Solution to High Drug Prices, 106 CAL. L. REV. 2023, 2047–54 (2018); Amy 
Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, “Government Patent Use”: A Legal 
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 792–93 (2016); 
Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public Health: 
An Analysis of the CellPro March-in Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1115 
(1999) (noting advantages of § 1498 over Bayh–Dole Act march-in rights); 
Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, Assessing Drug Pricing Reform 
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But the statute is not limited to such uses, and our focus in this 
Article is to show that § 1498 need not be at all extreme in its 
operation or impact. Under its authority to have patented inventions 
“used or manufactured by or for the United States” at the cost of 
“reasonable and entire compensation,” the government can fine-tune 
the scope and duration of its invocation of § 1498 to make modest 
interventions in the market, perhaps with only limited disruption to 
investment-backed expectations. And as a matter of history, § 1498 
is not nearly as exceptional as some modern critics make it out to 
be. The government has long exercised both § 1498 and even 
stronger government patent-use powers, often with substantial 
support from the stakeholder community. 
To highlight this more modest, ordinary role that § 1498 can 
play in national policy, we consider a specific class of uses: federal 
responses to complex large-scale crises, including the COVID-19 
pandemic that the world faces today. While the statute’s 
effectiveness can go well beyond crisis management, a focus on 
emergency contexts reveals particular aspects and advantages of 
§ 1498 that illuminate its value and carry over into non-emergency 
contexts as well. To be sure, national emergencies entail some policy 
considerations different from those of non-emergency times, but 
nevertheless they helpfully draw focus to latent features of § 1498 
that might otherwise escape attention. We find that § 1498 is well 
suited to a perfectly ordinary role as a crisis management policy tool, 
on the same plane as other emergency powers such as the Defense 
Production Act, the invocation of which many have supported to 
tackle COVID-19.16 
 
Proposals: The Real Leverage and Benefits of Competitive Licensing, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20191101.594551/full (noting unique benefits of compulsory licensing of 
patents on prescription drugs); Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government 
Patent Use to Address the Rising Cost of Naloxone: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio, 
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 472 (2018). 
16  See, e.g., Tim Hains, Nancy Pelosi: President Trump Must Use Defense 
Production Act to Build More Ventilators Now, “Save Lives,” REALCLEAR POL. 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/03/31/pelosi_
trump_must_use_defense_production_act_to_build_more_ventilators_now.html; 
Caleb Watney & Alec Stapp, Masks for All: Using Purchase Guarantees and 
Targeted Deregulation to Boost Production of Essential Medical Equipment, 
MERCATUS CTR. 3–5 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/
covid-19-crisis-response/masks-all-using-purchase-guarantees-and-targeted-
deregulation. 
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This Article is, to our knowledge, the first to consider in detail 
the special role of government patent use in cases of national 
emergency in the United States.17 Past scholarship on the historical 
development and use of § 1498 has tended to focus on judicial cases 
where patents were actually used by the U.S. government under the 
statute or its predecessors,18 which are useful for explicating the 
scope and nature of the statute but less helpful for assessing the 
appropriateness of invoking it in the first place (since, after all, a 
case about government patent use can only arise after the 
government has used the patent). A handful discuss its legislative 
history and note in passing its connection to American involvement 
in World War I. 19  Turning to normative analyses, substantial 
 
17 While this Article does not treat international or foreign law extensively, we 
note that § 1498 is related to and consistent with international treaty provisions 
and other nations’ laws that permit for compulsory licensing “in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use.” See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 31(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 
Coenraad Visser, Patent Exceptions and Limitations in the Health Context, U.N. 
Doc. SCP/15/3 (Sept. 2, 2010). For discussion of the international dimensions of 
government patent use in emergency situations, see Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, 
Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: 
A Database Analysis, PLOS MED., 2012, at 3; Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation 
Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and Immunity in the Development of 
Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 151 (2005); Robert 
Shapiro, Patent Infringement During a Time of National Emergency: Are 
Canadian, American and Mexican Governments Permitted to Do So Under Their 
Domestic Law, NAFTA and TRIPS; If So at What Cost?, 18 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL 
& SOC. ISSUES 37, 44–56 (2004); and Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of 
Patents During the Pandemic (Dec. 11, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3636456. 
18 See, e.g., James E. Denny, Eminent Domain Aspects of 28 USC 1498, 4 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 257, 257–74 (1960); Lionel M. 
Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government 
Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 408–15 (1995); Richard J. McNeely, 
Governmental Indirect Patent Infringement: The Need to Hold Uncle Sam 
Accountable Under 28 U.S.C § 1498, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 1065, 1100–05, 1112–
18 (2007); Blake E. Reese, Note, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: An International and 
Comparative Study of Governments’ Rights to “Infringe” Patents in Light of the 
Federal Circuit’s Recent Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and a Call for 
Congress to Modernize the Statute, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 84, 86–102 (2006). 
19 See Colleen V. Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the 
 
Fall 2020] Who’s Afraid of Section 1498? 9 
literature addresses the question of whether government patent use 
under § 1498 constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking of property,20 a 
proposition that the Federal Circuit recently rejected. 21  That 
literature does not generally distinguish emergency conditions from 
other situations. 22  Others have considered the role of § 1498 in 
 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 853, 868 (2003) (“[T]he statute was originally conceived with wartime 
urgency in mind”); Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right? The 
Confused Early History of Government Patent Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 188 (2012); William Brownell Humphrey, A History and 
Analysis of Section 1498 of Title 28 of the United States Code Dealing with 
Unlicensed Use of Patents by the United States Government and Its Effect on 
Procurement 9–12 (1974) (unpublished thesis), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/
AD0777985.pdf. Brennan and colleagues give a “brief” history of § 1498’s 
application that is more extensive than most, though they consider use of the 
statute broadly rather than its specific application to national emergencies. See 
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 298–307. 
20 For analysis contending that it is, see, for example, Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498(a) and the Unconstitutional Taking of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 
(2011) (arguing that, being an act of eminent domain, exercise of § 1498 requires 
compensation for litigation costs); Lavenue, supra note 18, at 506 (similar); David 
R. Lipson, We’re Not Under Title 35 Anymore: Patent Litigation Against the 
United States Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2003). 
For contrary views, see, for example, Denny, supra note 18, at 274 (finding 
eminent-domain treatment of § 1498 to be “unfortunate in the many problems that 
have arisen” in the case law as a result); Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, 
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV. 963, 991–92 (2019) 
(observing that government patent use “is described in terms of eminent domain 
or takings when that characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at 
hand”). Much of this commentary was prompted by a Federal Circuit panel 
decision in Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek I) that government patent use was 
not a Fifth Amendment taking. See 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc); Bradley M. Taub, 
Why Bother Calling Patents Property—The Government’s Path to License Any 
Patent and Maybe Pay for It, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 154 
(2006); Justin Torres, The Government Giveth, and the Government Taketh Away: 
Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 315, 338–
41 (2007); Reese, supra note 18, at 117–19. That decision was vacated when an 
en banc court reversed the panel on different grounds. See Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States (Zoltek II), 672 F.3d at 1318 (vacating Zoltek I); id. at 1327 (“[W]e need 
not and do not reach the issue of the Government’s possible liability under the 
Constitution for a taking.”). 
21 See Golden v. United States, 955 F.3d 981, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also infra 
notes 213–212–220. 
22 Earlier commentary from about the 1960s, by contrast, does occasionally note 
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specific fields such as health care,23 government contracting and 
procurement,24 and human rights.25 
Commentators have, to be sure, considered the applicability of 
§ 1498 to certain specific emergency contexts. 26  Several 
commentators have suggested that § 1498 may be useful in a public 
health emergency, for example.27 Some have specifically supported 
government patent use as a relief measure during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 28  Others have noted the statute’s relationship to war, 
generally in service of concluding its use is inappropriate outside of 
 
this distinction, perhaps because the active area of discussion at that time was the 
role of § 1498 in government procurement. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 19, 
at 21. 
23 See references cited supra note 15. 
24 See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 19, at 14–20; Lavenue, supra note 18, at 483–
87; Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in 
Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
5, 9–14 (1967). 
25 See Cahoy, supra note 2, at 501–07. 
26  See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A 
Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 
40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 136 (2002) (rejecting “blanket arguments” against § 1498); 
see also Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift 
Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-
Terrorism,” 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 291 (2002) (calling for compulsory 
licensing to respond to “super-terrorism”). Torrance provides a comprehensive 
review of patent-related options, including § 1498, during a natural disaster, but 
focuses on a new statutory proposal. See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the 
Rescue—Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 354 
(2007). 
27 See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such 
as an Influenza Pandemic, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2009); McGarey 
& Levey, supra note 15, at 1115 (briefly noting speed advantages of § 1498 in 
cases of “a public health need for the invention, particularly an immediate need”); 
Neiloy Sircar, Public Health Emergencies: Reconciling Trips and IHR (2005), 41 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. SIDEBAR 101, 120 (2018); cf. Amanda Mitchell, Tamiflu, the 
Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses: An Exploration of the Government’s 
Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95 CAL. L. REV. 535, 557–58 (2007) 
(favoring condemnation of patents over § 1498 during an influenza epidemic). 
One article considers several advantages and drawbacks of government patent use 
during an emergency, but ultimately reaches no conclusion and recommends that 
governments “continue to use their negotiating skills in hopes of securing 
agreements” with patent holders. Shapiro, supra note 17, at 62. 
28 See Kumar, supra note 17, at 27–30; sources cited supra note 12. 
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wartime.29 But this research generally stops at observing that § 1498 
could remediate (or not remediate) particular situations, without 
developing a more comprehensive theoretical basis for when and 
why the government should make use of third-party patents during 
national emergencies. And some scholars,30 including Hemel and 
Ouellette, 31  have advocated for an alternative approach to 
expanding access to patented anti-COVID-19 technologies—patent 
buyouts of some sort—without (to our knowledge) weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages of a buyout against those of 
government patent use under § 1498. 
This Article thus makes several contributions. First, it provides 
an up-to-date primer on government patent use—what it is, how it 
works, and how it compares to other policy tools to incentivize new 
inventions and allocate access to those inventions. 32  Second, it 
makes a novel descriptive contribution by synthesizing the history 
 
29 See, e.g., Taub, supra note 20, at 171–72; Humphrey, supra note 19, at 21 
(quoting speech by Leonard Rawicz, Patent Counsel, Goddard Space Flight 
Center) (“[S]ome view that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 1498 was to assure patent 
litigation free procurement only during a national emergency or war . . . .”); 
Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, 
J., concurring). 
30  See, e.g., Anton Howes, Bringing the Future Forward, ENTREPRENEURS 
NETWORK (May 27, 2020), https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/bringing-the-
future-forward; Anton Howes, Innovation: Eyes on the Prize, ENTREPRENEURS 
NETWORK (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/innovation-
eyes-on-the-prize; Thomas Pogge & Peggy Tse, Restructuring Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, CHINA GLOBAL TELEVISION NETWORK (June 2, 2020), https://news.
cgtn.com/news/2020-06-02/Restructuring-pharmaceutical-innovation-QZq50NZ
Oxi/index.html. 
31 See Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Pharmaceutical Profits and Public Health 
Are Not Incompatible, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/08/opinion/coronavirus-drug-company-profits.html. 
32 Others have covered large portions of this descriptive terrain before us, though 
we see value in explaining the basics, particularly as a Cabinet Secretary professed 
ignorance of § 1498 just last year (despite writing about the law in 2002). See Ari 
Shapiro & Selena Simmons-Duffin, How HHS Secretary Reconciles Proposed 
Medicaid Cuts, Stopping the Spread of HIV, NPR (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.
npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/08/711020181/how-trumps-hhs-
reconciles-medicaid-cuts-with-stopping-the-spread-of-hiv (quoting Secretary 
Alex Azar as stating that “There’s no such thing as a legal right to break patents 
in the United States.”). But see Alex Azar II, Cipro: Good Deal, Good Policy, AM. 
LAW., Apr. 2002, at 141 (“Section 1498(a) permits the United States to procure 
items without first obtaining a license, so long as it pays reasonable and entire 
compensation.”). 
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of the use of § 1498 and related statutes in times of national 
emergency. We include numerous early examples of government 
patent use that have not been explored in the legal academic 
literature. Even though the law has never been limited to those 
contexts and has broader application, § 1498 and norms of 
government patent use were shaped by national emergencies like the 
two world wars, and government patent use was widely accepted to 
be a valuable and critical tool during such emergencies. Third, the 
Article makes a novel, general normative case for government 
patent use in national emergencies, based on four key features of 
§ 1498: (1) speed, (2) flexibility, (3) ex post determination of the 
appropriate compensation and (4) determination of that 
compensation by an impartial adjudicator. Whenever these four 
features are advantageous—which will be true in most national 
emergency situations, as we show, but may also apply in 
peacetime—the U.S. government should strongly consider 
government patent use over patent buyouts and other policy tools. 
Government patent use under § 1498 can be used in many ways, big 
and small, in a national emergency. Fourth, we provide a novel 
roadmap to government patent use in one particularly practical use 
case: ensuring adequate and affordable access to remdesivir, an 
antiviral drug, in the COVID-19 pandemic. 
While the focus of this Article is the utility of § 1498 in the 
context of a national crisis, government patent use does not need to 
be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. We aim to demonstrate 
that government patent use is a flexible, highly useful policy tool. 
As we show below, § 1498 can be used modestly as well as 
massively to achieve various public benefits—lowering prices, 
expanding supply, or shielding socially useful activity from the risk 
of liability or injunction. The four key features of § 1498 that we 
highlight are permanent features of the section, and their benefits 
may warrant government patent use in ordinary circumstances as 
well as extraordinary ones, and not just in times of crisis but in times 
of relative calm, too. Ultimately, § 1498 is as much a Swiss Army 
knife as a sledgehammer. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the historical 
development of § 1498 and government patent use, particularly 
from a legislative and policy perspective, to assess perceptions and 
legislative expansions of the role of government patent use during 
times of national emergency. Part II briefly describes the present-
day nature of § 1498 and places it in the context of other policy tools 
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relevant to technological development and national crisis 
management. Part III then identifies several key advantages of 
§ 1498 that are especially pertinent to large-scale crisis situations. 
Those advantages can be used as factors to assess the utility of 
§ 1498 in particular situations, which we demonstrate through a case 
study of government patent use to expand supply and access to the 
COVID-19 treatment remdesivir. Part IV briefly concludes. 
I. HISTORICAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT PATENT USE IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS 
Throughout history, § 1498 has been closely tied to American 
responses to national crises. In addition to reviewing the origins of 
§ 1498, the discussion below focuses on three examples: the First 
World War, the Second World War, and the bioterrorism threat 
following September 11, 2001. 
While the U.S. government used § 1498 extensively at these 
times and others, 33  the purpose of this Part is not to catalog 
invocations of § 1498. Instead, to discern the policy considerations 
that motivate the legislative and executive branches to contemplate 
government patent use, we focus on the complex and disputed cases, 
namely situations where policymakers relied on powers broader 
than § 1498, amended § 1498, or publicly contested the application 
of that statute. Aside from there being better records of these 
disputed cases,34 the arguments elicited best highlight lawmakers’ 
interests and motivations in ways that are instructive for future 
situations of government patent use. 
A. Origin of the Statute 
Enacted in 1910, the first incarnation of § 149835 was not born 
of any national emergency—it was triggered by Congress repaving 
the Capitol building. In Schillinger v. United States, the owner of a 
patent on a concrete pavement method brought an infringement suit 
 
33 For articles reviewing cases under and invocations of § 1498, see generally 
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 302–07; Denny, supra note 18, at 258–74; 
Lavenue, supra note 18, at 452–72. 
34  Because there is no formal process for invoking § 1498, see infra text 
accompanying note 230, uses of the statute are not catalogued and may even go 
unrecorded. 
35 See Act of June 25, 1910 (1910 Act), ch. 423, 36 STAT. 851. The law was not 
numbered “§ 1498” at the time, but the government patent use laws described 
herein share a direct lineage to contemporary § 1498. See § 1498, hist. n. (noting 
derivation from 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1940)); 35 U.S.C. § 68 (noting derivation from 
1910 Act). Accordingly for purposes of simplicity, this Article uses that section 
number to refer to the statute throughout. 
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against the government, whose contractor had used the patented 
method during the Capitol renovation. 36  The Supreme Court 
rejected the suit on grounds of sovereign immunity.37 Despite the 
Tucker Act having partially waived sovereign immunity for “claims 
founded upon the Constitution . . . or upon any contract” with the 
United States, 38  the Court found this waiver inapplicable. The 
contract provision did not apply because the patent infringement 
action was “one sounding in tort.”39 Nor was the action “founded 
upon the Constitution” despite the patent holder’s protestations that 
the government’s infringement was a “taking of private property,” 
as the Court deemed that reading excessively broad;40 instead the 
Court read the waiver of sovereign immunity for Constitution-
founded claims to exclude torts.41 
In response to Schillinger, Congress enacted the Act of June 25, 
1910 to “provide additional protection for owners of patents” by 
offering them a cause of action for “reasonable compensation” (but 
not injunctive relief) for any use of a patented invention “by the 
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to 
use the same.”42 Contrary to how some have viewed the law, then, 
the logic of § 1498’s predecessor statute was not that it cut back on 
patentees’ remedies against the government; the baseline situation 
was that no remedy was available at all in view of sovereign 
immunity, and § 1498’s predecessor expanded patent protection by 
offering a new, albeit partial, remedy for government use.43 
 
36 155 U.S. 163, 171–72 (1894). 
37  See id. at 167 (“The general principle which we have already stated as 
applicable to all governments, forbids, on a policy imposed by necessity, that they 
should hold themselves liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted by their officers 
on the citizen, though occurring while engaged in the discharge of official 
duties.”) (quoting Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1869)). 
38 Tucker Act, ch. 359, sec. 1, 24 STAT. 505, 505 (1887), quoted in Schillinger, 
155 U.S. at 167. 
39 Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 169. 
40 Id. at 168 (“Can it be that Congress intended that every wrongful arrest and 
detention of an individual, or seizure of his property by an officer of the 
government, should expose it to an action for damages in the Court of Claims?”). 
41 Id. (“[Congress] added, ‘all claims founded upon the Constitution of the United 
States,’ but that does not include claims founded upon torts . . . .”). 
42 Act of June 25, 1910 (1910 Act), ch. 423, 36 STAT. 851. 
43 See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 298-99; see also ADDITIONAL PROTECTION 
FOR OWNERS OF PATENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, at 3 (1910) (“Our only purpose 
is to extend the jurisdiction of [the Court of Claims] so that it may entertain suits 
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While national emergencies did not cause § 1498’s original 
enactment, at least some members of Congress recognized the law’s 
close tie to one sort of emergency condition: national security. The 
House report “conceded that the Government ought to have the right 
to appropriate any invention necessary or convenient for natural 
defense or for beneficent public use, and that, too, without previous 
arrangement or negotiation with the owner.”44 The congressional 
debate record also reveals that Congress consulted with the War and 
Navy Departments on the bill, and Representative Currier, the 
leading proponent of the 1910 Act in the House, specifically called 
out during the debate the possibility that “government officers can 
be restrained in preparing the national defense.”45 In subsequent 
debate, Representative Dalzell, another proponent of the bill, was 
asked what should happen if “one of our officers of the army or the 
navy, having invented some useful implement of war, should decline 
to allow the Government to have it.” Dalzell’s answer was that the 
invention “ought to be appropriated by the Government by due 
process of law.”46 Thus, § 1498 in its origins was plainly envisioned 
to have applicability outside of national emergencies—repaving the 
Capitol was rather clearly not one—but the statute’s authors 
recognized its relevance to emergency conditions from the very 
beginning. 
B. World War I 
Hypothetical national security and emergency response 
concerns became reality during the First World War. As a war that 
heavily exploited science in the service of combat and that arguably 
invented the military public–private partnership,47 World War I set 
 
and award compensation to the owners of patents . . . .”). One might wonder 
whether the statutory language “without . . . lawful right to use” in the 1910 Act 
undercuts this view of § 1498 as expanding conditions on the patent grant, the 
argument being that if the government has a preexisting right to use a patent, then 
the statute could not logically refer to situations where the government is 
“without . . . lawful right to use” the patent. But the legislative history makes clear 
that the aforementioned provision was intended to refer to a different form of 
“lawful right to use,” namely shop rights arising from inventions of government 
employees. See H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, supra, at 3. 
44 H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, supra note 43, at 2. The term “natural defense” is likely 
a typographical error; it probably should have been “national defense.” 
45 45 CONG. REC. 8759 (1910). 
46 Id. at 8781 (1910). 
47 See M. Anthony Mills & Mark P. Mills, The Invention of the War Machine, 42 
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the stage for clashes between patents and national defense, clashes 
that would sharpen the role of government patent use in times of 
crisis. While patent disputes interfered with the war effort with 
respect to multiple technologies, 48  the development of aviation 
technology most clearly characterizes the role of government patent 
use during war. 
The Wright brothers’ solution to the lateral-roll problem in 1903 
gave birth to a worldwide industry of powered aircraft.49 It also gave 
birth to a massive tangle of patent litigation, as the Wrights’ main 
competitor, airplane manufacturer Glenn Curtiss, sought to avoid 
the Wrights’ patented twisting-wing design through a design-around 
involving inflexible hinged ailerons.50 Across the early 1900s, the 
brothers waged a forceful campaign of patent lawsuits against not 
just Curtiss and other manufacturers but also individual aviators at 
flying exhibitions, reportedly springing service on them 
immediately after the shows.51 And both Curtiss and the Wrights 
engaged in patent licensing at rates that some historians have 
 
NEW ATLANTIS 3, 3 (2014); see also KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN, TORPEDO: 
INVENTING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GREAT BRITAIN 2–3 (2014) (describing role of torpedoes “in the invention of the 
military-industrial complex”). 
48 
Disputes over torpedo technology, for example, would drag the government 
through almost a decade of litigation and arguably stall American torpedo 
development. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 188–90 (1920); 
EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 154; Charles Duan, Of Monopolies and Monocultures: 
The Intersection of Patents and National Security, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 369, 388–89 (2020). The Chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance wrote that 
its torpedo contractor, the E.W. Bliss Company, had used its patent-backed 
“monopoly” to force the government “to accept the terms offered or get no 
torpedoes,” which ultimately “influenced the E.W. Bliss Company in its prices, 
deliveries and workmanship.” Letter from N.E. Mason, Chief of Bureau of 
Ordnance, to Sec’y of the Navy, in Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the 
Navy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 59th Cong. 433, 436 
(1907), https://www.loc.gov/item/tmp92007441. 
49 See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 3 ll. 12–30 (filed Mar. 23, 1903); see also Wright 
Co. v. Herring–Curtiss Co., 177 F. 257, 259 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910) (noting 
Wrights’ successful demonstrations), rev’d, 180 F. 110 (C.C.A.2d 1910). 
50 See Wright, 177 F. at 259–60; Herbert A. Johnson, The Wright Patent Wars and 
Early American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 21, 28–30 (2004) . 
51 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 31–33 & note 39 (noting “resentment that the 
Wright Company allowed flying events to occur, and decided whether to sue after 
the exhibition had been staged”). 
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described as “almost confiscatory” and “prohibitive.”52 
The Wrights’ vigorous patent enforcement is generally 
considered to have been a key impediment to aviation technology 
innovation in the United States.53 By 1910, Europe had outstripped 
the United States in airplane motor design, and had made great 
strides in fixed single-wing aircraft while American manufacturers 
remained fixated on the Wrights’ flexible two-wing configuration. 
In 1913, on the eve of World War I, the United States was far behind 
other nations in military aviation: France held 266 military airplanes 
while the United States sported just six.54 
With looming war and an industry impasse, the government’s 
military branches found it necessary to take action. Congress in 
1915 had formed a National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics,55 
and in January 1917, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Acting Secretary of War W.M. Ingraham asked 
 
52 LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, 
AND THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES 203 (2014); 1 ALEX ROLAND, MODEL 
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 1915–
1958, at 38 (1985). 
53 There is some debate as to the relationship between the Wrights’ patent activity 
and American innovation lag. The conventional view is that American firms 
eschewed investment in airplane technology out of fear of lawsuits or excessive 
royalty demands. See, e.g., ROLAND, supra note 52, at 38; Phaedra Hise, How The 
Wright Brothers Blew It, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2003), https://www.forbes.com/2003/
11/19/1119aviation.html; Johnson, supra note 50, at 42–43; Scott McCartney, 
Wright Brothers’ Patent Battle Proved Costly in Aviation Race, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
17, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107159573141697200; Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890–91 (1990). But several dissenting scholars note that 
there was substantial investment in airplane manufacturing during the pendency 
of the lawsuits and immediately after. See Tom D. Crouch, Blaming Wilbur and 
Orville: The Wright Patent Suits and the Growth of American Aeronautics, in 
ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 290–91 (Peter Galison & 
Alex Roland eds., 2000); Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of the 
Early Aviation Patent Hold-up—How a US Government Monopsony 
Commandeered Pioneer Airplane Patents, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1, 11 
(2014). A potentially better explanation, as one of us has hypothesized elsewhere, 
is that the Wrights’ litigation campaign, especially against foreign aviators, 
dampened knowledge crossovers between the United States and Europe. See 
Duan, supra note 48, at 391–92. 
54 See TOM D. CROUCH, WINGS: A HISTORY OF AVIATION FROM KITES TO THE 
SPACE AGE 147 (2003). 
55 See ROLAND, supra note 52, at 24. 
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NACA for a solution to the patent dilemma. 56  In response, the 
committee’s chairman Charles D. Walcott petitioned President 
Wilson in February to introduce legislation to appropriate $1 million 
for acquiring aviation patents “by purchase, condemnation, 
donation, or otherwise.” The legislation was enacted in a naval 
appropriations bill on March 4, 1917.57 
The ability to obtain patents by “condemnation”—that is, 
seizure by eminent domain—was enough to bring the Wright-Martin 
and Curtiss-Burgess companies into a cross-licensing agreement.58 
Under the supervision of NACA and military representatives, the 
aircraft manufacturers formed the Manufacturers’ Aircraft 
Association and agreed to pay the MAA a royalty of $200 per 
airplane—substantially less than Wright-Martin’s usual $1000 
rate—to be distributed among the patent holders according to set 
percentages.59 Even so, the War and Navy Departments found the 
$200 royalty rate infeasible given the government’s expected 
wartime needs for airplane manufacturing, and threatened “to 
proceed to condemn the necessary patents” unless the MAA reduced 
the royalty rates to $100 per plane, with a maximum payment of $2 
million. 60  The MAA agreed, granting in March 1918 the 
government the requested royalty “during the period of the present 
war.”61 
To be sure, the aviation patent arrangement is not necessarily a 
model for future actions: Outright condemnation of patents is far 
stronger than use under § 1498, 62  and the MAA, which would 
outlive World War I by almost a half century, came to be the sort of 
patent-backed industry cartel that antitrust reformers of the late 
1930s would come to criticize strongly.63 But the airplane patent 
wars show how patents can cause problematic unpreparedness in the 
face of a national crisis such as war, and the origins of the MAA 
show the government’s once-unhesitating willingness to invoke the 
 
56 See id. at 38. 
57 See Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 180, 39 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1917); 
ROLAND, supra note 52, at 39. 
58 See ROLAND, supra note 52, at 39–41; Johnson, supra note 50, at 57. 
59 See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 487 (1933); 
Johnson, supra note 50, at 57. 
60 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, 77 Ct. Cl. at 491. 
61 Id. at 492. 
62 See discussion infra notes 216–218 and accompanying text. 
63 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 58–61. 
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power of government patent use to bargain for satisfactory licensing 
arrangements in times of crisis. 
Coming off of its successes dealing with aviation patents, the 
Navy Department next looked to expand government patent use 
more broadly. In April 1918, Navy Secretary Roosevelt wrote to 
Congress proposing an expansion of the government patent use 
statute then in force.64 The occasion for Roosevelt’s letter was the 
Supreme Court’s decision in William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine 
Building Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. a month 
earlier, which held that despite the 1910 Act, a government 
contractor could be sued and enjoined for patent infringement.65 
Reasoning that the 1910 Act was intended “not to weaken the rights 
of patentees, but to further secure them,” the Court concluded that 
the statute could not have acted to eliminate suits against 
government contractors.66 The Navy, according to Roosevelt, had 
been working on the opposite assumption that contractors were 
insulated from suit, and the Court’s decision apparently was now 
deterring contractors from working with the government.67 
Roosevelt’s proposed amendment to the 1910 Act was 
introduced in a Senate amendment to the House naval 
appropriations bill on May 22, 1918.68 The amendment was brought 
to the House floor by Representative Lemuel P. Padgett, chair of the 
House Committee on Naval Affairs, on June 18.69 Padgett initially 
expressed “great reluctance” about bringing a patent law 
 
64 See Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Sec’y of the Navy, to Benjamin 
R. Tillman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Naval Affairs, in Wood v. Atl. Gulf & 
Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720, 720 (S.D. Ala. 1924). 
65 See 246 U.S. 28, 42 (1918) (finding “want of foundation for the contention 
that . . . the statute conferred upon all who contracted with the United States for 
the performance of work a right to disregard and take without compensation the 
property of patentees”). 
66 Id. at 37. 
67 See Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 721. The Navy’s justification was that it had 
relied a prior case, Crozier v. Fried. Krupp AG, 224 U.S. 290 (1912), for the 
proposition that the 1910 Act insulated government contractors from suit. See 
Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 721. While Crozier involved infringement by a 
federal officer, the Court reasoned that the statute applied because “the United 
States shall be considered as having ratified the act of the officer and be treated as 
responsible pecuniarily for the consequences.” Crozier, 224 U.S. at 305. It appears 
that the Navy assumed (apparently wrongly, in light of Cramp) that this 
ratification logic would apply to contractors as well. 
68 56 CONG. REC. 6886 (1918). 
69 Id. at 7960. 
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amendment to a naval appropriations bill but defended its placement 
based on the Navy’s need for the amendment.70 A colleague quickly 
allayed his concerns: 
Mr. [William E.] Cox. Does not the gentleman feel 
that this is a law that would expedite the 
manufacture of war material? 
Mr. Padgett. That is what I am going to do. 
Mr. Cox. I think the gentleman could get it in three 
minutes.71 
As Cox predicted, the amendment was agreed to, and enacted 
into law on July 1.72 
The 1918 amendment effected a recognition of government 
patent use not just as a compensatory mechanism for patent holders 
but also as a shield enabling the government to protect certain patent 
users from injunctions and liability for patent infringement. That 
such an amendment could pass “in three minutes” when it would 
“expedite the manufacture of war material” shows that, at least in 
emergency circumstances such as war, there was no objection to the 
government limiting patent liability in the service of the public. 
C. World War II 
Government patent use would arise forcefully again at the start 
of the Second World War. Here as well the historical events show 
the unique relevance that the government use statute can play at a 
time of national emergency. In particular, the start of American entry 
into the war highlighted the immediacy and unpredictability of 
needs with respect to patents—immediacy and unpredictability that 
made § 1498 especially well-suited. 
To see how the national emergency of a world war invited 
government patent use, we begin with the pre-war conversation over 
patents, which was closely tied to the conversation over competition 
policy. Beginning in the late 1930s, concerns arose over dominant 
firms and the role of antitrust law in policing oligopoly collusion. 73 
 
70 See id. at 7961. 
71 Id. 
72 See id.; Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 114, 40 STAT. 704, 705 (1918). 
73  President Roosevelt’s 1938 anti-monopoly speech to Congress is generally 
considered to signal the opening of this period. See 1938 FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT, Recommendations to the Congress to Curb Monopolies and the 
Concentration of Economic Power, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 305, 306 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941), https://quod.
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The charge was led by Thurman Arnold, President Roosevelt’s 1938 
appointee to the post of Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice. 74  Arnold, a Yale law 
professor, vigorously pursued an agenda of breaking up industry 
cartels. 75  In his view, monopolistic and oligopolistic industries 
encouraged higher prices, constrained supply, and slowed 
innovation; the last point was exemplified by an agreement under 
which lightbulb manufacturers agreed not to invent low-wattage 
fluorescent bulbs so as not to cut into the electric utilities’ profits.76 
Patents were seen, at the time, as a primary vehicle for big-
business abuse to bolster those cartels. In a 1942 essay in the Atlantic 
Monthly, Arnold described the patent laws as the “principal smoke 
screens under which domestic and international cartels have cloaked 
their activities,” insofar as arrangements such as patent pools 
enabled firms to divide up markets, fix prices, and restrict consumer-
beneficial innovation.77 These views were not unique: Roosevelt 
himself criticized the use of patents “to create industrial 
monopolies.” 78  Roosevelt’s call to end monopoly abuse led 
Congress in 1938 to create the Temporary National Economic 
Committee to “make a full and complete study and 
investigation . . . on monopoly and the concentration of economic 
power,”79 and it is indicative of the close tie between patents and 
antitrust that the TNEC’s first formal non-introductory proceeding 
was on “the effect of the use of patents upon industry.”80 In its final 
 
lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus; see also Gene M. Gressley, Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, 
and the New Deal, 38 BUS. HIST. REV. 214, 217 (1964). 
74 See Gressley, supra note 73, at 217–18; Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust 
Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 569, 574–77 (2004). 
75  See Gressley, supra note 73, at 222–25 (describing Arnold’s approach to 
antitrust enforcement); Waller, supra note 74, at 588–94 (listing cases brought). 
In his later years, Arnold co-founded the law firm Arnold & Porter. 
76 See Thurman W. Arnold, The Abuse of Patents, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 531, 539–
40 (1942); see also id. at 536–38 (industry agreement not to develop synthetic 
rubber technology); id. at 538–39 (agreement not to improve flashlight bulbs in 
service of battery manufacturers). 
77 Id. at 536. 
78 Roosevelt, supra note 73, at 318. 
79  Joint Resolution to Create a Temporary National Economic Committee, 
ch. 456, § 2(a), 52 STAT. 705, 705 (1938). 
80  Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Before the 
Temporary National Economic Comm., 75th Cong. 253, 253 (1939–1941). Arnold 
was a member of the committee and the initial witness at the patent hearing. See 
id. at 254. 
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report in 1941, the TNEC’s lead suggestions for legislative changes 
focused on patents, with the report finding that “[n]o one can read 
the testimony developed before this committee on patents without 
coming to a realization that in many important segments of our 
economy the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been 
shamefully abused.”81 
While these concerns about patents arose independently from 
the war, Arnold and others drew an immediate connection: Patents 
enabled cartels, cartels enjoyed benefits from constraining supply 
and limiting certain forms of technological advancement, and limits 
on supply and innovation hampered the war effort.82 In March 1941 
the House Committee on Patents held a hearing to consider a bill 
that would enable the Commissioner of Patents to declare certain 
patents “necessary to the national defense” and thereby restrict 
injunctive relief on those patents “during the continuance of the 
national emergency” that the president had declared as of September 
1939. 83  There, Arnold testified on how patent arrangements 
constrained military supply, describing in particular how a deal 
between the dominant optical glass manufacturers, Bausch & Lomb 
in America and Zeiss in Germany, was creating a shortage of 
military-grade optical lenses: “our production goes down . . . and 
German production goes shooting up.”84 
At a time when American entry into the war was still 
speculative, the Patents Committee found the war–patent connection 
too speculative as well. Committee Chair Charles Kramer harshly 
 
81 INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, S. 
DOC. NO. 77-35, at 36 (1941), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001430359. 
The report specifically recommended compulsory licensing of patents, 
prohibition on use-restricted licenses, recordation of assignments, limitations on 
infringement actions, and forfeiture of patents for licensing violations. Id. at 36–
37. Well ahead of its time, the report also called for creation of a single patent 
appeals court and a patent term of twenty years from filing rather than seventeen 
years from issuance. Id. at 37. 
82 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 76, at 536–37. 
83  H.R. 3360, 77th Cong. § 1 (1941), reprinted in Preventing Publication of 
Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents: Hearings on H.R. 3359 and 
H.R. 3360 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 55 (1941), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/002009460. 
84 Preventing Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents, 
supra note 83, at 119; see also id. at 148 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant 
Att’y Gen.) (“Bausch & Lomb and Zeiss have unlawfully combined and conspired 
to suppress and limit competition in military optical instruments . . . .”). 
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criticized Arnold, questioning the accusations against Bausch & 
Lomb85 and later flatly accusing Arnold of “attacking” the patent 
system. 86  More importantly, the Committee asked military 
representatives to assess the need for the bill; the representatives 
could not identify any. Major Francis H. Vanderwerker, representing 
the War Department, supported the patent bill based on the 
possibility that “in some of the other Government departments there 
may be a need for this type of legislation,” but testified that “the War 
Department has no present need for a bill of this character.” 87 
Lieutenant Commander K.C. Caldwell noted that the Navy 
Department was conducting an investigation for problematic 
patents, and knew of “instances” where patents had hampered the 
Navy, but did not identify any specifically.88 
Skepticism about the effect of patents on national preparedness 
would quickly change once the threat of war became real on 
December 7, 1941. Just months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Senate Committee on Patents took up a wartime measure that went 
further than the House bill, giving the president power to mandate 
compulsory licensing of any patent “upon such terms and for such 
period of time as the President may prescribe,” and further power 
“to acquire patents, applications therefor, inventions, or licenses 
under any of the foregoing, by donation, purchase, taking or 
otherwise.”89 Across April–August 1942, the Committee held thirty-
three days of hearings on that bill and the patent system generally.90 
The chair of the Committee, Senator Homer T. Bone, opened the 
hearings with a strong statement on the role of government patent 
use: 
No right fashioned by law is superior to the 
public welfare or national interest. The very fact that 
men are to die to preserve our system and our way of 
life leaves only one conclusion; that is, that patent 
rights and every other form of property right must be 
subordinated to the all-out effort confronting us. It is 
 
85 See id. at 119–20. 
86 Id. at 131. 
87 See id. at 107. 
88 Id. at 109. 
89 S. 2303, 77th Cong. §§ 1(a), 2 (1942), reprinted in 1 Hearings on S. 2303 
Before the S. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 1 (1942), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/001511288. 
90 See 1 Hearing on S. 2303, supra note 89. 
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crystal clear that in this hour of trial the profit motive 
cannot be accented without inviting the destruction 
of morale. . . .  
The American patent system enters the trenches 
and goes along on the battlefield with our boys. To 
the extent that they achieve victory, to the same 
extent do we achieve safety and security for our 
social and economic system.91 
The House Patents Committee, for its part, also revisited patents 
during the exigencies of war in October 1942, as it considered an 
emergency legislative proposal from the War and Navy 
Departments.92 The statutory proposal, subsequently enacted into 
law, was intended “to aid in the successful prosecution of the War”93 
and had two primary effects. First, the statute cleared up an 
ambiguity as to whether subcontractors were covered under § 1498, 
making explicit that “a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, 
firm, or corporation” could enjoy immunity to a patent infringement 
suit based on government use. 94  Second, the statute enabled a 
government department to identify patent royalties “which are 
believed to be unreasonable or excessive” and to terminate payment 
of such royalties, fixing an alternate rate that the department head 
determined to be “fair and just, taking into account the conditions of 
wartime production.”95 The patentee in that situation was not stuck 
with the department-authorized royalty, but could bring suit in 
federal court to recover any deficiency from “fair and just 
compensation.”96 This provision responded to an observed situation 
in which the government already had a licensing arrangement in 
place with a patent holder, but the royalty rates, though reasonable 
 
91 Id. at 3–4. 
92 See Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United 
States: Hearing on H.R. 7620 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 1-4, 
31-32 (Oct. 13–15, 1942) [hereinafter Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing], https://
catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100669202. 
93 Royalty Adjustment Act, ch. 634, § 1, 56 STAT. 1013, 1013 (Oct. 31, 1942). 
94 Id. § 6, 56 STAT. at 1014. This defect in the statute had been identified in the 
1941 House hearing, for example by Commissioner of Patents Conway Coe, who 
testified that it was “open to doubt, I should say, as to whether or not a 
subcontractor falls under the provisions” of the 1910 Act. See Preventing 
Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents, supra note 83, 
at 56; see also id. at 57 (testimony of Major Vanderwerker). 
95 Royalty Adjustment Act § 1, 56 STAT. at 1013. 
96 Id. § 2, 56 STAT. at 1013. 
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in peacetime conditions, proved excessive in view of massively 
increased wartime demands;97 in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry 
Dock Co. v. Isherwood a court had held that § 1498 was inapplicable 
where the government already had a license in place.98 The new 
royalty-termination provision was carefully limited: The statute 
repeatedly called on agencies and courts to consider “the conditions 
of wartime production,”99 and included a sunset of the provision six 
months after termination of the war.100 
In stark contrast to the 1941 House committee hearing, by 1942 
the military had found numerous instances of patents interfering 
with wartime production. The Secretaries of War and the Navy 
wrote of “a number of instances” of existing patent royalty 
arrangements that “when applied to the enormous quantities needed 
for the prosecution of the war such royalty rates are regarded in 
some cases as exorbitant, excessive, and unfair.”101 Colonel Earl S. 
Patterson offered more detail on behalf of the War Department, 
testifying as to the government’s difficulties with patents on airplane 
parts, recoil springs, steel milling, and radio technology. 102  The 
Senate report on the legislation acknowledges the “cost of patents in 
war procurement” as the driving force behind the law.103 With this 
evidence and general consensus in favor, the bill swiftly passed 
Congress and was enacted into law. 
 
 
97 See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 17. 
98 See 5 F.2d 924, 934 (1925) (government use statute inapplicable where “[t]here 
was no use of a patent by the United States, without license of the owner”). 
99 Royalty Adjustment Act §§ 1–2, 56 STAT. at 1013–14. 
100 See id. § 7, 56 STAT. at 1014. 
101  Letter from Henry L. Stimson, Sec’y of War, to Speaker, House of 
Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 3, 3; 
accord Letter from James Forrestal, Acting Sec’y of the Navy, to Charles Kramer, 
House of Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 
31, 32. 
102 See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 18–19, 22. The Navy’s 
representative similarly identified examples of problematic patent licensing 
arrangements, though he did not identify specific technologies, perhaps out of 
secrecy concerns. See id. at 42–44. 
103 See ADJUSTMENT OF ROYALTIES FOR THE USE OF INVENTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. NO. 77-1640, at 2 (1942), https://books.google.
com/books?id=FNx8zn1cIfgC&pg=RA14-PA1&lpg=RA14-PA1. 
26 Yale Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 23 
 
D. Bioterrorism Threats After September 11 
Government patent use and § 1498 again took center stage 
amidst an immediate national threat following the terrorist attacks 
on the United States on September 11, 2001. 104  This historical 
episode confirmed the nondisruptive and beneficial role that § 1498 
can play and indeed suggests broad acceptance of use of § 1498 in 
times of need. 
In the two months following the September 11 attacks, 
Congress, the Bush Administration, and the public became aware of 
a likely possibility of bioterrorism, specifically in the form of 
anthrax spores being blanketed over a large population.105 At the 
time, the only approved antibiotic for treating anthrax was 
ciprofloxacin, sold under the brand name Cipro. The drug quickly 
became a household name after news anchor Tom Brokaw, himself 
the recipient of an anthrax-laden letter, ran a television segment 
ending with the line, “in Cipro we trust.” 106  Calls for a federal 
 
104 The episode described here has been covered generally a number of times. See, 
e.g., Cahoy, supra note 26, at 126–27, 171–73 (focusing on monetary 
compensation to patent holder); Duan, supra note 48, at 392–94 (national security 
implications); Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the Evolution of 
U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth 
to Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 227, 239–42 
(2005) (impact on access to AIDS treatments in Africa); Shapiro, supra note 17, 
at 39–41, 59–61 (pharmaceutical industry impact). One particularly interesting 
source describes the situation from the perspective of Bayer’s marketing and 
brand management campaign, concluding that “Bayer AG was able to be a good 
and ethical corporate citizen, placate the regulatory environment, impede entry 
for competitors, and enable the US government to provide the public with life-
saving medicines.” Hagai Gringarten, Bayer, Ethics, and the Anthrax Scare: 
Leveraging National Crisis for a Public Relations Bonanza, in ETHICAL 
BRANDING AND MARKETING: CASES AND LESSONS 69, 76 (Hagai Gringarten & 
Raúl Fernández-Calienes eds., 2019). 
105 See, e.g., Effective Responses to the Threat of Bioterrorism: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 107th Cong. 5 (Oct. 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist). 
106 Howard Kurtz, Tom Brokaw, Putting a Familiar Face on the Anthrax Story, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/
2001/10/18/tom-brokaw-putting-a-familiar-face-on-the-anthrax-story/d3b2c39b-
74b3-4e66-8357-291a3f55f4c5/; see Donald G. McNeil Jr., A Rush for Cipro, and 
the Global Ripples, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/
10/17/world/a-nation-challenged-the-drug-a-rush-for-cipro-and-the-global-
ripples.html. Other treatments may have been equally effective or possibly 
superior; the national focus on ciprofloxacin may have been a failure of messaging 
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stockpile of the drug, however, met a roadblock: the German firm 
Bayer AG held a patent on ciprofloxacin, but was unable to meet the 
government’s requisition amount for a sufficient stockpile; the 
company reported that it would require almost two years to 
manufacture enough.107 While generic manufacturers estimated that 
they could fulfill the requisition in three months, Bayer refused to 
license the patent.108 
Bayer’s patent standoff led to numerous calls to invoke § 1498 
to enable generic manufacturing of the drug. Alfred Engelberg, a 
“smart and tough-as-nails attorney” known for his role in the Hatch-
Waxman Act governing pharmaceuticals, 109  authored a 
memorandum to Senator Chuck Schumer, laying out the case for 
invoking the law and a procedure for doing so. Engelberg proposed 
that the Department of Health and Human Services provide a 
blanket government authorization for generic firms to submit federal 
 
consistency from federal health experts. See Elin Gursky et al., Anthrax 2001: 
Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response, 1 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 97, 105 (2003) (noting 
CDC’s recommendation of doxycycline rather than ciprofloxacin); UPMC CTR. 
FOR HEALTH SEC., HOW TO STEWARD MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PUBLIC 
TRUST IN AN EMERGENCY: A COMMUNICATION CASEBOOK FOR FDA AND ITS 
PUBLIC HEALTH PARTNERS 111–12 (2016), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.
org/our-work/events/2016%20FDA%20MCM/Summary. Some have used the 
availability of alternatives to suggest that the anthrax scare was not an actual 
emergency, see, e.g., Azar, supra note 32, but that would appear to be hindsight 
reasoning. 
107 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Administration Won’t Allow Generic Versions of Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/us/nation-
challenged-response-administration-won-t-allow-generic-versions-drug.html. 
108 See id. For its part, Bayer thought that its production capacity was sufficient 
for U.S. demand and questioned whether generic manufacturers could ramp up 
production so quickly, see Vanessa Fuhrmans & Ron Winslow, Bayer Works to 
Meet Soaring Cipro Demand as It Starts Campaign to Keep Patent in U.S, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003698325298160000, 
despite simultaneously “exploring whether to ask some rival drug companies to 
produce some of its antibiotic Cipro to make certain an adequate supply of the 
drug is available,” see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Bayer May Ask Its Rivals for Help 
Producing Anthrax Antibiotic Cipro, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB100334769597877200. 
109 148 CONG. REC. 15,356 (2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 32 (2001). 
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bids for procurement. 110  Just days later, the senator called for 
invocation of the law in a press conference,111 leading to national 
interest in the possibility of invoking government use of Bayer’s 
patent.112 
Engelberg’s memorandum is succinct in its analysis of § 1498. 
It simply observes “ample authority” and “overwhelming 
precedents” supporting the use of § 1498 to procure a stockpile of 
ciprofloxacin,113 quotes a few cases, and moves on to more detailed 
analysis of practical questions of regulatory approval and dismissal 
of ongoing patent infringement litigation. The memorandum does 
not discuss effects on incentives to innovate or other policy 
implications of invoking government patent use at all. 
One can imagine a variety of reasons for this summary 
treatment of § 1498, but the likeliest is the prior context. In the 
decades prior to 2001, the appropriateness of § 1498 in the context 
of federal procurement—in both emergency and non-emergency 
situations—was settled. A 1958 decision of the Comptroller General 
addressed the question of whether procurement officers should 
consider patent or patent license holdings in the course of choosing 
among bids.114 The Comptroller General’s answer was no, based on 
an understanding that any standard procurement invitation 
automatically provided the requisite authorization and consent 
under § 1498. 115  The U.S. government was, and still is, free to 
procure whatever it needs from whomever it wants without 
permission from patent holders. The Comptroller General’s decision 
 
110 Because the memorandum does not appear to be otherwise available in any 
permanent form, it is reprinted as an appendix to this Article with permission from 
Mr. Engelberg. See infra Part V. 
111 See Senator Seeks Generic Cipro, CNN MONEY (Oct. 16, 2001), https://money.
cnn.com/2001/10/16/news/generic_cipro. 
112 See Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, Drug Firm Plays Defense in Anthrax 
Scare, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/2001/10/20/drug-firm-plays-defense-in-anthrax-scare/aa3b0b39-2cb3-
4264-a360-aed1babbe8f8. A bill was introduced a few weeks later to enable the 
HHS Secretary to authorize compulsory licensing of patents during a public health 
emergency. See H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (Nov. 6, 2001); see also 
Avedissian, supra note 26, at 261–62. 
113  In a contemporaneous interview, Engelberg remarked, “[i]t boils down to 
something very simple. . . . The government has the right to procure whatever it 
needs for government purposes.” Bumiller, supra note 107. 
114 See Herbert Cooper Co., 38 Comp. Gen. 276, 277 (1958), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/003100408. 
115 Id. at 279. 
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sparked a wave of patentee-friendly legislative proposals across the 
1960s to restrict the U.S. government’s patent-blind procurement 
practice; none of the bills succeeded.116 As government procurement 
officers purchased patented technologies again and again in 
subsequent decades, case law confirmed repeatedly that § 1498 is 
automatically invoked and “the patentees’ sole remedy [is] a suit 
against the United States in the Court of Claims.”117 Given this long-
settled federal policy of using § 1498 as a routine part of government 
contracting, there was no need to treat in depth the question of using 
§ 1498 for procuring ciprofloxacin. 
In the wake of Senator Schumer’s call, Bayer rapidly moved to 
oppose any invocation of § 1498. Bayer immediately launched a 
comprehensive branding campaign (including a $3 million buy for 
full page advertising in all the major papers) promising that the 
company would “stand ready to support the United States 
government providing Cipro to meet emergency needs.”118 Bayer 
and other pharmaceutical industry representatives also lobbied 
Congress and the administration heavily “to provide reassurance of 
Bayer’s commitment.”119 Bayer also attempted to paint government 
patent use as misguided, even illegitimate, “emphasiz[ing] the 
importance of patents for research and investment.”120 Remarkably, 
the Bush Administration initially sided with Bayer on the aptness of 
§ 1498. Likely concerned about contradicting its international 
opposition to compulsory patent licensing—having rejected calls to 
invoke compulsory licensing on HIV/AIDS drug patents in the 
Global South as the landmark 2001 Doha Declaration was being 
 
116 See Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 24, at 16–27 (describing legislative 
reform proposals). 
117 TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 
Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1989); W.L. Gore 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Motorola, 
Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 771–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Decca Ltd. v. United 
States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166–67 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Rel-Reeves, Inc. v. United States, 
534 F.2d 274, 298 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Roberts v. Herbert Cooper Co., 236 F. Supp. 
428, 430 (M.D. Pa. 1959) (“No extended discussion is required on the question 
whether this action falls within the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.”). 
118 Paul Holmes, Bayer Responds to Cipro Crisis, PROVOKE (Nov. 19, 2001), 
https://www.provokemedia.com/latest/article/bayer-responds-to-cipro-crisis. 
119 See Paul Holmes, In Cipro We Trust, PROVOKE (Oct. 22, 2002), https://www.
provokemedia.com/latest/article/in-cipro-we-trust. 
120  Id.; see also Fuhrmans & Winslow, supra note 108; Gringarten, supra 
note 104, at 77–79. 
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negotiated121 —the Bush administration publicly rebuked calls to 
invoke the statute. A spokesman for HHS said that “[w]e don’t feel 
there’s a need to lift the patent at this time,”122 and HHS Secretary 
Tommy Thompson more bluntly rejected calls to “break” Bayer’s 
patent: “No. 1, it’s illegal,” the Wall Street Journal quoted him as 
saying.123 
As pressure mounted, though, the government appeared to 
change course: Secretary Thompson “threatened to bypass Bayer’s 
patent” and was “ready to ask Congress for special legislation that 
would make the government exempt from paying any damages to 
Bayer for breaking the patent.”124 Ultimately, Bayer agreed to make 
substantial concessions in negotiations with the government, 
including massive increases in manufacturing and a price cut on 
ciprofloxacin to $0.95 or less per pill, compared to $1.83 that the 
government had been paying previously and the wholesale price of 
$4.67.125 
What role § 1498 played in that ultimate deal is a Rashomon 
question with at least three possible answers. The majority view, as 
reported by almost all commentators at the time and subsequently, 
was that Thompson did indeed threaten to invoke § 1498, which 
“provide[d] the government with the necessary leverage” to force 
Bayer into a concession. 126  Indeed, Bayer’s financial statements 
 
121 See Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 1299, 1313–16 (2002). 
122 Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat 
Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2001) https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/19/
business/nation-challenged-treatment-canada-overrides-patent-for-cipro-treat-
anthrax.html. 
123 Fuhrmans, supra note 108; see also Bumiller, supra note 107.  
124  Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price for 
Anthrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/
10/25/business/nation-challenged-cost-bayer-agrees-charge-government-lower-
price-for-anthrax.html; see also Dan Ackman, A New Deal on Cipro, FORBES 
(Oct. 24, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20040907005526/http://www.
forbes.com:80/2001/10/24/1024topnews_print.html (quoting Thompson saying 
that Bayer is “going to meet our price, which is less than $1, or else we’re going 
to go to Congress and ask for some support to go in and do some other business”). 
125 See Bradsher, supra note 124. 
126 Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 303; see, e.g., Jennifer R. Andrew, Swine Flu, 
Bird Flu, Sars, Oh My—Applying the Precautionary Principle to Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under Article 31 of Trips, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
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noted that “in response to anthrax bioterror attacks in the United 
States in 2001, the U.S. and Canadian governments contemplated 
compulsory licensing of our ciprofloxacin antibiotic,” which seems 
to confirm that § 1498 did come up in Bayer’s negotiations. 127 
Thompson’s general counsel Alex Azar, on the other hand, 
contended that Thompson “never threatened to break Bayer’s 
patent,” though Thompson did advise Bayer that he was willing to 
ask Congress for “authority to procure generics” in a manner that 
was “hardly the same thing as threatening a company.” Azar 
repeated that statement at his 2018 nomination for HHS Secretary.128 
Bayer’s CEO Helge Wehmeier advanced a third view and claimed 
that Thompson had not even gone that far—according to Wehmeier, 
the negotiation over Cipro took “less than ten minutes” with no 
invocation of leverage, from § 1498 or Congress.129 
The Wehmeier and Azar views that § 1498 played no role in the 
negotiations have found little traction among historians. Even those 
critical of § 1498 generally accept that HHS invoked it or some other 
threat of government patent use en route to negotiating a favorable 
 
405, 411 (2011); Bayer’s Reasons for Not Giving Cipro Away; USA Slammed for 
“Double Standards,” PHARMA LETTER (Nov. 7, 2001), https://www.
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slammed-for-double (noting “USA’s threat to override Bayer’s patent”); Jill 
Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees to Slash Price for Cipro Drug, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 25, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003966074330899280 
(describing “high-stakes threat by Tommy Thompson . . . to break Bayer’s 
patent”); Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 53; 
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s Health: 
Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 434, 435 (2006); 
Mullenbach, supra note 104, at 227; Ho, supra note 17, at 113–14; Jennifer 
Penman & Fran Quigley, Better Late than Never: How the U.S. Government Can 
and Should Use Bayh-Dole March-in Rights to Respond to the Medicines Access 
Crisis, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171, 187–88 (2017). 
127 See Bayer AG, Registration Statement (Form 20-F), at 10 (June 24, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1144145/000115697302000306/
f00360e20vf.txt; James Love, Secretary Alex Azar’s Comment on 28 USC 1498 
Submitted for the Record of the 2018 Confirmation Hearings, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.keionline.org/28631. 
128 Azar, supra note 32; accord Nomination of Alex Michael Azar II: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 115th Cong. 119–20 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg34341/pdf/CHRG-115shrg34341.pdf 
(“Bayer was never threatened with the use of section 1498 . . . .”). 
129 Holmes, supra note 118; see also Carroll & Winslow, supra note 126. 
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deal for the government,130 and Azar’s letter appears to not to have 
been cited in any subsequent literature.131 
But Bayer’s massive public relations push, coupled with the 
Bush Administration’s initial vocal disavowal of the appropriateness 
of § 1498, seems to have had an important (and 
underacknowledged) legacy, shifting views of § 1498 from a 
routine, beneficial government power commonplace in federal 
procurement to a dramatic incursion too extreme for use even in the 
face of a credible terrorist threat—or even “illegal.” Legal observers 
at the time were left “scratching their heads” over this change.132 
This history suggests that contemporary views of § 1498 are of 
relatively recent vintage, rather than being any long-held 
understanding about the statute. The now widespread “conventional 
wisdom” that § 1498 is an “exceptional” remedy to be used only in 
a vanishingly small set of circumstances133 seems to be a product of 
just the last two out of the eleven decades the statute has been on the 
 
130  See F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and 
(Intended) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 25, 35 (2011) (discussing the “infamous” Cipro case in which “the 
Government’s threat . . . was enough to get Bayer, the patentee, to drop its price”); 
Natalie Goldberg, The Bayh-Dole Act: Is It the Proper Treatment for the Big 
Pharma Price-Gouging Epidemic?, 29 FED. CIR. B.J. 387, 414 (2020) (discussing 
arguments against compulsory licensing but observing that “the Government has 
also taken or threatened to utilize compulsory licensing . . . to address anthrax 
with Cipro”); Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza 
Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1164 (2009) (“The 
possibility that the U.S. government might issue a compulsory license under 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 . . . was very real and represented a significant departure from 
existing reluctance to exercise such power.”); see also Kirby W. Lee, Permitted 
Use of Patented Inventions in the United States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not 
Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REV. 175, 175–76, 196 (2003) (noting 
calls to “override Bayer’s patent rights” but not indicating a view as to whether 
§ 1498 was used); Jason D. Ferrone, Note, Compulsory Licensing during Public 
Health Crises: Bioterrorism’s Mark on Global Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 
26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 385, 409–10 (2002) (criticizing the 
“contemplation of compulsory licensing of ciproflaxin [sic]” as rendering “the 
U.S.-championed TRIPS Agreement less effective”). 
131 A search of the HeinOnline Law Journal Library for “Azar w/50 cipro*” and 
JSTOR for “(Azar cipro* ~50) AND patent” produced no relevant results other 
than one of our own articles. 
132 Fleischer-Black, supra note 126 (quoting a “former Reagan administration 
health official” saying, “They can’t seriously be suggesting that [the government] 
can’t buy generic Cipro”). 
133 See sources cited supra notes 2–13. 
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books. For much more of our nation’s history, § 1498 was used 
routinely, especially in times of national emergency. 
At the same time, if Engelberg and Schumer had not put § 1498 
on the table, Bayer may not have made that massive public relations 
push or been as conciliatory to the federal government as it 
eventually was. Bayer’s efforts were described as “[u]ncertain” and 
“detached” in the days before Schumer proposed invoking § 1498, 
and Canada not only threatened but actually ordered a compulsory 
license.134 The company’s media and lobbying salvo focused not 
just on reassuring the public of Bayer’s manufacturing capacities, 
but also on “the importance of the patent issue,”135 suggesting that 
Bayer’s public response was likely triggered by an expectation that 
§ 1498 might actually be used. If that was so, then the Cipro crisis 
both confirmed the statute’s vitality and simultaneously 
marginalized it in the years to come. 
E. Lessons for the COVID-19 Pandemic 
The foregoing history shows that for most of the last century, 
§ 1498 and government patent use more generally have been viewed 
as ordinary and integral policy tools with which the U.S. 
government can face emergencies of national dimension, including 
public health crises. The COVID-19 pandemic is not a war or a 
threat of terrorism, but it presents exigencies of the same ilk. 
Millions of human lives are at stake. Success depends on rapid, 
collaborative technological developments.136 A patent system that 
favors single-firm control over a technological field clashes with 
that demand. The promise of pecuniary gain from patent protection 
is of course a strong motivator for innovation in emergencies as in 
ordinary times. But this pandemic, like all other crises, may demand 
that holders of patents, as with any other roadblocks to fast 
deployment of technology, temporarily cede some pecuniary gain to 
limit a crisis of national, existential dimensions. 
In addition to this overarching point, several other lessons may 
 
134 Edmund L. Andrews, Drug Maker Seems Uncertain in Response to Cipro 
Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2001) https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/20/
business/nation-challenged-drug-maker-drug-maker-seems-uncertain-response-
cipro-frenzy.html; see Gringarten, supra note 104, at 75 (noting “two weeks of no 
decisive response to the crisis”). 
135 Holmes, supra note 118. 
136 See Matt Apuzzo & David D. Kirkpatrick, Covid-19 Changed How the World 
Does Science, Together, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/01/world/europe/coronavirus-science-research-cooperation.html. 
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be drawn about the role of government patent use in national crises. 
First, there is consistent general recognition that emergency 
conditions demand greater government involvement in directing use 
of patents. The U.S. government’s creation of the Manufacturers’ 
Aircraft Association after a threat of condemnation of patents 
exemplifies this, 137  as does the Royalty Adjustment Act, when 
Senator Bone proclaimed that the “patent system enters the trenches 
and goes along on the battlefield with our boys.”138 
In the past, even the patent holders and lawyers who typically 
opposed government patent use quickly came around to accepting it 
in emergencies. Patent attorney Lawrence Langner offered a nearly 
line-by-line rebuttal to Thurman Arnold’s 1942 patents-and-cartels 
article in the Atlantic Monthly, but Langner nevertheless agreed that 
“the grant of compulsory licenses under all patents during the war 
period . . . can be accepted in principle if it is surrounded by the 
proper safeguards and the license is limited to the war period.”139 
Similarly, at the 1942 House hearing, the American Patent Law 
Association “approve[d] Government regulation of royalties to be 
paid by the Government under patents during the emergency of war 
conditions,” 140  and the American Bar Association approved in 
principle the “compulsory granting of licenses under patents in 
furtherance of the war effort.” 141  In the 2001 anthrax scare, a 
representative for the pharmaceutical industry agreed with 
“[p]utting aside personal and company considerations in a time of 
crisis,” which included “making some compromises,” 142  and 
another industry executive found the Cipro negotiations to be 
“completely legitimate” and even would have accepted “abrogation 
of patents in the time of a true national emergency.”143 Despite the 
 
137 See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
138 1 Hearing on S. 2303, supra note 89, at 4. 
139 Lawrence Langner, We Depend on Invention: An Answer to Thurman Arnold, 
Atlantic Monthly, July 1942, reprinted in 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 545, 561 (1942). 
140  Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 52 (statement of Karl 
Fenning, American Patent Law Association). 
141 Letter from Chester L. Davis, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Charles Kramer, House of 
Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 51. 
142 Gardiner Harris, Bayer’s Cipro Will Be Profitable, Even on Discount Deal With 
U.S, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100404895
4559116840 (quoting Jeff Trewhitt on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America). 
143 Carroll & Winslow, supra note 126 (quoting Henry McKinnell, chairman and 
chief executive of Pfizer Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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post-2001 conventional wisdom that rejects use of § 1498 even in 
moments of national emergency, history demonstrates near-
universal acceptance of government patent use in furtherance of the 
national interest in times of emergency. 
Second, the driving motivation behind government patent use 
was often not lowering costs but increasing supply and accelerating 
technological development, a finding that is especially important in 
response to the dominant criticism that use of § 1498 will be 
deleterious to future innovation. 144  Patent squabbles were a key 
cause of the lack of American aviation technology (and plain lack of 
airplanes) prior to World War I,145 and in the 1930s and ’40s they 
contributed to the supply constraints that Arnold criticized.146 The 
impasse over steel milling patents, as noted in the 1942 House 
hearing, acutely affected wartime supply, since the War Department 
reported that “all mills of the noninfringing type are already loaded 
to capacity.” 147  And the threat to invoke § 1498 on Bayer’s 
ciprofloxacin patent stemmed largely from fears that Bayer could 
not manufacture enough antibiotic to counter a terrorist attack. To 
be sure, cost was often significant: The very purpose of the Royalty 
Adjustment Act was to adjust royalties to save the government 
money, 148  and Cipro tablet prices were central to the HHS 
negotiation. 149  But the possibility that a patent could cause the 
government simply to run out of materials during a crisis has 
consistently been a focus of the conversation over government 
patent use. The notion that government patent use will decrease 
innovation, then, must be tempered by historical cases of 
government patent use increasing both production and innovation 
by overcoming patent impasses. 
Third, national need for patented technologies may turn out to 
be highly unpredictable in an emergency situation. Just months 
before the United States entered World War II, neither Congress nor 
the military departments could predict what patents would pose 
 
144 Nearly all of the criticisms of § 1498 described supra notes 2–13 rely on this 
proposition in some form. 
145 See supra note 53. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 77–84. 
147 See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 19. 
148 See id. at 21 (“The War Department is today fully cognizant of the fact that 
patent cost in war procurement is a vital problem.”). 
149 See Bradsher, supra note 124. 
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issues or if patents would indeed pose issues at all.150 As late as 
August 1942, Arnold and his Department of Justice colleague 
Francis M. Shea hypothesized that the superiority of magnesium 
over steel would render the former metal of greater importance to 
the war effort. 151  By October 1942, though, the military had 
identified specific patents of concern and identified patents on steel 
as the actual holdup. 152  Pre-war hypothesizing over government 
patent use in the abstract was no substitute for wartime knowledge 
of concrete public needs. Once those exact needs were identified, 
expediency was of the greatest concern: Between introduction of the 
Royalty Adjustment Act in Congress and its enactment into law, a 
single month elapsed.153 
Fourth, in times of crisis the U.S. government and the public 
have historically been willing to go far beyond § 1498 with respect 
to government patent use. Under § 1498, the government effectively 
receives a nonexclusive license to use a patented invention on its 
own behalf at a judicially-set compensation rate; the patentee’s other 
rights and exclusivities are unaffected. 154  Contrast this with the 
World War I authorization to condemn aviation patents,155 the World 
War II bill authorizing compulsory licensing at a presidentially set 
royalty rate, 156  the Royalty Adjustment Act that undid existing 
government patent licenses, and Secretary Thompson’s threat that 
he would go to Congress to “make the government exempt from 
paying any damages to Bayer.” 157  Compared to these far more 
dramatic actions and threats, § 1498 is relatively tame, suggesting a 
normative reason in favor of applying the statute more often. To the 
extent that § 1498 is off the table in the run-up to an emergency, as 
many critics of the statute would like it to be, lawmakers may be 
pressured or compelled during the emergency to act more 
 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 82–88. 
151  See Preventing Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on 
Patents, supra note 83, at 140–41; Arnold, supra note 76, at 542–43. 
152 See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 19. 
153 H.R. 7620 was introduced on September 30, 1942, and enacted on October 31. 
See 88 CONG. REC. 7661 (1942); Royalty Adjustment Act, ch. 634, 56 STAT. 1013, 
1015 (Oct. 31, 1942). 
154 See § 1498(a); see also infra Part II.D. 
155 See Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 180, 39 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1917). 
156  See H.R. 3360, 77th Cong. § 1 (Feb. 17, 1941), reprinted in Preventing 
Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents, supra note 83, 
at 55. 
157 Bradsher, supra note 124. 
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aggressively toward patents than § 1498 permits. 
Finally, § 1498 enhances the government’s bargaining power; 
where it is absent patentees have proven willing to hold out even in 
times of crisis.158 Even after the airplane manufacturers had formed 
the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association to head off condemnation 
of their patents, they still demanded a royalty in excess of what the 
government found feasible.159 In view of the Newport News decision 
that § 1498 could not affect preexisting government patent licenses 
even to adjust for increased wartime production needs,160 the Navy 
Department testified to Congress that most patent owners had 
“patriotically agreed to take a greatly reduced royalty,” but at least 
some “owners of inventions have insisted on receiving the full 
royalty even though unreasonable.” 161  In other words, where 
government patent use is not available as a backstop, patent owners 
may not act in the nation’s best interests. By contrast, after Senator 
Schumer and (probably) HHS proposed use of § 1498 in 2001, 
Bayer ceded some profits and negotiated a deal with the U.S. 
government. Indeed, starting in 2005, Roche, Inc. agreed to 
sublicense the patent on Tamiflu to at least nineteen contractors and 
made numerous pricing concessions to alleviate potential shortages 
of the influenza treatment in preparation for a possible avian flu 
pandemic; while not loudly proclaimed, § 1498 “may have played a 
role in persuading Roche to enter the sublicensing agreements.”162 
This quiet role of § 1498 as a motivator for negotiation and 
“corporate patriotism” is frequently missed. Epstein suggested in the 
wake of the Cipro deal that the government’s monopsony buyer 
status was leverage enough to procure a price cut without resorting 
 
158  See also Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 303 (§ 1498 “provides the 
government with the necessary leverage to obtain major price reductions”). This 
is consistent with Lemley’s finding that most government patent use cases are 
settled in the shadow of § 1498 rather than resolved judicially. See Mark A. 
Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 10 CAL. L. REV. 463, 473 (2012). 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 55–61. 
160 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924, 
934 (4th Cir. 1925). 
161 Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 41 (statement of Ralph L. 
Chappell). 
162  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. RL33159, INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL 
DRUGS AND PATENT LAW ISSUES 9 (2007), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/RL33159.html. 
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to § 1498,163 but neither the airplane manufacturing firms in the 
1910s nor the patent licensor holdouts in 1942 were swayed by that 
status alone—nor was Bayer, until the prospect of § 1498 was 
concrete. Others have suggested that some drug companies’ 
professed willingness to negotiate with the United States and other 
governments during the COVID-19 pandemic refutes the need to 
use § 1498.164 But this view ignores the fact that such willingness to 
negotiate is likely a response to the possibility of § 1498 being used 
otherwise. The oft-repeated sentiment that patents have not been a 
barrier to the COVID-19 response 165  may be not so much an 
 
163 See Richard A. Epstein, Respect Bayer’s Patent, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2001), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122660341966225183 (“It is equally clear that 
wholly without resorting to this threat he had powerful leverage in price 
negotiations with Bayer, just as any other volume purchaser whom a monopolist 
can cheaply provide.”). 
164 See, e.g., Valerie Bauman, States Demanding Gilead Drug Seizure Misread 
Law, Attorneys Say, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/health-law-and-business/states-demanding-gilead-drug-seizure-misread-
law-attorneys-say (disputing call for compulsory patent licensing on remdesivir 
because its manufacturer “Gilead has already voluntarily licensed the drug to 
generic drugmakers in Egypt, India, and Pakistan to boost global supply”). Gilead 
and other firms have indeed made various pledges of reduced or free patent 
licensing. See, e.g., Darrell Etherington, Medtronic Is Sharing Its Portable 
Ventilator Design Specifications and Code for Free to All, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 
30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/30/medtronic-is-sharing-its-portable-
ventilator-design-specifications-and-code-for-free-to-all; Diane Peters & Eric 
Steuer, Tech Giants Join the CC-Supported Open COVID Pledge, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (Apr. 20, 2020), https://creativecommons.org/2020/04/20/tech-giants-
join-the-cc-supported-open-covid-pledge. 
165 See, e.g., Richard Lloyd, No Evidence That Patents Are Acting as a Barrier to 
Covid Research, Says Bristol Myers IP Head, IAM (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.
iam-media.com/coronavirus/bristol-myers-squibbs-henry-hadad-no-evidence-
patents-are-acting-barrier-covid-research (interviewing Henry Hadad, deputy 
general counsel of Bristol Myers Squibb) (“I have yet to hear one example of a 
patent being enforced or litigation being threatened in a way that has been a barrier 
to research with respect to covid.”); Nicholson Price et al., Are COVID-19 Vaccine 
Advance Purchases a Form of Vaccine Nationalism, an Effective Spur to 
Innovation, or Something in Between?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/08/are-covid-19-vaccine-advance-
purchases.html (“[T]here’s no evidence that IP is being used to frustrate 
competition or keep early-stage [COVID-19 vaccines] developers off the market. 
Nor would patents likely be used to restrict the supply of any successful 
vaccine.”). This view is questionable, given that at least one patent has already 
been asserted against a COVID-19 testing service. See Mike Masnick, SoftBank 
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argument against § 1498 as exemplification of the statute’s long 
shadow. 
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S INNOVATION POLICY TOOLBOX 
As seen above, government patent use has evolved across 
history, as reflected in the legislative expansions of § 1498 and 
policy debates in times of national emergency. That history brings 
us to the law of government patent use in place today. This Part 
describes § 1498 in its current formulation, and in particular places 
the statute in the context of related innovation policy tools that have 
featured prominently in the COVID-19 dialogue: research grants, 
prizes, and patent buyouts.166 All of these policy tools variously 
incentivize the invention and development of new innovations or 
allocate existing and prospective innovations to those who need or 
want them, 167  so the overview presented in this Part tees up a 
comparison of their relative merits in Part III. 
A. Grants 
One straightforward and hugely important means of 
incentivizing innovation is directly funding innovators’ research and 
development work. The U.S. government provides over $100 billion 
 
Owned Patent Troll, Using Monkey Selfie Law Firm, Sues to Block Covid-19 




166  See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1719–24 (2008). Many other policy tools 
can incentivize new innovations and allocate existing ones; these include tax 
incentives for R&D and outright government seizure of patents, patented 
products, and the manufacturers themselves. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 321 
(2013), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HemelOuellette.
pdf (explaining U.S. government tax incentives, such as tax credits and 
deductions); discussion of patent condemnation infra notes 216–218 and 
accompanying text. 
167 For more on the dual roles of intellectual property as innovation incentive and 
allocation mechanism, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 547 (2019), https://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss3/1. See also James Love & Tim 
Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 155 (2009) (exploring the possibility of a hybrid patent-and-prize 
system that would “de-link” the innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms 
of the patent system); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005) (unpublished working paper), http://
www.keionline.org/misc-docs/drugprizes.pdf (same). 
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per year in direct grants to federal laboratories, private and public 
universities, private companies, and other entities.168 Grantmaking 
is not monolithic; grants to recipients outside the government can, 
for example, be conditioned on commitments to study a particular 
research problem or to price affordably any inventions that result 
from government-funded research. As Price has shown, the grant 
system provides U.S. government policymakers with rich and 
flexible tools to incentivize and disseminate innovation.169 
Grant-making has been a primary—perhaps the primary—
innovation policy tool used by the U.S. government in its COVID-
19 response. For example, a single COVID-19 bill, the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, allocated over $3 
billion to the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority (BARDA) and over $700 million to the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to be spent on research 
and development of COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and 
diagnostics, mostly through grants to entities outside the U.S. 
government. 170  As of writing, Congress has allocated the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ “Operation Warp 
Speed” a staggering total of almost $10 billion in funding for 
grantmaking for and procurement of a COVID-19 vaccine.171 
B. Prizes 
Innovation prizes are an alternative policy tool that the U.S. 
government could use—and already does use, to a limited 
 
168 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 166, at 320 (overview of grants); MATT 
HOURIHAN & DAVID PARKES, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
FEDERAL R&D BUDGET TRENDS: A SHORT SUMMARY 4 (2019), https://www.aaas.
org/sites/default/files/2019-01/AAAS%20R%26D%20Primer%202019.pdf 
(showing U.S. government spending on R&D in excess of $100 billion every year 
since the early 1980s). 
169 W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 31 (2019); see also 
Danielle Conway-Jones, Research and Development Deliverables Under 
Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: 
University Roles, Government Responsibilities and Contractor Rights, 9 
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 181 (2004). 
170 Kellie Moss et al., The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act: 
Summary of Key Health Provisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-coronavirus-aid-relief-and-
economic-security-act-summary-of-key-health-provisions. 
171 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Explaining 
Operation Warp Speed (June 15, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/
06/16/fact-sheet-explaining-operation-warp-speed.html. 
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extent172 —to incentivize the creation of new technologies while 
simultaneously ensuring widespread access to those technologies. In 
a classic prize system, the government promises payment of some 
set amount of money—$1 billion, say—to the first entity to create 
some desired innovation, such as a cold fusion reactor or a 
rechargeable battery manufactured without heavy metals. As a 
condition of claiming the prize, the winner’s innovation is placed in 
the public domain, permitting many competing manufacturers to 
make and sell the innovation at near marginal cost and thereby 
ensuring widespread access. Some notable legal scholars and 
economists have endorsed prizes as a useful complement or 
alternative to patents, including Abramowicz173 and Stiglitz.174 
In the COVID-19 pandemic, several scholars and other experts 
have suggested that the U.S. government use prizes to incentivize 
development of the most critically needed technologies, first and 
foremost a vaccine. 175  In March of 2020, Hemel and Ouellette 
notably proposed a prize for a working COVID-19 vaccine of $500 
per person—approximately $165 billion, assuming all Americans 
receive it—to “ensure that a vaccine would be cheap—or even free” 
to patients “while giving the private sector powerful incentives to 
pour resources into vaccine research.”176 
C. Patent Buyouts 
Patent buyouts enable expanded access to already-patented 
technologies. In a classic patent buyout—as in Kremer’s proposal—
a government purchases a patent from a private patent holder and 
 
172 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 166, at 317 (describing the U.S. government’s 
limited use of innovation prizes); MARCY E. GALLO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
REPORT NO. R45271, FEDERAL PRIZE COMPETITIONS (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R45271.pdf (same). 
173 Michael B. Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 114 
(2003). 
174  Joseph Stiglitz, Prizes, Not Patents, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2007,), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/prizes--not-patents. 
175 See, e.g., Charles Duan, Coronavirus Reveals Holes in American Innovation 
Policy—and How to Fix Them, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/coronavirus-reveals-holes-in-american-
innovation-policy-and-how-to-fix-them; Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, We 
Need a Coronavirus Vaccine. Patents Might Slow the Process, NAT’L INT. (Apr. 
7, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/we-need-coronavirus-vaccine-
patents-might-slow-process-141627. 
176 Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus Vaccine, Fast? Here’s a 
Solution, TIME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5795013/coronavirus-vaccine-
prize-challenge. 
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then commits to license the patent non-exclusively for little or 
nothing, or disclaims the patent altogether and thereby places the 
patented invention in the public domain. 177  In so doing, the 
government opens the floodgates for all to make, use, and sell the 
patented invention, thereby driving down its cost to near marginal 
cost. In order for the patent holder to consent to the buyout, the 
purchase price of the buyout must be at or above the patent holder’s 
expected profits from the patent.178 
Despite their conceptual appeal and perennial attention in the 
scholarly literature, true patent buyouts seem rare, or perhaps 
altogether extinct. The U.S. government does not appear to have 
purchased and taken title to any privately held patent in the last sixty 
years.179 
Nevertheless, some commentators have proposed patent 
buyouts as a COVID-19 response to ensure widespread access to 
therapeutics while preserving traditional patent incentives. Hemel 
 
177  Michael R. Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1138 (1998) (explaining how the government 
of France purchased the patent for Daguerreotype photography in 1839 and then 
placed it in the public domain). 
178 See id. (proposing that the government “buy out patents at [their] private value 
times a fixed markup that would roughly cover the difference between the social 
and private values of inventions”). 
179 Michael Kremer’s influential 1998 paper discusses nineteenth century patent 
buyouts in France, England, and several U.S. states, but it provides no modern 
example of a U.S. government patent buyout. Id. at 1144. Kremer points out that 
“[t]he United States Patent Compensation Board compensates developers of 
innovations of military value relating to atomic energy,” but does not provide 
examples. Id. at 1145. The most recent example we have been able to find of the 
U.S. government purchasing or otherwise compensating an inventor for an atomic 
energy patent is in 1953, when the Atomic Energy Commission purchased U.S. 
Patent No. 2,206,634, entitled “Process for the production of radioactive 
substances,” from a group of inventors that included Enrico Fermi. See Simon 
Turchetti, “For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay”: Enrico Fermi’s Patent and the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Program, 1938–1953, 97 ISIS 1, 2 (2006). Hemel and Ouellette 
describe the U.S. government’s Medicaid program as “[t]he closest thing to a 
large-scale patent buyout scheme in the United States.” Hemel & Ouellette, supra 
note 167, at 594. But Medicaid and other federal programs under which the U.S. 
government purchases authorized copies of prescription drugs and medical 
devices at full or near-full price differ significantly from true patent buyouts, not 
least because the government’s purchases of patented products under Medicaid 
transfer no patent rights to the government and do not empower the government 
to manufacture those products itself, nor to authorize competitor manufacturers to 
do so. 
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and Ouellette suggest that the United States and others could “offer 
strong incentives to drugmakers while ensuring affordability by 
committing to patent buyouts for effective treatments.”180 Kominers 
has similarly proposed that the U.S. government “could purchase 
medical-device patents and then place them in the public domain,” 
which would “free manufacturers—with coordination from 
government—to produce those devices and meet soaring demand” 
during the COVID-19 crisis.181 
D. Government Patent Use Under Section 1498 
Today’s government patent use statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498(a), opens as follows: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by 
a patent of the United States is used or manufactured 
by or for the United States without license of the 
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture 
the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action 
against the United States in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable 
and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture.182 
The statute goes on to make clear, based on the World War II 
amendments noted earlier, 183  that federal contractors, 
subcontractors, and other authorized agents are immune to 
infringement liability where they have “authorization and consent of 
the Government.”184 
The nature of “reasonable and entire compensation” under the 
statute is worth some discussion. 185  The Supreme Court has 
historically emphasized the “comprehensive character of the remedy 
provided” under the law. 186  Courts have interpreted the statute 
 
180 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 31. 
181 Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Protection Should Take a Backseat in a Crisis, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2020-03-26/patent-protection-should-take-backseat-in-coronavirus-crisis. 
182 § 1498(a). 
183 See supra note 94. 
184 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
185  For more comprehensive discussions of compensation under § 1498, see 
generally Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 310; Cahoy 2011, supra note 2; Cahoy 
2002, supra note 26. 
186 Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343 (1928). 
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generally to call for a reasonable royalty rather than other 
remedies.187 Lost profits may be available “only after the strictest 
proof that the patentee would actually have earned and retained 
those sums in its sales to the Government”; 188  value to the 
government is rarely the standard.189 Any royalty is premised upon 
a nonexclusive license adequate to cover the goods and services 
procured or authorized by the government, rather than the value of 
an exclusive license or total appropriation of the patent.190 
Belying the perception that government patent use is “stealing,” 
“expropriation,” a “nuclear option,” or the like,191 surveys of past 
§ 1498 cases confirm that reasonable royalty awards under § 1498 
are “generally provided at a market rate,”192 such that the reasonable 
royalty paid for government patent use is similar to compensation 
for private infringement calculated using the standard factors of 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 193  Royalty awards 
under § 1498 may, and often do, account for a patent holder’s risk-
 
187 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1169 & n.22 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing 
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977)); Brennan et al., 
supra note 11, at 313; Cahoy, supra note 26, at 156–57; Mitchell, supra note 27, 
at 542–43. 
188 Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 349; accord Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 
958, 970–71 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 311 (“ ‘[L]ost 
profits’ are strongly disfavored, and perhaps entirely unavailable, under § 1498.”); 
Cahoy, supra note 26, at 155 (“[L]ost profits have apparently been out of reach to 
plaintiffs in § 1498 actions since the mid-1930s.”). 
189 See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 971; Decca, 640 F.2d at 1167 n.20. 
190 See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(describing government as “a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee”). 
191 See supra notes 2–13. 
192 Cahoy, supra note 2, at 491; see also Bendix Corp. v. United States, 676 F.2d 
606, 609 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Federal Circuit’s predecessor court describing “awards 
against the private infringer, and against the government taker,” as “similar”); 7 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (2020) (describing § 1498 
compensation as “construed and applied in a fashion similar to the measure of 
compensatory damages in suits against infringers other than the United States”); 
Laura Burson et al., Suing for Patent Infringement if the Government Takes Your 
Intellectual Property During the COVID-19 Pandemic, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 24, 
2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/24/suing-patent-infringement-
government-takes-intellectual-property-covid-19-pandemic/id=120922 (noting 
the use of “hypothetical negotiation” under Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood Corp. to assess § 1498 damages). 
193 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 446 F.2d 
295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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adjusted investments in research and development. 194  In other 
words, government patent use will generally not “represent a 
discount from the market price of the licensed good” unless the 
patentee’s expectations are excessive;195 the public value of § 1498 
may instead be accuracy and objectivity of compensation. As a 
result, Cahoy observes that, rather than being “disruptive,” 
government patent use and § 1498 “can fit within the broader goals 
of the intellectual property system, encouraging fair and intelligent 
pricing, and supporting access.”196 Government patent use does not 
dramatically undercompensate patent holders and, as such, need not 
upset patent holders’ investments or incentives to innovate (although 
the timing of compensation under § 1498 is delayed, as we discuss 
below197). 
One way of understanding the operation of § 1498 is through 
the distinction between “property rules,” where the price of an 
entitlement is subjectively set by the holder, and “liability rules,” 
where the price is set by an independent adjudicator.198 Patents are 
 
194 See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 350 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (noting 
relevance of patentee “which took the risks and bore the expense of developing 
the [invention] and creating a market for them”); Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 
314. Numerous scholars have suggested that royalties of 10% or less of the 
infringers’ sales are common in § 1498 cases, and that royalties of over 10% are 
rare. See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 310; Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra 
note 15, at 793 (“Royalties are commonly set at 10 percent of sales or less” in 
§ 1498 cases involving the Department of Defense); Richard J. McGrath, The 
Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United States Government or Its Contractors, 
18 AIPLA Q.J. 349, 352 (1991) (“Historically, the highest royalty rate that the 
United States Claims Court has awarded is 10%.”); see also JAMES LOVE, WHO, 
REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 18 (2005), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/
69199 (same). While we are not aware of a court-ordered royalty under § 1498 of 
more than 10% of the revenues associated with the government’s use—e.g., the 
sales revenues of a contractor authorized under § 1498—reasonable royalties 
calculated under the Georgia-Pacific factors in routine patent infringement suits 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 sometimes exceed 10%. See 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 
ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST §§ 30:107–30:110 (2019) (documenting reasonable 
royalties in recent § 271 cases of greater than 10% of the infringers’ sales 
revenues, e.g., 14.5%, 17.5%, and 32%). It seems to us that the same may be true 
in future litigation under § 1498. 
195 Cahoy, supra note 2, at 494. 
196 Id. 
197 See infra Part III.A.3. 
198 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
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ordinarily treated under a property rule, insofar as courts and 
administrative tribunals may issue injunctions that prevent would-
be infringers from using a patented invention without the voluntary 
consent of the patent holder.199 While the desirability of applying a 
property rule to patents is a topic of much debate,200 it has been long 
recognized that injunctive relief is inappropriate where access to a 
patented invention is necessary for public health or safety. 201 
Section 1498 can thus be understood to give the U.S. government 
discretion to waive the property rule remedy of patent injunctions in 
appropriate situations. 
Government patent use under § 1498 should be distinguished 
from several other forms of public and private ordering of patent 
interests. First, it is entirely distinct from arrangements involving so-
called “FRAND” licenses. The latter concept relates to patent-
holder obligations to license certain patents on “Fair, Reasonable, 
and Non-Discriminatory” terms, arising either out of a private 
commitment to do so202 or to satisfy a government regulation or 
 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 
(1972). 
199 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (as amended); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 283. In private patent infringement disputes, liability rather than property rules 
often prevail, as courts frequently decline to order injunctive relief under the 
Supreme Court’s test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC. See 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006). See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation 
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1984 (2016). Such 
circumstances are somewhat less common with respect to pharmaceutical patents, 
because courts tend to award injunctions to bona fide operating manufacturers. 
See id. at 1988–90. 
200 See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the 
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual 
Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 255–56 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. 
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
783, 784 (2007); Doug Lichtman, Patient Patents: Can Certain Types of Patent 
Litigation Be Beneficially Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2017); Carl Shapiro, 
Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 308 
(2010); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 
278 (2011). See generally Seaman, supra note 199, at 1956–58 & nn.33–49 (citing 
sources and reviewing arguments). 
201 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (citing examples); Seaman, supra note 199, at 1962, 1991. 
202  Patent owners may commit to FRAND licensing in order to have their 
technologies adopted into privately developed technical standards such as Wi-Fi 
or mobile communications systems. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief 
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benefit condition.203 While FRAND arrangements also overcome 
the property rule of patent remedies and indeed often enlist a court 
to do so, the computation of such royalties is idiosyncratic and 
subject to rules different from the traditional Georgia-Pacific 
factors.204 
Additionally, government patent use under § 1498 is distinct 
from the Defense Production Act (DPA).205 The DPA, enacted at the 
start of the Korean War206 and since expanded,207 permits the U.S. 
government to take effective control of manufacturing when doing 
so is “necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense,”208 
broadly defined.209 The DPA also includes a variety of powers “to 
help ensure that the nation has an adequate supply of, or the ability 
to produce, essential materials and goods necessary for the national 
defense.”210 This makes the DPA complementary to § 1498, in that 
 
History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust 
Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42 (2015); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683 (2020); Mark A. 
Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 
CORNELL L. REV. 607, 610 (2019). 
203 See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and 
the ONC Health IT Certification Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 25642, 25960–61 (May 
1, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 171.303) (requiring licensing of certain 
electronic health record technology on “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory” 
terms); AT&T Commc’ns of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atl.-Va., Inc., 197 F.3d 663, 670–71 
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding telecommunications statute requiring “access to network 
elements” on terms that are “reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” 47 U.S.C. § 251, 
to require provider “to renegotiate its existing intellectual property licenses”); 
Narechania, supra note 1, at 1517–23. 
204 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–32 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
205 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568. 
206 Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 STAT. 798. 
207 See J. Michael Littlejohn, Using All the King’s Horses for Homeland Security: 
Implementing the Defense Production Act for Disaster Relief and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2006) (tracing gradual 
expansion of the DPA). 
208 50 U.S.C. § 4511(a). 
209 § 4552(14) (defining “national defense” to encompass “programs for military 
and energy production or construction, military or critical infrastructure assistance 
to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and any directly 
related activity”). 
210 MICHAEL H. CECIRE & HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 
R43767, THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 9, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf; 
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the former can force a firm to engage in certain manufacturing, 
while the latter removes patent-infringement barriers to that 
manufacturing.211 But the U.S. government can use patents under 
§ 1498 without invoking the DPA, and government patent use is, in 
many ways, a milder intervention than coordinated production under 
the DPA. For example, if a manufacturer refuses to sell a particular 
patented product to the U.S. government, the government might 
choose to procure the product from a competitor authorized under 
§ 1498, or it might instead choose to invoke the DPA and compel the 
manufacturer’s own factories to supply the government. The 
government patent use option would protect the manufacturer’s 
existing contracts and business relationships; the DPA option would 
upend them. 
Finally, § 1498 must be distinguished from eminent domain, or 
takings, under the Fifth Amendment. The Federal Circuit recently 
reaffirmed this distinction in Golden v. United States, holding that 
“a patent owner may not pursue an infringement action as a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment,” because patent infringement actions 
against the U.S. government “sound in tort and are to be pursued 
exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.” 212  The court deemed this 
 
see also James A. Durham, The Present Status of Price Control Authority, 52 
COLUM. L. REV. 868 (1952); Littlejohn, supra note 207; Note, The Defense 
Production Act: Choice as to Allocations, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 350 (1951). 
211  See Rick Longton et al., Intellectual Property Considerations for 
Manufacturers Contracted Under the Defense Production Act, COVINGTON & 
BURLING LLP 2 (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/
insights/2020/04/intellectual-property-considerations-for-manufacturers-
contracted-under-the-defense-production-act. The DPA alone likely cannot affect 
patents. See Defense Production Act of 1950: Hearing on H.R. 9176 Before the H. 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong. 35 (July 24–25, 1950), https://
catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/102432877 (testimony of Mr. Kendall, National 
Security Resources Board). 
212 955 F.3d 981, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2020). While Golden did not answer the 
question of whether application of § 1498 itself is an eminent domain action, the 
opinion is irreconcilable with that view in describing government patent use as 
sounding in tort. Golden further repeatedly approves of Zoltek I, which squarely 
rejected § 1498 being an eminent domain statute. See Zoltek I, 442 F.3d 1345, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Had Congress intended to clarify the 
dimensions of the patent rights as property interests under the Fifth Amendment, 
there would have been no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity 
waiver [of the 1910 Act].”), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), 
cited with approval in Golden, 955 F.3d at 987-88. The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Golden in December 2020. Golden v. United States, No. 20-5532, 
2020 WL 7132384 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020). 
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holding “mandate[d]” by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schillinger that patent infringement could not be remedied as a 
taking. 213  Eminent domain may serve as a helpful analogy for 
government patent use, but it is a distinct act.214 Indeed, outright 
government condemnation of patents was historically contemplated 
with regard to aviation technology215 and commentators have called 
for the government to invoke eminent domain on patents,216 but 
condemnation has distinctly different consequences from 
government patent use: In the former case but not the latter, the 
owner of the condemned patent loses the ability to license the patent 
to third parties and indeed may lose the ability to practice the 
invention at all.217 To be sure, a substantial line of Supreme Court 
and other cases describe § 1498 in terms of eminent domain,218 as 
do multiple commentators.219 But, as Masur and Mortara observe 
from review of those § 1498 cases, those judicial statements have 
consistently been in dicta with “no effect whatsoever on the success 
or failure of the claims”; in other words, government patent use “is 
described in terms of eminent domain or takings when that 
characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at hand.”220 
 
213 Golden, 955 F.3d at 988. 
214 See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 307–09. 
215 See supra notes 55–61. 
216 See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 126, at 435; Mitchell, supra note 27, 
at 548–49 (distinguishing takings of patents from § 1498); cf. Fran Quigley, Tell 
Me How It Ends: The Path to Nationalizing the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 755, 804-05 (2020) (suggesting that seizure of patents may 
not require significant Fifth Amendment compensation). 
217  As one of us has noted, the government could use intellectual property 
condemnation as a mechanism for suppressing information, with obvious and 
troubling consequences for speech interests. See Charles Duan, Copyright Law 
Could Stop 3-D Printed Guns. Should It?, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/copyright-law-could-stop-3-d-printed-guns-should-it. 
Government patent use cannot effect this result. 
218 See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882); Leesona Corp. v. 
United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964–65 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Contra De Graffenried v. 
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 387 (1993) (“[T]he far more compelling argument 
is that Section 1498(a) actions are not ‘eminent domain proceedings’ . . . .”); 
Charles Pfizer & Co., 39 Comp. Gen. 760, 763 (1960) (“Clearly, [the 1910] act is 
an amendment to the patent laws and restricts the rights of a patentee by providing 
for government use of patents . . . .”). 
219 See sources cited supra note 20. 
220  Masur & Mortara, supra note 20, at 990–92. James provides a striking 
example: The Court digresses for a page and a half on the takings nature of 
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III. SECTION 1498 AS POLICY TOOL IN A NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 
The history and nature of § 1498 suggest a useful framework 
for weighing the role of government patent use, in national 
emergencies and otherwise. In particular, we discern four generally 
underappreciated features of § 1498: (1) speed, (2) flexibility, (3) ex 
post determination of the appropriate compensation (occurring not 
only after not only invention but after the government’s use), and (4) 
determination of that compensation by an impartial adjudicator. The 
salience of these four factors to any particular situation, in our view, 
is indicative of whether § 1498 will likely be advantageous in that 
situation over other tools such as patent buyouts for ensuring access 
to critical technologies. That is not to say that § 1498 is always 
preferable to, or should be used to the exclusion of other innovation 
policy tools; it is instead a complement that can be freely mixed and 
matched with the others when appropriate.221 
These features of § 1498 do not depend on the presence of a 
national emergency, and we do not find the existence of emergency 
conditions to be a prerequisite to use of § 1498. Besides the obvious 
difficulties in defining national emergencies, 222  the identified 
advantages of § 1498 can be relevant to plainly non-emergency 
situations. The flexibility of government patent use, for example, 
can be highly relevant to the operations of financial markets.223 
Furthermore, we intend this analysis to be one of sufficiency rather 
than necessity: Where none of these advantages is especially salient, 
use of § 1498 may still be warranted, but that use could be justified 
on other factors outside of the scope of the present analysis, such as 
deadweight loss from monopoly pricing224 or human rights.225 
 
government patent use, only to then flatly note that “the conclusion which we 
have reached in this case does not render it necessary to decide this question.” 104 
U.S. at 357–59. 
221 For an analysis of intellectual property’s two distinct elements—innovation 
incentive and allocation mechanism—and the ways in which patent-based 
innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms can be mixed and matched with 
other incentives and mechanisms, such as tax credits and prizes, see Hemel & 
Ouellette 2019, supra note 167, at 563–74. 
222 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646–47 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (describing “[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives” 
such as “emergency,” “without fixed or ascertainable meanings”). 
223 See infra note 232 (describing use of § 1498 for check clearing transactions). 
224 See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 317–18. 
225 See Cahoy, supra note 2, at 500–07. 
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That these features have indeed been salient in past national 
crises shows that § 1498 will continue to be an advantageous and 
sometimes indispensable policy tool. Indeed, as we describe below, 
the advantages of § 1498 are highly relevant to COVID-19 
technologies, including diagnostic tests, ventilators, and medical 
treatments.226 To highlight these advantages and their relevance, we 
develop a roadmap for one use case today: ensuring adequate and 
affordable access to remdesivir, an antiviral drug that has shown 
promise as a treatment for COVID-19. Our roadmap illuminates the 
four underappreciated features of § 1498 and highlights how 
government patent use can protect public health, patent holders, and 
the public purse. 
A. Four Key Features of Government Patent Use in a 
National Emergency 
1. Speed 
Government patent use is quick—a feature particularly valuable 
in a national emergency. The U.S. government can exercise its 
powers under § 1498 instantly, without any procedure—not even 
notice to the holder of patent rights in the product being used or 
manufactured by the government.227 (In this regard, “election” or 
“invocation” of government patent use are perhaps the wrong terms 
to use—the U.S. government’s power to use privately held patents 
is always on, by default.228) 
 
226 A comment that applies to all of Section IV: this Article was researched and 
written in the spring and summer of 2020 and edited in the fall of 2020. The 
COVID-19 pandemic is fast-changing, but we have done our best to ensure that 
the facts herein were accurate as of mid-September 2020. 
227  According to the 1995 Resource Book published by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and International Centre on 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) on the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), “under U.S. law, the government 
may use any patented invention (or authorize its contractor to use such invention) 
without providing prior notification to the patent holder, subject only to the patent 
holder’s right to initiate a proceeding before the Court of Claims for 
compensation.” UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. & INT’L CTR. 
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005); see also Cahoy, supra note 2, at 494 (observing that 
“the U.S. essentially engages in” “compulsory licensing without negotiation”). 
228 In this respect, the U.S. government’s patent rights under § 1498 differ from—
and are more powerful and versatile than—its march-in rights under the Bayh–
Dole Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a). To exercise march-in rights and issue a 
compulsory license on a Bayh–Dole patent, a federal agency must first make a 
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Indeed, the U.S. government can exercise its rights under 
§ 1498 unwittingly—for example, if it unknowingly purchases 
products from a supplier that turn out to be covered by another 
party’s patents. 229  Section 1498 even arguably enables the 
government to absolve third parties of their liability for past acts of 
infringement: § 1498 applies to acts performed (1) “by or for” the 
government and (2) with the government’s “authorization or 
consent.”230 In Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Circuit recognized that private activity 
that confers “significant benefits to the United States” satisfies the 
“by and for” the government prong of the test, and “post hoc” 
consent by the government can constitute the requisite 
“authorization or consent.” 231  This absolution can be achieved 
quickly—in the same case, a Treasury official simply sent a letter to 
the infringer, confirming that the U.S. government condoned the 
infringer’s use of the patented technology.232 
Government patent use’s instantaneity is particularly valuable 
 
determination that certain statutory conditions have been met, such as a 
determination that public “health or safety needs . . . are not reasonably satisfied 
by the [patent rights-holding] contractor, assignee, or their licensees.” § 203(a)(2). 
No such determination is necessary under § 1498. 
229 See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text. A 1958 opinion of the United 
States Comptroller General acknowledged as much, and seems indeed to actively 
encourage a kind of willful blindness on the part of U.S. government procurement 
officers: “[Section 1498] is not consistent with any duty on the part of a 
contracting agency of the Government to protect the interests of patentees or 
licensees with respect to articles which it proposes to purchase, since the statute 
itself defines and provides an exclusive remedy for enforcement of the patentee’s 
rights as to the Government.” Herbert Cooper, 38 Comp. Gen. 276, 278 (1958). 
This opinion appears to remain in effect and govern U.S. government procurement 
even today, despite substantial efforts to undo the decision legislatively across the 
1960s. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 771 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 305; Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 24, at 
16–27 (describing legislative reform proposals). 
230 § 1498(a). 
231 583 F.3d 1371, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In Advanced Software, the patented 
technology was a method of detecting fraudulent bank checks, and the “significant 
benefits” to the United States that met the “by and for” the government prong of 
the test was reduced fraud and financial benefits to the Federal Reserve Banks, as 
well as to private banks. Id. at 1373, 1378; see also Brennan et al., supra note 11, 
at 332-33 (reviewing case law on “authorization and consent”). 
232 See Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1377; see also Madey v. Duke Univ., 413 
F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“§ 1498 does not require the authorization 
to take any specific form.”). 
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when the government must move quickly to disseminate patented 
products needed to combat a national crisis. By contrast, a patent 
buyout with even a willing, good faith patent holder could take 
weeks to negotiate—weeks the government and the American 
public may not have to spare.233 Moreover, the government may not 
know all the patents that cover a particular product, and thus it may 
not know which patents it needs to buy, and from whom. For 
example, as of writing, many different firms are now developing—
and likely patenting—new ventilator designs designed to protect the 
lungs of COVID-19 patients. In April 2020, CNET reported that 
“newly designed, cutting-edge ventilators may be on the way from 
the likes of tech giant Dyson, General Motors, MIT and a British 
consortium led by Airbus.”234 In situations like this, a wide-ranging 
search of active patents and full-fledged “clearance” study (also 
known as a “freedom to operate” study) by the government would 
be necessary to identify all relevant patents and their owners before 
the government could confidently undertake buyout negotiations. 
Even a single study on a single product can be “time-consuming and 
costly.”235 
In practice, the government may choose to try to negotiate a 
buyout or other deal first, in the same way that the government 
negotiated royalty rates with the Manufacturers’ Aircraft 
Association in 1918 and HHS negotiated the Cipro deal in 2001. 
Section 1498 nevertheless serves as an important backstop: it 
prevents “hold-up” or “hold-out” situations where a single patent 
holder demands a buyout far in excess of the investment costs for 
developing the invention and a “reasonable” profit.236 Hold-ups can 
occur even in times of national emergency, as occurred in 2001’s 
anthrax scare, when Bayer initially refused to budge on the price of 
 
233  The same defect seems true of auctions, which Kremer proposes as a 
mechanism to elicit the market value of patents purchased by the government in 
patent buyouts. See Kremer, supra note 177, at 1146-48. 
234  Jackson Ryan, In the War Against Coronavirus, One Device Can Be the 
Difference Between Life and Death, CNET (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/
features/coronavirus-ventilators-why-one-machine-is-pivotal-in-the-battle-
against-covid-19. 
235 See Linda J. Thayer, When is a Freedom to Operate Opinion Cost-Effective?, 
FINNEGAN (March 2013), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/when-
is-a-freedom-to-operate-opinion-cost-effective.html. 
236 See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 309. 
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ciprofloxacin until HHS threatened to use § 1498.237 Hold-ups are 
socially harmful, as they cause delay and inefficient public 
overspending on the patented technology.238 Indeed, there may be 
hold-up situations that delay, even derail, dissemination of needed 
patented products to the public that arise not from any intentional 
gamesmanship on the part of the patent holder but simply from the 
patent holder’s genuine overvaluation of its own patent. If there is 
no zone of agreement between the patent holder and the 
government—if the patent holder’s reserve price exceeds the 
government’s willingness or ability to pay—then no buyout deal 
will ever be reached. 
2. Flexibility 
Government patent use under § 1498 can be used flexibly, in 
numerous ways. We highlight two here. 
(a) “Surgical strikes” to expand supply and relieve 
shortages.   Section 1498 is particularly well-suited to relieve limits 
on production and supply created by patents, especially in times of 
national emergency. In past emergencies of infectious disease, for 
example, suppliers that hold patents on important technologies have 
been unable to keep up with demand, even while they have declined 
to license their patents to competitor manufacturers. The story of 
Bayer and ciprofloxacin (Cipro), told above, is one vivid instance.239 
Roche and oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is another; in 2005, a global 
outbreak of avian flu led to a spike of demand in the United States 
and around the world.240 Roche’s own manufacturing capacity was 
 
237 See supra Part I.D; see also Leslie Wayne & Melody Petersen, A Muscular 
Lobby Rolls Up Its Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/11/04/business/a-muscular-lobby-rolls-up-its-sleeves.html (reporting that, 
to the pharmaceutical industry, “any threats to [patent] protection, even at a time 
of national crisis, is a clarion call to action” and that Bayer initially refused to give 
the U.S. government any discount on large-scale purchases of ciprofloxacin). 
238 See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 309-10. 
239 See supra Part I.D. 
240 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 162, at 2-3. Somewhat ironically, 
independent researchers later uncovered clinical trial data (which Roche had 
withheld from the medical literature) revealing that the billions of dollars spent 
on oseltamivir by governments around the world were largely wasted: oseltamivir 
failed to prevent the spread of the flu, reduce hospital admissions, or minimize 
complications significantly. See Richard Van Noorden, Report Disputes Benefit of 
Stockpiling Tamiflu, NATURE NEWS & COMMENT (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.
nature.com/news/report-disputes-benefit-of-stockpiling-tamiflu-1.15022 (citing 
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unable to meet demand, but Roche declined to license its patents to 
Cipla, saying it “fully intend[ed] to remain the sole manufacturer of 
Tamiflu.”241 This led to shortages, to several senators calling for 
invocation of § 1498, and ultimately to Roche making an “about-
face” and agreeing to multiple licenses.242 
The same phenomenon—a patent-holding manufacturer 
apparently unable to meet demand and yet unwilling to voluntarily 
license its patents—has already occurred in the COVID-19 
pandemic. One significant example is the field of anti-COVID-19 
therapeutic drugs: Gilead, which holds patents on the COVID-19 
treatment drug remdesivir, was unable to meet demand (both within 
the United States and overseas) and yet (to date) is largely unwilling 
to license its patents to other manufacturers. We tell the story of 
remdesivir in detail below and make a case for use of § 1498 to 
expand supply.243 
Another example of the phenomenon seems to have occurred in 
diagnostic testing. The molecular diagnostics company Cepheid has 
drawn praise for developing what is, as of writing, among the most 
reliable, sensitive point-of-care diagnostic tests for COVID-19, sold 
under the Xpert Xpress SARS CoV-2 brand name.244 These tests 
 
Tom Jefferson et al., Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and Treating 
Influenza in Adults and Children, in 2014 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC 
REVIEWS, https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD008965.pub4). Oseltamivir does 
appear, however, to shorten some symptoms. See What You Should Know About 
Flu Antiviral Drugs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/treatment/whatyoushould.htm.  
241 See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indian Company to Make Generic Version of Flu 
Drug Tamiflu, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/14/
health/indian-company-to-make-generic-version-of-flu-drug-tamiflu.html. 
242 Sabin Russell, About-Face on Influenza Drug / Manufacturer Says It Will 
Consider Licensing Tamiflu, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 19, 2005), https://www.sfgate.
com/health/article/About-face-on-influenza-drug-Manufacturer-says-
2575819.php; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 162, at 13–14. 
243 See infra Part III.B. 
244 See Bruce Japsen, FDA Approves More “Rapid” COVID-19 Coronavirus Tests 
for Use on Frontlines, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucejapsen/2020/03/24/us-approves-more-rapid-covid-19-tests-for-use-on-
frontlines/ (describing FDA’s emergency use authorization for the Xpert Xpress 
SARS CoV-2); Giorgia Guglielmi, The Explosion of New Coronavirus Tests That 
Could Help to End the Pandemic, NATURE (July 17, 2020), https://www.nature.
com/articles/d41586-020-02140-8 (explaining that Cepheid’s test “take[s] less 
than one hour to perform”); Rachana Pradhan, As Problems Grow with Abbott’s 
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provide results in less than hour, making them particularly useful in 
hospitals and other “point-of-care” locations where rapid results are 
needed to provide appropriate medical care. HHS has spent millions 
in public money to purchase Cepheid’s test machines through the 
Strategic National Stockpile for public health emergencies245 and 
distribute them to hospitals in need.246 Each Xpert Xpress SARS 
CoV-2 test uses a single disposable plastic cartridge, pre-filled with 
the appropriate chemicals to run the test.247 Cepheid has struggled 
to manufacture and distribute enough of the disposable cartridges 
tests to meet demand through the summer of 2020.248 
A third example of shortages of (presumably) patented anti-
COVID technologies has occurred with personal protective 
equipment (PPE). In the spring of 2020, 3M’s patented N95 
respirators were widely demanded by health care providers across 
 
Fast COVID Test, FDA Standards Are Under Fire, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 
22, 2020), https://khn.org/news/abbott-rapid-test-problems-grow-fda-standards-
on-covid-tests-under-fire/ (describing Cepheid’s test as more accurate than a 
competitor’s point-of-care test). Cepheid has also drawn some criticism for its 
pricing. See Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières Int’l, Cepheid Charging 
Four Times More than It Should for Coronavirus COVID-19 Tests (July 28, 2020), 
https://www.msf.org/diagnostic-company-cepheid-charging-more-it-should-
covid-19-tests. 
245 See FDA standards under fire as problems grow with fast COVID-19 tests, 
HEALTHCARE PURCHASING NEWS (Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.hpnonline.com/
sourcing-logistics/lab-pharmacy-supply-management/article/21143494/fda-
standards-under-fire-as-problems-grow-with-fast-covid19-tests.  
246 See Pradhan, supra note 244; Contracts for April 10, 2020, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/
2146301/ (“Cepheid, Sunnyvale, California, was awarded a $32,788,420 firm-
fixed-price contract for the purchase of up to 137 Cepheid GeneXpert instruments, 
105 GeneXpert 16s instruments, and up to 472,000 emergency-use-only assays to 
detect novel coronavirus disease in human clinical samples.”). 
247 See Michael J. Loeffelholz et al., Multicenter Evaluation of the Cepheid Xpert 
Xpress SARS-CoV-2 Test, 58 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (2020), https://jcm.
asm.org/content/58/8/e00926-20. 
248 See Lauren Dunn, COVID-19 Tests: There’s an Insurmountable Backlog of 
Virus Tests. A Rapid Test Could Help, NBC NEWS (July 23, 2020), https://www.
nbcnews.com/health/health-news/covid-19-tests-there-s-insurmountable-
backlog-virus-tests-rapid-n1234622; Craig LeMoult, Hospitals Can’t Get Enough 
COVID-19 Tests, WGBH NEWS (Jun. 29, 2020), https://www.wgbh.org/news/
local-news/2020/06/29/hospitals-cant-get-enough-covid-19-tests; see also Joel 
Rose, Coronavirus Testing Machines Are Latest Bottleneck in Troubled Supply 
Chain, NPR (May 28, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/863558750/
coronavirus-testing-machines-are-latest-bottleneck-in-troubled-supply-chain 
(describing shortages of other COVID-19 tests). 
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the United States, but the company proved unable to meet demand, 
leading Governor Beshear of Kentucky to call on 3M to voluntarily 
license its patents to competitor manufacturers to increase supply.249 
Shortages of drugs, diagnostic tests, and PPE in the COVID-19 
pandemic suggest a valuable use of § 1498: to break logjams like 
these and increase supply, and quickly.250 Government patent use 
can be used to make focused “surgical strikes” in places where there 
is a need to move quickly to expand supply of patented products—
e.g., supplying COVID-19 diagnostic tests to emerging rural virus 
hotspots where there is little existing testing capacity.251 HHS could, 
for example, continue to purchase and distribute as many Xpert 
Xpress SARS CoV-2 cartridges and test machines from Cepheid as 
the company can manufacture while simultaneously soliciting bids 
for further supply of diagnostic tests that mimic Cepheid’s. Assume 
that Cepheid holds one or more patents on its tests and can 
manufacture up to about 500,000 Xpert Xpress test cartridges per 
week.252 Assume further that Cepheid declines to license its patents 
 
249 See Morgan Watkins, Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear Calls on 3M to Release 
Patent for N95 Respirator Amid Pandemic, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 3, 
2020), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/04/03/beshear-calls-3-
m-release-patent-n-95-respirator-amid-pandemic/5112729002. 
250 We do not mean to suggest here that patents or other intellectual property 
protection are the sole source of shortages of goods used against COVID-19. 
Shortages are caused by a large number of factors—scarcity of raw materials, 
breakdown in supply chains or distribution systems, customs and regulatory rules, 
etc. See, e.g., Erin R. Fox et al., Drug Shortages: A Complex Health Care Crisis, 
89 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 361 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013.11.
014. Shortages of simple, presumably off-patent commodities like nasal swabs 
have also plagued the United States’s COVID-19 response. See, e.g., David Lim 
& Brianna Ehley, Inside America’s Unending Testing Snafu, POLITICO (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/22/coronavirus-testing-problem-
america-201372. Our point is simply that whenever a shortage arises from, or is 
aggravated by, a patent holder’s reluctance to voluntarily license its patents and 
inability to manufacture enough of its patent products to meet demand, 
government patent use offers a straightforward solution. 
251 Reis Thebault & Abigail Hauslohner, A Deadly “Checkerboard”: Covid-19’s 
New Surge Across Rural America, WASH. POST (May 24, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/24/coronavirus-rural-america-outbreaks. 
252  This was, roughly speaking, the case as of June 2020, when Cepheid 
anticipated its cartridge manufacturing capacity over the summer of 2020 would 
be approximately 2 million tests per month (6 million tests per quarter). See Susan 
Kelly, Cepheid Developing Test to Distinguish COVID-19 from Flu, 
MEDTECHDRIVE (June 10, 2020), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/cepheid-
developing-test-to-distinguish-covid-19-from-flu/579524. 
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voluntarily to competitor manufacturers (as, so far, it seems to have). 
National demand for reliable point-of-care COVID-19 tests is, as of 
writing, running much higher than 500,000 tests per week; some 
public health experts estimate that the United States must administer 
millions of tests per day to contain future outbreaks.253 Under these 
circumstances, Cepheid might ordinarily sell its Xpert Xpress test 
cartridges at a high price to the highest-bidding users as it gradually 
ramps up its manufacturing capacity, leaving everyone else without 
access to Cepheid’s testing technology, which is purportedly best-
in-class. HHS could expand supply more quickly—and deal with the 
COVID-19 testing crisis plaguing the United States as we write—
by invoking § 1498 to enable generic manufacturing even as it 
continues to buy tests at Cepheid’s monopoly price. 
The above hypothetical “surgical strike” to increase supply of 
and expand access to Cepheid’s point-of-care diagnostic test for 
COVID-19 illustrates how the U.S. government can tailor its use of 
§ 1498 to make relatively small interventions in the marketplace and 
the “normal” operation of patents and patent incentives. Such use of 
§ 1498 would protect Cepheid’s investments and expectations, as 
Cepheid would receive compensation under § 1498 for the 
government-authorized generic manufacturing in addition to its 
profits on all of the tests it is able to manufacture and sell at full 
price. In specific circumstances—even in whole fields of 
technology—where the U.S. government is particularly concerned 
about patent holders’ investment expectations and incentives for 
future innovation, such modest interventions with § 1498 may be 
most appropriate.254 The possibility of using § 1498 in this flexible, 
modest way belies the conventional wisdom 255  that government 
patent use is necessarily disruptive. 
 
(b) Shielding beneficial activity from infringement liability.   
Section 1498 could also be used to shield specific socially useful 
activities from the threat of unexpected patent infringement liability. 
 
253 See Alexis C. Madrigal & Robinson Meyer, A Dire Warning From COVID-19 
Test Providers, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2020/06/us-coronavirus-testing-could-fail-again/613675. This number 
includes both rapid point-of-care testing and slower laboratory testing. 
254 See, e.g., Rizzolo et al., supra note 13 (expressing concern over the possibility 
that exercise of § 1498 on patented anti-COVID-19 drugs could “have a chilling 
effect on biopharmaceutical research and drug development”). 
255 See supra notes 3–13. 
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For example, in March 2020, a non-practicing entity, Labrador 
Diagnostics LLC, filed a patent infringement suit seeking injunctive 
relief against a company whose equipment is used in some COVID-
19 diagnostic testing, raising concern over the (admittedly remote) 
possibility that the lawsuit would reduce or delay testing. 256  As 
Moss and Harmon of the Electronic Frontier Foundation have 
argued, HHS could conceivably intervene in situations like this, 
providing post hoc authorization for the allegedly infringing activity 
under § 1498 and shifting onto the government any liability for 
patent infringement, thereby ensuring the activity continues.257 Such 
intervention occurred in Advanced Software, where the Treasury 
Department retroactively authorized patent-infringing activity. 258 
(This diagnostic testing scenario would satisfy the first prong of 
Advanced Software’s test: a use of patented technology that confers 
“significant benefits to the United States” constitutes use “by and 
for” the government, as required by the text of § 1498.259 “When the 
government requires private parties to perform quasi-governmental 
functions, . . . there can be no question that those actions are 
undertaken ‘for the benefit of the government.’”260) 
Recall that Congress revised § 1498’s predecessor statute in 
1918 and again in 1942 to permit precisely this type of government 
patent use: protecting and encouraging socially useful third-party 
activity that is, or might be, patent infringing from the risk of an 
injunction and monetary liability.261 As an appellate panel of the 
Court of Claims held in 1967 (in a case concerning the Department 
of Defense’s purchase of third-party anti-G suits and valves to 
prevent military pilots from blacking out in flight), “[i]t is clear that 
[§ 1498] was enacted for the purpose of enabling the Government to 
 
256 See Masnick, supra note 165. 
257  See Elliot Harmon, How Patent Abuse Could Hurt the Fight Against the 
Pandemic, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/patent-
abuse-government-research-coronavirus.html; Alex Moss & Elliot Harmon, The 
Feds Can Stop Patent Trolls from Endangering COVID-19 Testing and Treatment, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2020/03/feds-can-stop-patent-trolls-endangering-covid-19-testing-and-
treatment. 
258 See supra text accompanying note 232. 
259 Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 
1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
260 Iris Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Iris, 
the quasi-governmental function was detection of fraudulent passports. 
261 Supra text accompanying notes 47–103. 
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purchase goods for the performance of its functions without the 
threat of having the supplier enjoined . . . .”262 
Government patent use to protect, even encourage, socially 
beneficial but patent-infringing activity may have wider import and 
application than generally appreciated. We are not aware of other 
scholars who have drawn the connection, but it seems to us that such 
use of § 1498 could even serve a fair use-like function within patent 
law, in emergency and normal periods alike. Prominent scholars 
have proposed that patent law should, through statutory reform or 
perhaps through judicial intervention, develop a fair use doctrine 
comparable to copyright law’s. 263  Strandburg, for example, has 
observed that “there are situations in which the social costs of 
exclusivity in a particular context simply outweigh the social 
benefits of the additional patent incentive provided by infringement 
liability in that context, such that use in that context should be 
permitted without conditions.”264 Government patent use allows the 
U.S. government to do just that, making government authorization 
under § 1498 a rough surrogate for a judicial determination that fair 
use applies.265 
In addition, though we are not aware of a historical example or 
proposal, it seems clear to us that government patent use under 
§ 1498 could be deployed as a shield in connection with a non-patent 
innovation incentive: innovation prizes set by the U.S. 
government.266 Prizes as an innovation incentive encourage many 
competitors to race all at once to solve a problem, but if one 
competitor obtains and enforces patents on a technology needed to 
reach or commercialize the prize goal, then they may be able to 
extract royalties or even enjoin the prizewinner, reducing the value 
of the innovation incentive. A straightforward way to avoid this 
problem would be for the government to guarantee § 1498 as a 
shield: it could authorize the use of any patents needed to develop, 
 
262 Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (1967). 
263 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Strandburg, supra note 200. 
264 Strandburg, supra note 200, at 278. 
265 Jacob Victor has argued, in the copyright context, that compulsory licensing 
and fair use provisions of the Copyright Act ultimately similarly serve the same 
ends of maximizing social utility. See Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing 
Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72 STAN. L. REV. 915 (2020); Jacob Victor, 
Utility-Expanding Fair Use, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
266 Supra Part II.B. 
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test, or commercialize the prizewinning innovation. This would 
enable those vying for the prize to use any and all existing 
technology freely in solving the prize problem, increasing the 
effectiveness of the prize. 
Like government patent use, a patent buyout could also shield 
socially beneficial third-party activity, but a buyout will often be 
inferior to government patent use. When the government knows 
precisely which patents stand in the way of that activity—as when 
the company that makes COVID-19 testing equipment was sued for 
infringement—it could purchase or license them from the patent 
holders and then extend the necessary licenses to the third-party 
infringer. In this situation, the benefits of a buyout would be 
comparable to those of § 1498. However, when the relevant patents 
have not been identified in advance of the infringing activity—as in 
the prize-setting scenario—buyouts will generally be more difficult 
than government patent use, as they will require the government to 
undertake a lengthy and expensive search to find those patents 
before it can begin the buyout negotiation. Separately, when a patent 
holder has already brought suit against an alleged third-party 
infringer—or is negotiating a buyout with the U.S. government to 
immunize that infringer—the hold-up or nuisance value of the suit 
may lead the patent holder to demand a price higher than the value 
of the patented technology, making a buyout more expensive for the 
government than use of § 1498.267 
 
3. Ex Post Remedy Determination 
Under § 1498, the appropriate compensation due to the patent 
owner is determined ex post, when the injured patent holder brings 
a claim for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims. In this 
regard, the remedy is determined not just ex post but “extra” ex 
post—that is, not merely after the invented technology is 
successfully reduced to practice and becomes worthy of a patent,268 
but after, and often long after, the government and the public at large 
actually make use of the patented invention. Given the typical 
 
267 See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often 
Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 242, 
255 & nn.22 & 80 (2017) (describing “nuisance-value settlements” in patent 
infringement cases); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent 
Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 403 (2014). 
268 It is in this sense that Hemel and Ouellette use the phrase “ex post.” See Hemel 
& Ouellette, supra note 167, at 544. 
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pendency of a lawsuit under § 1498,269 this could mean several years 
elapse between the government’s first use of a patent and the 
determination of appropriate compensation. Sufficient time passes 
that when the Court of Federal Claims awards the “reasonable and 
entire compensation” owed under § 1498, it often adds interest on 
the reasonable royalty, to make the patent holder whole for the time 
passed since government patent use began.270 This patience is a 
feature, not a bug, of government patent use. 
In our view, patience in determining compensation has 
numerous benefits in a fast-moving national crisis like COVID-19. 
Sober patent valuation is hard amidst a pandemic or other national 
emergency.271 For example, estimates of the value of a vaccine or 
treatment may be wildly variable until its therapeutic properties—
e.g., its side effects, its efficacy, and, in the case of a vaccine, its 
duration of effect—are fully established, years after first approval 
and the first purchases. (As the FDA has stated, “the true picture of 
a product’s safety actually evolves over the months and even years 
that make up a product’s lifetime in the marketplace.”272 ) In that 
sense, § 1498 may actually end up offering the patent holder a better 
deal, in the end, than a buyout: if the emergency takes a turn 
substantially for the worse or the invention turns out to be especially 
useful, the compensation paid under § 1498 would be greater than a 
one-time ex ante payment. 
A separate benefit of patience is that it avoids any potential 
problems with “royalty stacking”: the situation where a single 
 
269  See Michael J. Schaengold & Robert S. Brams, Choice of Forum for 
Government Contract Claims: Court of Federal Claims vs. Board of Contract 
Appeals, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 321 (2008) (suggesting that across all cases in the 
Court of Federal Claims, “[b]arring extensive filing of pretrial motions, it will 
take approximately two years for a case to progress from the filing of the 
complaint to the issuance of a decision”). 
270 See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1168 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (“The other 
component of ‘reasonable and entire’ compensation for a patent license taken by 
the Government is delay compensation. Delay compensation is recompense for 
the Government’s delay in paying for the license.”); 7 CHISUM, supra note 192, 
§ 20.03 (“[A] patent owner may recover prejudgment interest as delay 
compensation . . . .”) 
271 For a broader analysis of how delaying the calculation of damages in patent 
infringement cases can improve courts’ analysis and accuracy, see Lichtman, 
supra note 200. 
272 Step 5: FDA Post-Market Drug Safety Monitoring, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-5-
fda-post-market-drug-safety-monitoring. 
Fall 2020] Who’s Afraid of Section 1498? 63 
product infringes multiple patents held by multiple patent owners, 
increasing the risk of hold-up by one or more of those patent holders, 
as well as the risk of overcompensation of patent holders whose 
technology contributes only a small portion of the product’s 
value.273 Given the flurry of inventive activity directed to COVID-
19, it is very possible that we will see overlapping patent rights on 
important technologies like ventilator designs (as noted above) and 
research tools for vaccine development. (While less common in 
pharma, royalty stacking problems sometimes emerge there, too,274 
especially with biologic drugs, whose manufacture may be more 
complex than that of small molecules drugs.)  If there are multiple 
patent holders with patents infringed by products used by the 
government under § 1498, they can all bring claims to the CFC, and 
(in a consolidated case) the judge could apportion the value of each 
patent holders’ contribution to the product and allocate 
compensation accordingly.  By contrast, in a buyout situation, the 
government risks overpaying if it negotiates a buyout with one 
patent holder without recognizing that other patent holders hold 
additional relevant patents.  (The government could undertake a 
comprehensive search of others’ patents and buy those out, too, but 
this would impose unnecessary search costs on the government and 
slow it down unnecessarily, as noted above.) 
Of course, if a patent holder in fact thinks it would get a better 
deal from determination of the value of the patent after the 
government uses it, it could achieve the same result—or any of a 
flexible array of outcomes—through a patent buyout. For example, 
the patent holder for an effective COVID-19 treatment could offer 
rights to its drug for $X upfront plus $Y per use plus $Z on the basis 
of patient outcomes (as determined through, say, an arbitration 
process). But such a negotiation would take time—and could thus 
cost additional lives—to produce an effective ex post evaluation 
system comparable to what already exists under § 1498. 
Indeed, these same problems—uncertainty and time wasted in 
attempting to predict the value of the government’s use before it has 
 
273 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of 
FRAND Licensing Practices: Towards “Interoperable” Legal Standards, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 429, 432 (2016). 
274 See, e.g., Leila Abboud, Abbott’s Bid to Squeeze Royalties May Carry Wider 
Impact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB110108567498880474. 
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occurred—afflict not only patent buyouts but government-funded 
direct grants and prizes, too. Government grants are disbursed to 
innovators before their inventions are complete and are therefore an 
example of what Hemel and Ouellette term ex ante incentives—
monetary incentives whose incentive value is set before results are 
achieved. 275  Prizes are “ex post” incentives in the Hemel and 
Ouellette sense—they are disbursed only after an invention proves 
successful. Yet prizes turn out to share a common Achilles heel with 
grants: they require the government to set the value of the incentive 
long prior to the government’s use, and typically before inventions 
have been reduced to practice. For a prize to have any utility in 
incentivizing innovation, the government must set and announce the 
prize, and commit itself to a payout, before innovators have begun 
experimenting. It is true that the incentive size of a prize, like that a 
patent buyout, is flexible and can be conditioned on the value of the 
patented technology and the government’s use thereof—e.g., $X 
upon proof of a functional prototype plus $Y per government use 
plus $Z on the basis of patient outcomes. Such conditions can limit 
the government’s risk of overpaying for an invention that proves 
only marginally useful. But these conditions only reduce risk; they 
cannot eliminate it. When setting the size of a prize, the government 
must always hazard some estimates about the costs of developing an 
invention and its social utility. In a fast-moving emergency, this is a 
serious drawback. The government needs time and resources to 
gather information to make those estimates—time and resources it 
may not have. Use of § 1498 eliminates this uncertainty inherent in 
prizes, since the court-ordered reasonable and entire compensation 
always coincides with the precise extent of the government’s use.276 
The fact that compensation under § 1498 coincides with the 
precise scope of the government’s use produces another advantage 
of government patent use as compared to buying a patent outright: 
by choosing government patent use, the government will likely 
spend less of the public’s money. Any time the government uses a 
patent under § 1498, the patent holder retains substantial rights in 
the patent: a right to continue practicing the patent, a right to license 
it to third parties, a right to enforce it against third parties not 
 
275 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 167, at 556. 
276 Indeed, one might consider compensation under § 1498 “to effectively set an 
ex post prize” with the advantage that the adjudicator may “examine evidence of 
market share” before setting it. Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 317. 
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authorized by the government, and so on. And government patent 
use is typically time-limited. As soon as the government ceases 
using the patent, the patent holder’s ability to exploit the patent is 
restored in full. As such, even expansive government patent use 
necessarily leaves a significant fraction of the total value of the 
patent in the hands of the patent holder, and the reasonable and entire 
compensation the government pays under § 1498 should always be 
less than the price the government would pay in an outright buyout 
of the patent.277 
To be sure, ex post determination of the appropriate 
compensation can have drawbacks, too, in some contexts. Small 
innovative companies may rely primarily or entirely on revenues 
from their patents to raise capital and sustain themselves, and they 
may not be able to wait years for compensation. In such 
circumstances, the U.S. government might voluntarily choose to pay 
compensation for government patent use sooner to keep the 
companies afloat, or it might decide to use another policy tool (such 
as a buyout) instead. The government should weigh potential 
impacts on the patent holder, its investors, and broader incentives in 
the sector before deciding to use § 1498, and whether to make a large 
intervention or a small one.278 
If HHS does elect to use § 1498 to procure drugs, tests, 
ventilators, and other technologies necessary to navigate the 
COVID-19 crisis, it could take steps from the start to ensure a deep 
evidentiary record to support the determination of appropriate 
compensation when the day comes. For example, HHS could ask 
that the recipients of products procured through § 1498 document 
who uses these products and how well these products work. HHS 
could also put known patent holders on notice as to its exercise of 
§ 1498 and encourage them to collect and keep data that will be 
useful if the CFC must later determine the appropriate level of 
compensation under § 1498, such as data on the patent holder’s 
R&D costs and the patent holder’s perception of the value of its 
invention. Asking patent holders to collect and retain such data is 
efficient—the patent holder is likely best positioned to generate 
useful evidence about the value of the invention—and patent holders 
 
277 See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 553 (“The fair market value indicates what a 
willing buyer would pay for ownership, while a reasonable royalty is simply what 
a licensee would pay for ongoing use of the patent as a licensee.”). 
278 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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have good incentives to collect reliable evidence that will hold up to 
court scrutiny, as we discuss in the next subpart. 
4. Determination of Compensation by an Impartial 
Adjudicator 
Finally, a fourth key feature of government patent use under 
§ 1498 is the adjudicator of the remedy: when the U.S. government 
uses patents, the appropriate compensation is decided not by the 
government or the patent holder but by impartial judges. As noted 
above, this makes § 1498 a liability rule: the value of the patent is 
objectively determined (by a court) rather than subjectively 
determined by the patent holder and the government’s negotiator. 
Placing the question of patent valuation in the hands of an 
independent arbiter has numerous benefits. First, many of the 
entities likely to hold important patents on COVID-19 technologies 
are the same set of pharmaceutical, medical device, and 
biotechnology companies who wield some of the most powerful 
lobbies in the United States 279  and who have been accused for 
decades of government and media capture, 280  price-gouging, 281 
strategic gamesmanship of the patent and data exclusivity 
 
279  Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Big Pharma Continues to Top Lobbying Spending, 
OPENSECRETS (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/10/big-
pharma-continues-to-top-lobbying-spending/; see also Wayne & Petersen, supra 
note 237 (observing that, as of 2001, the pharmaceutical industry’s lobby had 
“managed to stave off many actions that would harm them, like violating patents 
or forcing them to supply free drugs”). 
280 See, e.g., JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN & DEVIN DUFFY, THE COST OF CAPTURE: 
HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY HAS CORRUPTED POLICYMAKERS AND 
HARMED PATIENTS, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF 2019 (May 2019), https://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RI_Pharma_Cost-of-
Capture_brief_201905.pdf; Gringarten, supra note 104, at 74–76 (describing 
Bayer’s “crisis management” lobbying efforts to shape media coverage and the 
U.S. government’s response to the anthrax crisis); Alexander Zaitchik, How Big 
Pharma Was Captured by the One Percent, NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/149438/big-pharma-captured-one-percent. 
281 See, e.g., KEVIN T. RICHARDS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 
R46221, DRUG PRICING AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING PRACTICES 2 (2020) 
(“critics argue that these patenting practices are used to keep drug prices high, 
without any benefit for consumers or innovation”); MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, 
LIVES ON THE EDGE: TIME TO ALIGN MEDICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
WITH PEOPLE’S HEALTH NEEDS 17 (2016) (collecting examples of alleged 
pharmaceutical industry price-gouging and profiteering). 
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systems, 282  and antitrust violations. 283  (And others may be non-
practicing patent assertion entities like Labrador Diagnostics, noted 
above.284) As noted earlier, there is a real risk of gamesmanship and 
hold-up by this set of patent holders in the event of a rushed buyout 
precipitated by an ongoing public health crisis.285 Hold-up in patent 
buyouts can lead not only to harmful delay but also to the 
government overpaying. 
In a patent buyout, patent holders are not the only worry. As 
noted above, 286  the U.S. government does not appear to have 
negotiated a patent buyout in over 60 years. As such, the 
government’s own negotiators are likely inexperienced and ill 
prepared to enter a high-stakes buyout negotiation, whether in a time 
of emergency or not. Indeed, the government’s IP negotiators may 
not even have deep expertise in other types of IP valuation, such as 
licensing the government’s own patent portfolio. For example, the 
Department of Defense’s intellectual property negotiators were, as 
of 2018, sufficiently inexpert that Congress demanded formation of 
a “cadre of IP experts” to help.287 
By contrast, the judges of Court of Federal Claims have deeper 
and recent experience in valuing patents in § 1498 cases, as 
 
282 See generally Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCE 590 (2018); RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 281. For specific examples 
of alleged gamesmanship and misuse of patent and data exclusivity, see Allergan, 
Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (Oct. 
16, 2017) (court expressing “serious concerns about the legitimacy of” Allergan’s 
efforts to immunize its patents from challenge by transferring ownership to a 
Native American tribe); Michael Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring 
the Mission to Rare Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210 (2016). 
283  See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Higher Drug Prices from Anticompetitive 
Conduct: Three Case Studies, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 151 (2019) (documenting 
examples of anticompetitive conduct by pharmaceutical companies); C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568 (2006) (describing widespread 
anticompetitive “pay-for-delay” tactics by pharmaceutical companies). 
284 Supra notes 256–260. 
285 Supra notes 236–238 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra note 179. 
287 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802(b), 10 
U.S.C. § 2322; see also Adam Bartolanzo & Keith Szeliga, Contractors Beware: 
The 2018 NDAA Ushers In New Changes Affecting IP Rights, GOV’T CONT. & 
INVESTIGATIONS BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.governmentcontractslaw
blog.com/2018/01/articles/department-of-defense/ndaa-ip-rights. 
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numerous cases are brought every year.288 This experience means 
there is a body of law on the reasonable and entire compensation 
under § 1498 that helps to anchor the calculation and provide some 
consistency and predictability—something missing in a patent 
buyout. While we are not aware of a recent, in-depth empirical 
review of the consistency and predictability of damages awards in 
§ 1498 cases decided by the Court of Federal Claims, some 
anecdotal evidence suggests that they are at least on par with those 
in the federal district courts.289 While calculation of damages in 
patent cases is inherently complex and somewhat unpredictable—
reasonable royalties very much included—the expertise and 
experience of the judges of the Court of Federal Claims should allay 
concerns somewhat. 
Other benefits flow from § 1498’s use of the Court of Federal 
Claims as impartial adjudicator to determine compensation. 290 
 
288 A Westlaw search for Court of Federal Claims cases returned 134 decisions 
decided between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2019 that reference “28 
U.S.C. § 1498” and “patent.” In the 1990s, Lavenue calculated that “[s]ince the 
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessor 
courts have decided an average of five and one-half cases a year.” Lavenue, supra 
note 18, at 496. 
289 In an empirical study published 2001, Chu concluded that judgments of the 
Court of Federal Claims in patent cases are affirmed by the Federal Circuit at a 
higher rate (and reversed at a lower rate) than is true for any district court in the 
nation. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1124–25 (2001). In Return 
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, the Supreme Court suggested that 
remedies in § 1498 cases are at least as predictable as remedies in 35 U.S.C. § 271 
cases brought in district court, though the Court’s analysis focused on the simple 
fact that injunctions are not available in § 1498 cases but are in 35 U.S.C. § 271 
cases. See 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1867 (2019) (“[A]lthough federal agencies remain 
subject to damages for impermissible uses, they do not face the threat of 
preliminary injunctive relief that could suddenly halt their use of a patented 
invention, and they enjoy a degree of certainty about the extent of their potential 
liability that ordinary accused infringers do not.”). 
290  One significant cost flows from § 1498’s use of a court to determine 
compensation: the costs of litigation. We are not aware of specific estimates of the 
costs of litigation under § 1498, but district court patent infringement suits and 
Section 337 investigations at the International Trade Commission cost a median 
of $700,000 to $4 million in 2019. See Scott McBride, Strategies For Controlling 
Costs in Patent Litigation, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1198463/strategies-for-controlling-costs-in-patent-litigation. These costs 
are real, but we think them acceptable, for four reasons. First, small patent holders’ 
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Federal judges of the CFC appointed to 15-year terms291 are also 
insulated from the pernicious influence of industry lobbying in a 
way that the U.S. government’s negotiators may not be. Discovery 
in litigation will disgorge otherwise secret information relevant to 
the calculation of compensation—on the patent holder’s R&D costs, 
on others’ (including the government’s) contributions to that R&D, 
on the value of the patented invention (e.g., a drug’s safety and 
efficacy), and so on.292 And the critical issues of patent validity, 
enforceability, and infringement can be properly ventilated and 
decided. (Like any defendant in standard infringement litigation, the 
government owes no compensation whatsoever if the asserted patent 
turns out to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.) Patent 
holders may benefit from this independent adjudicator, too, insofar 
as the government cannot use its vast media and regulatory powers, 
or its sometime monopsony purchaser status, to strong-arm an 
unduly cheap deal. 
B. A Case Study for the Use of § 1498: Remdesivir in the 
COVID-19 Pandemic 
To exemplify how policymakers can weigh these four 
advantages of § 1498 to assess its applicability, this Part considers 
how these advantages apply to the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
experimental drug remdesivir, one of the few treatments for 
 
costs are typically paid by the government in a successful § 1498 action. See 
§ 1498(a) (“Reasonable and entire compensation shall include the owner’s 
reasonable costs, including reasonable fees for expert witnesses and attorneys, in 
pursuing the action if the owner is an independent inventor, a nonprofit 
organization, or an entity that had no more than 500 employees at any time during 
the 5-year period preceding the use or manufacture of the patented invention by 
or for the United States.”). Second, from the public’s perspective, even paying 
both a successful patent holder’s costs and the government’s will be cost-effective 
in situations where the value of the patented technology used—potentially worth 
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars—will dwarf those costs. Third, the costs 
of litigation are, to some extent, simply the unavoidable costs of gathering 
(through discovery and judicial fact-finding) useful information on the value of 
the patent; collecting the same information prior to a patent buyout, for example, 
would also incur costs. Fourth, like any litigants, the patentee plaintiff and the 
U.S. government can settle at point prior to or during litigation and thereby avert 
further litigation costs. See Lemley, supra note 158, at 473. 
291 See 28 U.S.C. § 172. 
292 See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 316 (discussing the value of discovery and 
expert testimony in actions brought under § 1498 to determine “R&D outlays and 
the risk of failure at each stage of investment” in the patented invention). 
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COVID-19 currently available.293 Remdesivir is also economically 
significant—the potential U.S. market for the drug has been 
estimated in the billions of dollars per year for years to come.294 We 
trace below how the U.S. government could use § 1498 to expand 
supplies of the drug while simultaneously spending less (and 
produce savings for private payers, too). 
We select remdesivir largely because it is a “ripe” example: a 
fully developed anti-COVID-19 technology about which we now 
have meaningful information on manufacturing costs, supply 
limitations, retail pricing, patent protection, and so on.295 But the 
logic of government patent use to expand supply and lower prices 
could apply equally to other currently experimental and patented 
technologies useful against COVID-19, such as monoclonal 
antibodies, 296  new diagnostics, and, perhaps most important, a 
vaccine. The United States and other countries have invested 
unprecedented sums to accelerate vaccine development,297 but there 
currently are profound concerns that the public may not get access 
 
293 See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Covid-19 Study Details Benefits of Treatment with 
Remdesivir, and Also Its Limitations, STAT (May 22, 2020), https://www.
statnews.com/2020/05/22/covid-19-study-details-benefits-of-treatment-with-
remdesivir-and-also-its-limitations. 
294 Cristin Flanagan, Gilead Upgraded With Covid Sales Seen Reaching $7.7 
Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-06-03/gilead-loses-a-skeptic-with-remdesivir-sales-seen-at-7-billion. 
295 One of us (C.J.M.) published earlier, briefer analyses of potential exercise of 
government patent use to expand access to and lower prices on remdesivir. See 
Christopher Morten, Christian Urrutia & James Krellenstein, A Powerful Law 
Gives HHS the Right to Take Control of Remdesivir Manufacturing and 
Distribution, STAT (July 2, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/02/
powerful-law-gives-hhs-right-to-control-remdesivir-manufacturing-distribution; 
James Krellenstein & Christopher J. Morten, U.S. Government’s Apparent Co-
Ownership of Patents Protecting Remdesivir, PREP4ALL (May 20, 2020), https://
www.prep4all.org/news/remdesivir. 
296 Janet Woodcock, the Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
at the FDA, has publicly expressed concern about inadequate supplies of anti-
COVID-19 monoclonal antibodies and the possible need to draw on global 
monoclonal antibody manufacturing capacity. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Operation 
Warp Speed Is Pushing for Covid-19 Therapeutics by Early Fall, WASH. POST 
(July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/13/operation-
warp-speed-is-pushing-covid-19-therapeutics-by-early-fall. 
297 See Mapping of Global Public Funding for Covid-19, UNIVS. ALLIED FOR 
ESSENTIAL MEDS. (2020), https://www.publicmeds4covid.org. 
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to a vaccine despite this public funding,298 should global demand 
overwhelm the manufacturing and distribution capabilities of patent 
holders. 299  Our analysis of § 1498 and remdesivir would likely 
apply with equal force to a hypothetical vaccine patent, but vaccines 
exhibit additional considerations that we discuss briefly in this 
Part.300 
1. Remdesivir: An Experimental Drug That Promises 
Modest but Important Benefits 
What is remdesivir? It is a small molecule experimental 
antiviral drug manufactured by Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“Gilead”), 
under the brand name Veklury.301 Gilead holds patents on remdesivir 
and is the sole supplier in the United States. Remdesivir was 
originally developed through a collaboration by Gilead, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and U.S. Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and was 
tested against numerous viruses, including Ebola, but proved 
ineffective against them.302 
 
298 See, e.g., Will Feuer & Noah Higgins-Dunn, WHO Warns Against Coronavirus 
“Vaccine Nationalism and Risk of Price Gouging”, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/who-warns-against-coronavirus-vaccine-
nationalism-and-risk-of-price-gouging.html; Elisabeth Rosenthal, How a Covid-
19 Vaccine Could Cost Americans Dearly, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine-cost.html. 
299 See, e.g., Damien Garde & Helen Branswell, 6 Burning Questions Congress 
Could Push Covid-19 Vaccine Makers to Answer Today, STAT (July 20, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/20/covid19-vaccines-merck-moderna-
congress; Christopher Rowland et al., Even Finding a Covid-19 Vaccine Won’t Be 
Enough to End the Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 11, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/11/coronavirus-vaccine-global-supply; 
Julie Steenhuysen & Kate Kelland, Vaccine Makers Face Biggest Medical 
Manufacturing Challenge in History, REUTERS (June 25, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-vaccines-manufactu-idUSKBN23W1
ND. 
300  See infra text accompanying notes 359–366. See generally Ana Santos 
Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property, 
Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3656929. 
301  Gilead Scis., Fact Sheet for Health Care Providers: Emergency Use 
Authorization (EUA) of Veklury (remdesivir) (July 2020), https://www.gilead.
com/-/media/files/pdfs/remdesivir/eua-fact-sheet-for-hcps.pdf. 
302  See Dustin Siegel et al., Discovery and Synthesis of a Phosphoramidate 
Prodrug of a Pyrrolo[2,1-f][triazin-4-amino] Adenine C-Nucleoside (GS-5734) 
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Remdesivir’s safety and therapeutic benefits in COVID-19 
patients are still being investigated, 303  but as of writing, those 
benefits appear both modest and significant. One clinical trial 
sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) has shown that remdesivir helps hospitalized 
patients with severe COVID-19 recover and leave the hospital more 
quickly than a placebo—a median of 4 days more quickly. 304 
Another trial showed some statistically significant benefit in 
recovery time in patients whose COVID-19 symptoms were 
moderate (rather than severe) and who received 5 days of treatment 
with the drug.305 A third trial that terminated early due to under-
enrollment showed no statistically significant improvement in 
COVID-19 patients treated with remdesivir compared to placebo.306 
Remdesivir has not been shown in any rigorous clinical trial to 
reduce mortality in COVID-19 patients—that is, to save lives.307 
Although the clinical trial data supporting remdesivir’s use in 
COVID-19 patients is limited, doctors have few good 
alternatives.308 Based on the NIH trial, FDA granted an emergency 
 
for the Treatment of Ebola and Emerging Viruses, 60 J. MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 
1648 (2017); Travis K. Warren et al., Therapeutic Efficacy of the Small Molecule 
GS-5734 Against Ebola Virus in Rhesus Monkeys, 530 NATURE 381 (2016). For 
remdesivir’s failure as a treatment for Ebola, see Helen Branswell, Two Ebola 
Treatments Yield “Substantial Decrease” in Mortality, Landmark Trial Shows, 
STAT (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/11/27/two-ebola-
treatments-mortality-decrease/; Gina Kolata, How Remdesivir, New Hope for 
Covid-19 Patients, Was Resurrected, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/05/01/health/coronavirus-remdesivir.html. 
303 See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Missed Opportunities on Emergency Remdesivir 
Use, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 331 (2020). 
304  See John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of Covid-19—
Preliminary Report, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1813 (2020). 
305 See Christoph D. Spinner et al., Effect of Remdesivir vs Standard Care on 
Clinical Status at 11 Days in Patients with Moderate COVID-19: A Randomized 
Clinical Trial, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1048 (2020). 
306  See Yeming Wang et al., Remdesivir in Adults with Severe COVID-19: A 
Randomised, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled, Multicentre Trial, 395 LANCET 
1569 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)31022-9. 
307 Matthew Herper, Major Study Finds Common Steroid Reduces Deaths Among 
Patients with Severe Covid-19, STAT (June 16, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/06/16/major-study-finds-common-steroid-reduces-deaths-among-patients-
with-severe-covid-19. 
308 See Denise Grady, Malaria Drug Promoted by Trump Did Not Prevent Covid 
Infections, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
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use authorization (EUA) to the drug on May 1, 2020.309 Remdesivir 
has been described by Dr. Anthony Fauci, an infectious disease 
expert and one of the leaders of the White House Coronavirus Task 
Force, as the current “standard of care” for COVID-19,310 and the 
drug has already been used in thousands of patients.311 
Should further clinical trial data prove that remdesivir is indeed 
safe and effective at reducing COVID-19 mortality, it will be an 
indispensable tool in the COVID-19 response in the United States 
and around the world. Even if the drug saves no lives but merely 
accelerates recovery in patients with severe disease, it will 
nonetheless be valuable, considering the enormous social benefits 
of keeping people out of the hospital. A single day in an American 
intensive care unit (ICU) costs thousands of dollars, 312  so 
accelerating recovery by even a day has significant economic 
 
2020/06/03/health/hydroxychloroquine-coronavirus-trump.html. In June and July 
2020, a group at the University of Oxford reported clinical trial results suggesting 
that the widely available steroid dexamethasone successfully reduced mortality in 
patients with moderate or advanced COVID-19 disease who were receiving 
mechanical ventilation or oxygen. See Nancy Lapid, Steroid’s COVID-19 Benefits 
Confirmed; Spotlight on Immune Cells, REUTERS (July 18, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-science-idUSKCN24I2SY. 
309  See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
Update: FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Potential COVID-19 
Treatment (May 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announce
ments / coronavirus - covid - 19 - update - fda - issues  - emergency  - use - authorization  - 
potential-covid-19-treatment. In August 2020, the FDA expanded the EUA to 
cover hospitalized COVID-19 patients with more moderate disease. See Press 
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., COVID-19 Update: FDA Broadens 
Emergency Use Authorization for Veklury (Remdesivir) to Include All 
Hospitalized Patients for Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.
fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/covid-19-update-fda-broadens-
emergency-use-authorization-veklury-remdesivir-include-all-hospitalized. 
310 Sue Hughes, Remdesivir Now “Standard of Care” for COVID-19, Fauci Says, 
HOSPITALIST (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/
221518/coronavirus-updates/remdesivir-now-standard-care-covid-19-fauci-says. 
311 See Laurie McGinley & Christopher Rowland, FDA Authorizes Use of Gilead 
Sciences’ Remdesivir for Patients Severely Ill with Covid-19, WASH. POST (May 
1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/01/fda-authorizes-
use-gilead-sciences-remdesivir-severely-ill-patients-with-covid-19. 
312 See Joseph S. Dasta et al., Daily Cost of an Intensive Care Unit Day: The 
Contribution of Mechanical Ventilation, 33(6) CRITICAL CARE MED. 1266 (2005), 
https://journals.lww.com/ccmjournal/Abstract/2005/06000/Daily_cost_of_an_
intensive_care_unit_day__The.13.aspx. 
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benefits on that basis alone 313 —not to mention the benefits of 
allowing people to return to their jobs, homes, and loved ones. 
Accelerating recovery also frees ICU beds, equipment, and 
personnel to treat more patients. ICU shortages have plagued many 
countries’ early COVID-19 responses, exacerbating mortality, 314 
and experts suggested in spring and summer 2020 that the United 
States risks a new wave of ICU bed shortages in late 2020.315 
2. Two Problems: Shortages and Overpricing 
The United States’s COVID-19 response faces two problems 
vis-à-vis remdesivir: the problem of shortage and the problem of 
overpricing. 
The United States faced deep shortages of remdesivir through 
the spring and summer of 2020, causing physicians to ration the drug 
and patients to go without—shortages apparently caused at least in 
part by Gilead’s inability to manufacture enough. 316  Gilead has, 
 
313 Gilead’s CEO, Daniel O’Day, justified the price Gilead intends to charge for 
remdesivir on this basis. See Press Release, An Open Letter from Daniel O’Day, 
Chairman & CEO, Gilead Sciences (June 29, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/
news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/6/an-open-letter-from-daniel-
oday-chairman--ceo-gilead-sciences (“Taking the example of the United States, 
earlier hospital discharge would result in hospital savings of approximately 
$12,000 per patient. Even just considering these immediate savings to the 
healthcare system alone, we can see the potential value that remdesivir 
provides.”). There is some irony in a pharmaceutical company—a member of one 
oft-criticized sector of America’s oft-criticized health care system—using high 
prices of hospital care—another oft-criticized sector of the same—to justify its 
own high prices. 
314 See Shadman Aziz et al., Managing ICU Surge During the COVID-19 Crisis: 
Rapid Guidelines, 46 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1303 (June 8, 2020); Alberto 
Zangrillo & Luciano Gattinoni, Learning from Mistakes During the Pandemic: 
The Lombardy Lesson, INTENSIVE CARE MED. (June 5, 2020). 
315  See Will Feuer, CDC Says U.S. Has “Way Too Much Virus” to Control 
Pandemic as Cases Surge Across Country, CNBC (June 29, 2020), https://www.
cnbc.com/2020/06/29/cdc-says-us-has-way-too-much-virus-to-control-
pandemic-as-cases-surge-across-country.html; Nolan D. McCaskill, Rising ICU 
Bed Use “a Big Red Flag”, POLITICO (May 28, 2020), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/05/28/rising-icu-bed-use-red-flag-287552. 
316  See Elizabeth Cohen, Covid-19 Drug Rationed in the US Is Plentiful in 
Developing Countries, CNN (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/
health/covid-remdesivir-us-vs-other-countries/index.html; Cristin Flanagan, 
Gilead’s Virus Drug Seen in Short Supply for Americans, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-11/gilead-s-covid-19-
drug-seen-in-short-supply-for-americans; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Gilead Says It 
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rather gradually, voluntarily licensed its patents to competitor drug 
manufacturers in the United States and overseas,317 which expanded 
its supplies, but not quickly enough.318 
As the federal department ultimately responsible for navigating 
the country through the COVID-19 crisis, HHS has taken on itself 
the job of distributing of remdesivir to the hospitals in greatest need 
throughout the United States. 319  But despite purported 
“coordination,” HHS proved consistently unable throughout the 
spring and summer of 2020 to allocate the nation’s (short) supplies 
efficiently or effectively. 320  In an effort to address ongoing 
shortages, in June of 2020, HHS announced that it had contracted 
with Gilead to dedicate over 90% of Gilead’s supply of remdesivir 
from July through September 2020 to the United States alone—
about 500,000 treatment courses. 321 The deal was striking in its 
 
Will Be Able to Make Enough Remdesivir to Meet Global Coronavirus Demand 
in October, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/06/gilead-
says-it-will-be-able-to-make-enough-remdesivir-to-meet-global-coronavirus-
demand-in-october.html; Sydney Lupkin, How Feds Decide on Remdesivir 
Shipments to States Remains Mysterious, NPR (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.npr.
org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/19/903946857/how-feds-decide-on-
remdesivir-shipments-to-states-remains-mysterious. 
317 See Valerie Bauman, Gilead Gives Royalty-Free Remdesivir Licenses to Five 
Drugmakers, BLOOMBERG L. (May 12, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
pharma-and-life-sciences/gilead-gives-royalty-free-remdesivir-licenses-to-five-
drugmakers; Peter Maybarduk, Remdesivir Should Be in the Public Domain; 
Gilead’s Licensing Deal Picks Winners and Losers, PUB. CITIZEN (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.citizen.org/news/remdesivir-should-be-in-the-public-domain-
gileads-licensing-deal-picks-winners-and-losers/. 
318 After shortages were reported in the summer of 2020, Reuters reported in mid-
September 2020 that U.S. hospitals were turning away new shipments of 
remdesivir, suggesting that they had ample supplies and that shortages and 
rationing had ended. See Deena Beasley, Exclusive: U.S. Hospitals Turn Down 
Remdesivir, Limit Use to Sickest COVID-19 Patients, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-remdesivir-exclusi-
idUKKBN2622UM. 
319  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces 
Shipments of Donated Remdesivir for Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19 
(May 9, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/09/hhs-ships-first-
doses-of-donated-remdesivir-for-hospitalized-patients-with-covid-19.html. 
320 See Kapczynski, Biddinger & Walensky, supra note 12 (describing HHS’s 
distribution as “uneven and opaque,” and leading to shortages); see also Lupkin, 
supra note 316. 
321 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Trump Administration 
Secures New Supplies of Remdesivir for the United States (June 29, 2020) 
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nationalism and disregard of COVID-19 patients outside the United 
States—billions of people sick and at risk in countries outside 
Gilead’s network of authorized generic suppliers322 may have no 
access to remdesivir. 323  (And even those 500,000 doses proved 
insufficient to meet demand within the United States.324) In August 
2020, Gilead announced that it expects, finally, to be able to 
manufacture enough remdesivir to meet global demand by early 
October,325 but despite projecting manufacture of two million doses 
this year, Gilead acknowledged to investors that “there is no 
assurance that we will be able to meet global supply needs for 
remdesivir.”326 Some experts, including former FDA Commissioner 
Gottlieb, have predicted new peaks of infections and 
hospitalizations in the fall of 2020 and winter of 2021;327 if their 
fears come to pass, then shortages of remdesivir may continue. 
Besides shortages, the other problem is price. On June 29, 2020, 
Gilead announced what it plans to charge for remdesivir once 
donated doses run out in July 2020: $3,120 for a typical course of 
treatment for patients with private insurance as well as those covered 
by Medicare and Medicaid, and $2,340 for a smaller number of 
patients covered by certain other U.S. government insurance 
programs.328 The $3,120 price tag is over ten times what an expert 
independent organization (the Institute for Clinical and Economic 
Review (ICER)) deems to be remdesivir’s cost-effective value 
 
[hereinafter HHS Press Release], https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/29/
trump-administration-secures-new-supplies-remdesivir-united-states.html. 
322 See Ed Silverman, Gilead Signs Deals for Generic Companies to Make and 
Sell Remdesivir, STAT (May 12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/
2020/05/12/gilead-generics-remdesivir-covid19-coronavirus-licenses. 
323 Sarah Boseley, US Secures World Stock of Key Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, 
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/30/
us-buys-up-world-stock-of-key-covid-19-drug. 
324 See Cohen, supra note 316; Lovelace, supra note 316; Lupkin, supra note 316. 
325 See Lovelace, supra note 316. 
326 Gilead Scis., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 30, 44 (Aug. 6, 2020), 
http://investors.gilead.com/static-files/5648e7dd-c981-4d5b-8c8f-
22342d60a946. 
327 See Joseph Guzman, America Could Have a Third Act of Coronavirus and It 
Will Likely Be “More Pervasive,” Says Top Health Expert, HILL (Aug. 21, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/changing-america/well-being/longevity/513125-america-
could-have-a-third-act-of-coronavirus-and-it; see also Feuer, supra note 315. 
328 See Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19 
Drug Remdesivir, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/
gilead-announces-remdesivir-price-covid-19. 
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($310)329 and perhaps over three hundred times its manufacturing 
cost (which has been estimated at less than $10330). The $3,120 price 
tag that most Americans will pay is the highest in the world (despite 
U.S. taxpayers’ contributions to the drug); other wealthy countries 
will pay $2,340.331 Experts corroborate the view that the $3,120 
Gilead will charge most American patients is unfairly high, given 
the drug’s moderate therapeutic value, its low manufacturing costs, 
and the American public’s substantial contributions—at least 
$70,500,000—to its discovery and development.332 Gilead’s prices 
for remdesivir will likely generate enormous revenue for the 
company333 but strain the budgets of federal and state public health 
 
329 See Melanie D. Whittington & Jonathan D. Campbell, Alternative Pricing 
Models for Remdesivir and Other Potential Treatments for COVID-19, 2020 INST. 
FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV. 1, 6 (June 24, 2020), https://icer-review.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/ICER-COVID_Revised_Report_20200624.pdf 
(concluding that $310 is the appropriate cost-effectiveness price for remdesivir, 
given that it speeds recovery but has not been proven to reduce mortality). 
330  Andrew Hill et al., Minimum Costs to Manufacture New Treatments for 
COVID-19, 6 J. VIRUS ERADICATION 61 (Apr. 2020). 
331 See Michael Erman et al., Gilead Prices COVID-19 Drug Remdesivir at $2,340 
per Patient in Developed Nations, REUTERS (June 29, 2020), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-health-coronavirus-gilead-sciences-idUSKBN2401C8. 
332  See, e.g., Damian Garde & Ed Silverman, Less than a Movie Ticket or 
“Impossible to Overpay”? Experts Name Their Price for Remdesivir, STAT (May 
15, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/15/gilead-remdesivir-pricing-
coronavirus (quoting expert Peter Bach, director of Memorial Sloan Kettering’s 
Center for Health Policy and Outcomes, as suggesting a price of about $1,000 per 
patient as fair); Angus Liu, New Fair Price for Gilead’s Remdesivir? Below 
$2,800 if Dexamethasone Lives up to Its COVID-19 Promise, FIERCE PHARMA 
(June 24, 2020), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/new-fair-price-for-
gilead-s-remdesivir-below-2-800-if-dexamethasone-lives-up-to-its-covid-19; 
Jing Luo et al., Treatments Don’t Work If We Can’t Afford Them: The Global Need 
for Open and Equitable Access to Remdesivir, BMJ OPINION (June 3, 2020), 
https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/06/03/treatments-dont-work-if-we-cant-afford-
them-the-global-need-for-open-and-equitable-access-to-remdesivir (“In higher-
income countries, until more robust mortality data becomes available, existing 
evidence suggests that a price between ‘at cost’ ($10) and the lower of ICER’s 
cost-effective estimates ($390) is appropriate.”). Public Citizen has documented 
that the United States and other governments have contributed at least 
$70,500,000 to the development of remdesivir. See The Real Story of Remdesivir, 
PUB. CITIZEN (May 7, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/article/the-real-story-of-
remdesivir/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=9bdafb07-71bb-41dc-8726-
f80183f3f648. 
333 See Ed Silverman, Gilead’s Pricing for Remdesivir Raises Questions About the 
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agencies, insurers, and individual patients. 334  HHS’s plan to 
distribute 500,000 doses of remdesivir between July and September 
2020 committed parts of the U.S. government and all private payers 
to paying full price.335  
3. Patents Are the Sole Significant Barrier to Access 
Government patent use can be effective in solving shortages 
and overpricing, but only if there are no other insurmountable 
barriers to competition. We consider three candidates for non-patent 
barriers to remdesivir manufacturing and distribution and find that 
none of them will likely be impassable. 
First, although § 1498 is limited to government patent use rather 
than generalized compulsory licensing, § 1498 would still suffice to 
expand public access to remdesivir because the government could 
distribute the drug broadly. HHS’s distribution of remdesivir (or any 
therapeutic or vaccine used against COVID-19) would satisfy the 
statute’s requirement that authorization under § 1498 be limited to 
products “used or manufactured by or for the United States.”336 
Accelerating the recovery of people sick with COVID-19 and 
safeguarding hospital bed capacity clearly provides “significant 
benefits to the United States” and therefore meets the standard set 
out in Advanced Software. 337  As of writing, HHS is already 
coordinating distribution of remdesivir throughout the United States 
and has been since the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic.338 
HHS could, if it desired, purchase and distribute remdesivir through 
 
Drug’s Long-Term Prospects, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
pharmalot/2020/06/29/gilead-remdesivir-covid19-coronavirus-drug-prices 
(quoting a Wall Street prediction that Gilead could earn $2.3B from remdesivir in 
2020 alone). 
334 Garde & Silverman, supra note 332. 
335  Libby Watson, Big Pharma’s Got a Brand New Coronavirus Grift, NEW 
REPUBLIC (June 30, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158337/big-pharma-
coronavirus-grift; see also Peter B. Bach, Remdesivir Less Expensive for 
‘Government Programs.’ Not So Fast, Drug Pricing Lab (2020), https://
drugpricinglab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Remdesivir-Paper-1.pdf 
(alleging that most U.S. government programs will pay full price for remdesivir). 
336 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
337 Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 
1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
338 See, e.g., HHS Press Release, supra note 321(Announcing that remdesivir 
“will be allocated [in July, August, and September 2020] in the same way that 
Gilead’s donation of approximately 120,000 treatment courses of remdesivir were 
allocated: HHS allocates product to state and territorial health departments based 
on COVID-19 hospital burden, and health departments allocate it to hospitals.”). 
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the Strategic National Stockpile for public health emergencies, 
which would qualify as “use[] or manufacture[] by or for the United 
States,” as Wang and Kesselheim have noted.339 
Second, trade secrets and internal know-how will pose minimal 
barriers to generic manufacturing. Remdesivir is a small molecule 
drug with a relatively simple formulation: the active ingredient is 
combined with an excipient that improves its stability and solubility 
to form a powder and then dissolved in water to form an injectable 
solution.340 Making remdesivir is nontrivial in practice: the active 
ingredient is somewhat complex to synthesize, as small molecules 
go, and formulation involves a days-long step—lyophilization—that 
requires specialized equipment. 341  Yet the drug can be reverse 
engineered, and generic manufacturers overseas have already been 
able to develop formulations bioequivalent to Gilead’s, quickly.342 
For example, as of July 2020, one generic company in Bangladesh 
(Beximco) had scaled up its manufacturing of remdesivir from zero 
to 80,000 vials per month in less than three months, without 
authorization or assistance from Gilead. 343  The same company 
 
339 Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 15, at 478. 
340 Gilead Scis., supra note 301. 
341  See Himani Chandna, Govt Steps up Pressure on Remdesivir-Makers to 
Increase Output, Crack down on Black Marketing, THEPRINT (July 23, 2020), 
https://theprint.in/health/govt-steps-up-pressure-on-remdesivir-makers-to-
increase-output-crack-down-on-black-marketing/466887; Lisa M. Jarvis, Scaling 
up Remdesivir Amid the Coronavirus Crisis, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/infectious-disease/
Scaling-remdesivir-amid-coronavirus-crisis/98/web/2020/04. 
342 See India’s CDSCO Approves Generics of Favipiravir and Remdesivir for 
Covid-19 Treatment, PHARMACEUTICAL BUS. REV. (June 22, 2020), https://www.
pharmaceutical-business-review.com/news/covid-19-india-favipiravir-
remdesivir/ (describing two generic formulations of remdesivir approved for sale 
in India); Zeba Siddiqui, Bangladesh’s Beximco to Begin Producing COVID-19 
Drug Remdesivir, REUTERS (May 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-coronavirus-bangladesh-remdesi/exclusive-bangladeshs-beximco-to-
begin-producing-covid-19-drug-remdesivir-coo-idUSKBN22H1DD (describing 
approval of generic remdesivir in Bangladesh, developed without Gilead’s 
authorization or assistance); Ed Silverman, First Generic Version of Gilead’s 
Remdesivir Will Be Sold by a Bangladesh Drug Maker, STAT (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/22/gilead-remdesivir-covid19-
coronavirus-beximco-patent/ (same). 
343 See A.Z.M. Anas, Bangladesh’s Beximco Thrives on Coronavirus Challenges, 
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (July 26, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/
Pharmaceuticals/Bangladesh-s-Beximco-thrives-on-coronavirus-challenges. 
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stated that it intends to expand production further, to 160,000 vials 
per month by the end of August 2020, and that it has already 
exported the drug outside of Bangladesh to five other countries.344 
Another Bangladeshi generic company, Eskayef, has also developed 
a generic formulation of remdesivir without authorization or 
assistance from Gilead and has likewise exported the drug outside 
of Bangladesh. 345  Numerous brand-name, generic, and contract 
drug manufacturers within the United States have the expertise and 
equipment necessary to manufacture remdesivir. For example, 
Pfizer announced in August 2020 that it would begin manufacturing 
remdesivir at a McPherson, Kansas factory that specializes in 
injectable medicines, under a contract with Gilead, as Gilead 
gradually (too gradually) responded to shortages.346 
Third, manufacturers other than Gilead will likely be able to 
obtain the regulatory permission they need to distribute and sell 
remdesivir within the United States. 347 Generic firms may not be 
 
Perhaps counterintuitively, generic drug companies are often more, not less, 
innovative and successful than “innovator” brand-name drug companies at 
improving drug manufacturing processes, eliminating inefficiencies, and driving 
down the costs of production. Generics earn much smaller profit margins than 
brand-name drug companies and often compete fiercely with one another on price, 
sparking innovation in manufacturing processes that drives costs down. See 
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the 
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), https://
www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/
genericsupplement0809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 (“[G]enerics innovate, often 
obtaining ‘design-around’ patents or a more efficient manufacturing process, new 
formulations, or new forms of the active ingredient”). For example, it was Cipla, 
a low-margin generic manufacturer, that figured out how to manufacture and sell 
HIV drugs for $1 a day, a fraction of the manufacturing costs brand-name 
companies had incurred. See Sarah Boseley, Yusuf Hamied, Generic Drugs Boss, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/18/
aids.sarahboseley13.  
344 See Anas, supra note 343. 
345 Eskayef Pharma’s Remdesivir Is a Headache for Indian Drugmakers, BUS. 
STANDARD (June 9, 2020), https://tbsnews.net/coronavirus-chronicle/eskayef-
pharmas-remdesivir-headache-indian-drugmakers-90691. 
346  Press Release, Pfizer Inc., Pfizer Announces Agreement with Gilead to 
Manufacture Remdesivir for Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://
www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-announces-
agreement-gilead-manufacture-remdesivir. 
347 Regulatory questions are admittedly complex and especially unpredictable in 
this moment of declared public health emergency. See G. Caleb Alexander, Aaron 
 
Fall 2020] Who’s Afraid of Section 1498? 81 
able to use the normal Abbreviated New Drug Application pathway 
for FDA approval based on any New Drug Application approval that 
Gilead receives, because Gilead is likely to receive, upon approval, 
some data exclusivity that will preclude such abbreviated 
applications.348 Instead, we see two distinct alternative paths for a 
competitor manufacturer to obtain permission. The first is an 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). At least as of writing, the 
FDA has not actually approved Gilead’s remdesivir product; instead, 
the FDA has provided an EUA, which enables the HHS secretary to 
“authorize the introduction . . . of a drug, device, or biological 
product intended for use in an actual or potential emergency,” even 
when that product “is not approved, licensed, or cleared for 
commercial distribution.”349 Gilead’s EUA was authorized by the 
FDA on the basis of two trials,350 one of which was the earlier-
 
S. Kesselheim & Thomas J. Moore, Searching for an Effective Covid-19 
Treatment: Promise and Peril, STAT (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/04/10/searching-for-an-effective-covid-19-treatment-promise-and-peril/; 
Reynald Castaneda, FDA May Be Risk-Averse to Grant Emergency Use for Covid-
19 Vaccines, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA (July 2, 2020), https://www.
clinicaltrialsarena.com/comment/fda-covid-19-vaccines/; Leigh Turner, Could 
Pressure for COVID-19 Drugs Lead the FDA to Lower Its Standards?, 
CONVERSATION (June 10, 2020), https://theconversation.com/could-pressure-for-
covid-19-drugs-lead-the-fda-to-lower-its-standards-139013. 
348 Gilead announced in August 2020 that it is seeking full FDA approval of 
remdesivir, based on the same trials that supported its EUA. See Press Release, 
Gilead Scis., Inc., Gilead Submits New Drug Application to U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration for Veklury (Remdesivir) for the Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 
10, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/
2020/8/gilead-submits-new-drug-application-to-us-food-and-drug-
administration-for-veklury-remdesivir-for-the-treatment-of-covid19. In the event 
that Gilead’s application is approved, the FDA will grant Gilead a period of so-
called “data exclusivity” that prohibits the filing of “abbreviated” applications on 
remdesivir for several years. See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and 
Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 2, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-
and-exclusivity. 
349  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 564(a)(1)–(a)(2)(A), 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360bbb–3; see OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM & EMERGING THREATS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF 
MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND 
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 4 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download. 
350 See Letter from Denise M. Hinton, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ashley 
Rhoades, Gilead Scis., Inc. (May 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137564/
download; see also Gilead Scis., supra note 301, at 33 (summarizing data from 
NIAID trial). 
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mentioned clinical trial conducted (and paid for) by NIAID, which 
showed that remdesivir helps hospitalized patients with severe 
COVID-19 recover and leave the hospital more quickly than a 
placebo.351 According to news reports, this trial was apparently the 
more important of the two trials that supported the authorization,352 
and it recently formed the sole basis of conditional approval by 
Canada’s drug regulator.353 NIAID has committed to sharing the 
“[c]omplete de-identified patient data set” from its trial with any 
who ask for it, once the clinical study report has been finalized.354 
As such, it seems likely to us that a generic manufacturer seeking an 
EUA from the FDA for its own remdesivir product will be able to 
obtain one by obtaining and submitting the complete data set from 
the NIAID trial along with proof that its product is bioequivalent to 
Gilead’s.355 Generic manufacturers may also be able to submit, and 
rely on, clinical trial data from other publicly funded trials of 
remdesivir.356 A second path would be for a generic to file a full New 
Drug Application. Any FDA-granted data exclusivity for Gilead 
would not prevent a competitor manufacturer from submitting a 
complete (rather than an abbreviated) application for full FDA 
approval of its own, based on the NIAID trial and other publicly 
 
351 See supra notes 303–307. 
352 See, e.g., Maggie Fox et al., FDA Will Reportedly Authorize Use of Remdesivir 
for Covid-19 After Trial Shows “Positive Effect” on Recovery Time, CNN (Apr. 
30, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/29/health/gilead-sciences-remdesivir-
covid-19-treatment/index.html. 
353  See Health Canada Authorises Remdesivir as First Covid-19 Treatment, 
PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (July 29, 2020), https://www.pharmaceutical-
technology.com/news/canada-approval-remdesivir-covid/ (describing conditional 
approval); Gilead Sciences Canada, Inc., Product Monograph Including Patient 
Medication Information: Veklury, VEKLURY 1, 13 (July 27, 2020), https://pdf.hres.
ca/dpd_pm/00057134.PDF (referring to the NIAID trial, and only the NIAID 
trial). 
354  See Data Sharing Statement, https://www.nejm.org/doi/suppl/10.1056/
NEJMoa2007764/suppl_file/nejmoa2007764_data-sharing.pdf, in Beigel et al., 
supra note 304. 
355 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 320.21-.63. 
356  See, e.g., “Solidarity” Clinical Trial for COVID-19 Treatments, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (last updated July 6, 2020), https://www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-
ncov/solidarity-clinical-trial-for-covid-19-treatments; Trial of Treatments for 
COVID-19 in Hospitalized Adults (DisCoVeRy), U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (last 
updated July 22, 2020), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04315948. 
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available data.357 
That legal, logistical, and regulatory barriers are traversable 
makes remdesivir perhaps unlike some other anti-COVID medical 
products. In particular, with respect to vaccines, several scholars 
have focused on trade secret knowledge of manufacturing processes, 
observing that “the more significant impediments to producing a 
successful coronavirus vaccine lie on the manufacturing side” and 
are not patents themselves.358 (Vaccines and other biological drug 
products are often more difficult for competitors to reverse engineer 
than small molecule drugs.359) As a result, these scholars contend 
that use of § 1498 could be counterproductive; it could, they argue, 
erode a patent holder’s financial incentives to scale up 
manufacturing and distribution of the patented vaccine without 
concomitantly empowering competitors to make it, leaving the 
 
357 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (permitting filing of applications based on “full 
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug 
is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467, 488 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (“[R]egulatory 
exclusivity defers the filing and approval of ANDAs, but not of NDAs. An 
applicant who is able to submit ‘full reports of investigations which have been 
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is 
effective in use’ need not wait until the end of the exclusivity period, when the 
statute permits the use of an ANDA, but could instead file an NDA. . . . [I]f the 
data were publicly available, the competitor could file its own NDA at reasonable 
cost.”); Erika Lietzan, A New Framework for Assessing Clinical Data 
Transparency Initiatives, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 33, 67 (2014) 
(“[W]here the [clinical trial] data is released and available, an abbreviated 
application may not be required by the regulator. A full application can be 
submitted. This effects an end run around regulatory exclusivity, which prohibits 
only approval, or sometimes submission, of abbreviated applications.”). 
358 Nicholson Price et al., Are COVID-19 Vaccine Advance Purchases a Form of 
Vaccine Nationalism, an Effective Spur to Innovation, or Something in Between?, 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Aug. 5, 2020), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/
2020/08/are-covid-19-vaccine-advance-purchases.html; accord Ken Shadlen, 
Speeding up the Development and Distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines, ISSUES 
SCI. & TECH. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://issues.org/covid-vaccines-development-
distribution-patenting-shadlen/ (“For some COVID products (vaccines in 
particular), the [principal] barriers to access will be related to their 
production . . . .”). 
359 See Sara Eve Crager, Improving Global Access to New Vaccines: Intellectual 
Property, Technology Transfer, and Regulatory Pathways, 108 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S414, S415 (2018), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdfplus/10.
2105/AJPH.2014.302236r. 
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world with less supply than ever. 360  These scholars specifically 
contend that use of § 1498 and other compulsory patent licensing 
could impede transfer from the patent holder to those competitors of 
the vital knowledge those competitors need.361 
There are several reasons to think that knowledge transfer will 
not be as much a problem in the context of COVID-19 vaccines as 
these commentators suggest, even if § 1498 is on the table. The 
premise is that government patent use will lead patent holders to 
refuse knowledge transfer, but in fact history repeatedly shows that 
government patent use leads patent owners to be more conciliatory 
in negotiations; lack of government power has tended to give rise to 
patentee recalcitrance.362 In our view it is more likely that exercise 
of § 1498 or the threat of its exercise would encourage patent 
holders to make deals with the government that include elements of 
knowledge transfer. Furthermore, in cases of extreme impasse, the 
government may be able to compel technology transfer—including 
transfer of trade secret manufacturing information—via authority to 
“allocate materials” under the Defense Production Act.363 
In a larger sense, the fact that § 1498 cannot overcome trade 
secrets, regulatory exclusivities, and other barriers to emergency 
response reflects an ongoing failure to consider how these non-
patent forms of intellectual property intersect with crises. Even 
§ 1498 itself was not the product of thinking about patents in 
national emergencies; it arose out of a very non-emergency Capitol 
renovation. 364  That § 1498 has ended up playing a role in past 
national emergencies suggests a need for Congress to consider 
§ 1498-like statutory authority on trade secrets, regulatory 
exclusivities, and other competition barriers, as some scholars have 
argued it should,365 so that the U.S. government can better accelerate 
competition in the event of shortages, price-gouging, or other 
 
360 See Shadlen, supra note 358; Price et al., supra note 358. 
361 See Shadlen, supra note 358; Price et al., supra note 358. 
362 See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text. 
363  50 U.S.C. §§ 4511(a)(2) & 4552(13) (defining “materials” to include 
“technical information”); Quigley, supra note 216. Of course, the government 
would need to weigh the costs and benefits before exercising the DPA, just as it 
should with exercise of § 1498. 
364 See supra Part I.A. 
365 See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of Biologics Manufacturing 
Information, 47 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 54 (2019); Ameet 
Sarpatwari et al., The US Biosimilar Market: Stunted Growth and Possible 
Reforms, 105 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 92 (2018). 
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problems. 
4. Government Patent Use Offers a Way Forward 
Patents, then, are the major barrier to competitive 
manufacturing of remdesivir, and there is a straightforward solution 
to overcoming shortages and excessive pricing: The U.S. 
government, and HHS specifically, could use government patent use 
under § 1498 to permit other manufacturers to make and sell 
remdesivir in the United States. HHS can and should publicly 
commit now to using § 1498, so that the United States’ supply of 
affordable remdesivir is assured.366 
The normative case for the U.S. government use of § 1498 to 
procure remdesivir is based on our framework. All four advantages 
of government patent use are highly salient in the case of remdesivir 
and COVID-19. Government patent use is clearly preferable to a 
U.S. government buyout of Gilead’s patents, which other scholars 
have proposed.367 
First, speed is critical. As noted above, as of writing, the United 
States and other countries have already faced shortages of 
remdesivir that hinder doctors’ ability to treat their patients, and 
these shortages could continue into the fall and beyond.368 HHS 
must do whatever it can to get additional supply of remdesivir into 
the marketplace as quickly as possible. To this end, HHS can and 
should announce its intent now to authorize other manufacturers 
(besides Gilead) under § 1498 to manufacture, import, export, 
distribute, and sell remdesivir. HHS can do this instantly. By 
contrast, negotiating a patent buyout or licensing deal with Gilead 
could take many months. Some delay in getting alternative 
manufacturers to market is inevitable; Gilead’s competitors will 
need to scale up manufacturing and clear the regulatory hurdles 
 
366 One of us (C.J.M.) has previously advocated in shorter pieces for government 
patent use to expand access to remdesivir. See supra note 295. In July 2020, the 
legal scholar Amy Kapczynski and the medical researchers and practicing 
physicians Paul Biddinger and Rochelle Walensky published an op-ed advocating 
the same. Kapczynski, Biddinger & Walensky, supra note 12. To be clear, 
committing to use § 1498 does not require actually using it if the patent holder 
puts an appropriate deal on the table, in the same way that the threat of invoking 
§ 1498 prodded Bayer to negotiate on Cipro. See supra notes 124–125. But 
without a clear commitment, patent holders may not feel the same need to 
negotiate in good faith or with expediency. See supra notes 158–165. 
367 Hemel & Ouellette 2020b, supra note 31 (proposing that HHS buy the patent 
rights to remdesivir from Gilead). 
368 See supra notes 316–327 and accompanying text. 
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noted above. But these practical hurdles will arise regardless of 
whether a buyout or government patent use is used. A buyout simply 
introduces extra delay. 
Second, the flexibility of government patent use is 
advantageous here. We trace here two options for HHS—an 
ambitious intervention, under which all of the government’s need 
for remdesivir is met through government patent use, and a modest 
one, under which the government would authorize generic 
manufacturing under § 1498 and stockpile a smaller supply of doses, 
to keep on hand in case of shortages. 
Under the more ambitious option, HHS could bypass Gilead 
altogether and contract with one or more generic drug companies 
who are able to supply the drug cheaply, much closer to 
manufacturing cost than the thousands of dollars per course of 
treatment that Gilead is charging. To bypass Gilead altogether would 
mimic what the U.S. government threatened to do when Bayer 
refused to reduce the price or increase supply of ciprofloxacin in the 
2001 anthrax crisis.369 It would also mimic the proposals of Brennan 
et al.,370 Senators Bernie Sanders371 and Elizabeth Warren,372 and 
the editorial board of The New York Times,373 all of whom have 
called on the U.S. government to use § 1498 to move its spending 
from expensive brand-name to cheap generic versions of certain 
drugs. A generic manufacturer in Bangladesh is manufacturing and 
selling a generic version of remdesivir at a cost of between $295 and 
$781 (USD) per course of treatment,374 and generics in India are 
selling remdesivir at a similar price.375 (The marginal cost is surely 
 
369 Supra Part I.D. 
370 Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 346 (calling on government procurement 
officers to contract directly with generic companies to purchase hepatitis C drugs 
instead of purchasing any such drugs from Gilead). 
371 Sanders, supra note 11. 
372 Anderson, supra note 14. 
373 Editorial Bd., supra note 11. 
374 See Silverman, supra note 342; Siddiqui, supra note 342. 
375 See Sohini Das & Vinay Umarji, Covid-19: At Rs 2,800 per Dose, Zydus 
Launches Cheapest Remdesivir Brand, BUS. STANDARD (Aug. 13, 2020), https://
www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/zydus-cadila-s-cheapest-
remdesivir-brand-to-disrupt-indian-market-120081301528_1.html; Angus Liu, 
WuXi NextCODE Rebrand; Remdesivir Generic Prices; Sinopharm COVID-19 
Vax Phase 3, FIERCEPHARMA (June 26, 2020), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma-asia/fiercepharmaasia-wuxi-nextcode-rebrand-remdesivir-generic-
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even lower, and costs of manufacturing may decline further as 
generics grow more experienced.) Should these generic 
manufacturers supply the United States at similar prices to those in 
South Asia, then payers would reap enormous savings compared to 
Gilead’s current prices of $2,340 to $3,120. (Even HHS and the U.S. 
government, which would be required to pay Gilead “reasonable and 
entire compensation” for use of its patents, would come out far 
ahead, as we show below.) 
Alternatively, HHS could make a more modest intervention 
under § 1498, one that would trouble Gilead’s business expectations 
only minimally while simultaneously protecting the American 
public from a shortage of remdesivir. Under this proposal, HHS 
could continue to purchase remdesivir from Gilead at Gilead’s full 
price, at whatever rate Gilead is able to supply and sell, while 
simultaneously contracting with a generic manufacturer to build a 
stockpile. The stockpile could be reserved to ameliorate shortages 
and deployed (and replenished) only as needed. HHS would provide 
compensation to Gilead for its purchases of the generic. And 
Gilead’s existing business—selling remdesivir to HHS and other 
buyers around the world—would continue. 
Third, ex post determination of the appropriate compensation is 
highly beneficial in the case of remdesivir. Because of skimpy 
clinical trials and only a few months of real-world evidence, 
remdesivir’s value is currently highly uncertain. 376  Remdesivir 
could prove our best therapeutic weapon against COVID-19, or it 
could be supplanted by drugs that are more effective or cheaper—or 
by a vaccine.377 That makes a patent buyout particularly difficult 
from both Gilead’s and the government’s perspective: how to factor 
all that uncertainty? Use of § 1498 would helpfully defer the 
question of patent valuation and compensation until after more 
evidence of remdesivir’s therapeutic properties and sales has been 
 
prices-sinopharm-covid-vax, (explaining that generic remdesivir in India will cost 
“around $350 to $700 per treatment course, depending on which doses a patient 
needs”); Anuron Kumar Mitra & Siddharth Cavale, India’s Cipla Prices Its 
Generic Remdesivir at $53.34 per Vial, Below Rivals, REUTERS (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-cipla-idUSKBN2492Q3. 
376 See Garde & Silverman, supra note 332; Sarpatwari et al., supra note 303. 
Perhaps the most critical currently unanswered question is whether remdesivir 
reduces mortality—i.e., saves lives—or merely accelerates recovery in patients 
who would survive even without the drug. 
377 See Silverman, Gilead’s Pricing, supra note 333.  
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gathered. Indeed, to ensure a solid evidence base, HHS could 
concomitantly work with the FDA (a constituent agency) to create a 
patient registry that collects information on patient outcomes from 
doctors who prescribe the drug, as Sarpatwari, Kaltenboeck, and 
Kesselheim have suggested.378 HHS could also sponsor new clinical 
trials through the National Institutes of Health (another constituent 
agency) to generate better evidence of remdesivir’s therapeutic 
properties. 
Finally, the fourth key feature of § 1498, determination of that 
compensation by an impartial adjudicator, is likely to be 
advantageous as well. Placing the question of compensation in the 
hands of an objective judge rather than Gilead’s negotiators is likely 
preferable from the government’s (and public’s) perspective, as 
Gilead has a reputation for price gouging and bad faith, even in its 
dealings with the U.S. government.379 Given Gilead’s track record, 
a patent buyout raises the prospect of hold-up and worse. 
What compensation would HHS pay if chose to use § 1498 to 
authorize generic manufacturers to make and sell remdesivir? 
 
378 See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 303; see also Peter B. Bach, U.S. Hospitals 
Need to Study How Well Remdesivir Really Works, BLOOMBERG L. (July 13, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-13/u-s-hospitals-
need-to-study-how-well-remdesivir-really-works. 
379 In 2015, a bipartisan investigation of Gilead’s Hepatitis C drug portfolio by 
Senators Wyden (D-OR) and Grassley (R-IA) concluded that “Gilead’s 
marketing, pricing, and contracting strategies were focused on maximizing 
revenue—even as the company’s analysis showed a lower price would allow more 
people to be treated—not only for [its first FDA-approved Hepatitis C product], 
but more importantly for its follow-on . . . product pipeline.” STAFFS OF RANKING 
MEMBER RON WYDEN & COMM. MEMBER CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, 114TH CONG., 
THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 117 
(Comm. Print 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/the-price-of-
sovaldi-and-its-impact-on-the-us-health-care-system-full-report. The same report 
criticized Gilead’s lack of candor, observing that “despite the company’s 
assurances of cooperation, Gilead failed to produce all relevant documents and 
supporting materials.” Id. Gilead is also currently embroiled in a patent 
infringement lawsuit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), which alleges that Gilead acted in bad faith 
in negotiating a patent license to government-held patents with HHS and one of 
its constituent agencies, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See 
Complaint at 1–4, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-2103 (D. Del. 
Nov. 6, 2019) (“Gilead’s conduct was malicious, wanton, deliberate, consciously 
wrongful, flagrant, and in bad faith. This is especially true because . . . the 
Government has attempted to negotiate [a patent license] in good faith . . . .”); 
id. at 69. 
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Assuming conservatively that HHS pays a sale price of $800 to the 
generic for a standard course of treatment (higher than the highest 
generic prices currently charged overseas) and pays to Gilead a very 
generous court-set royalty of 50% of that sale price380 HHS would 
still spend a total of only $1,200 per course of treatment—far less 
than Gilead currently charges. HHS, and American taxpayers, would 
come out ahead. 
And Gilead itself would fare well at the Court of Federal 
Claims; despite “breaking” Gilead’s patent, this scenario is no 
“nuclear option.” After going to court to claim its compensation 
from the U.S. government, Gilead would collect a royalty that could 
run to the hundreds of millions,381 even billions,382 of dollars, all 
while foregoing the manufacturing and distribution costs it would 
incur if it made the infringing doses itself—while simultaneously 
selling remdesivir at whatever price it pleases to payers in other 
countries around the world, and perhaps to private payers in the 
United States not supplied by HHS. Between royalties and its own 
sales, Gilead should quickly recoup the “up to $1 billion or more” it 
has contended (without documentation) that it ultimately plans to 
invest in remdesivir.383 
Determination of compensation at the Court of Federal Claims 
has another interesting advantage in the case of remdesivir: the court 
can adjudicate not only compensation but also ownership of the 
patents that cover remdesivir. A report recently co-authored by 
Krellenstein and one of the authors concluded that the U.S. 
government likely co-owns (with Gilead) the patents on remdesivir 
itself as well as the method of treating COVID-19 with 
 
380  A 50% royalty would be extraordinarily high, making our estimates 
conservative (from the government’s perspective). See supra note 194 (observing 
that royalties of over 10% are rare in § 1498 cases). 
381  Assuming a royalty of $400 on 500,000 doses, Gilead would receive 
$200,000,000. 
382  Assuming a royalty of $400 of 5,000,000 doses, Gilead would receive 
$2,000,000,000. 
383 Sydney Lupkin, Putting a Price on COVID-19 Treatment Remdesivir, NPR 
(May 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/08/851632704
/putting-a-price-on-covid-19-treatment-remdesivir. HHS’s contract with Gilead to 
distribute 500,000 doses of remdesivir at Gilead’s full monopoly price between 
July and September 2020 may alone suffice to guarantee Gilead a payout of over 
$1B, likely sufficient to cover all of Gilead’s purported costs. See Bach, supra 
note 335. 
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remdesivir.384 This rather unusual feature of remdesivir arises from 
the fact that it was co-developed by Gilead and U.S. government 
scientists rather than by Gilead alone. This feature makes 
government patent use particularly appealing from the government’s 
(and public’s) perspective: for any patents that the U.S. government 
is able to prove it co-owns, the “reasonable and entire 
compensation” the government will owe under § 1498 for use of 
these patents will be zero.385 HHS would owe compensation only 
for use of any patents that Gilead owns outright, without co-
ownership by the U.S. government.386 Under U.S. patent law, HHS 
would owe no compensation to Gilead for use of any patent of which 
the U.S. government turns out to be rightful co-owner. 387  The 
consequent savings to HHS would represent a kind of compensation 
for the U.S. government’s investment in that patent—and, more 
broadly, compensation for the more than $70,000,000 that the 
American public invested in the early, riskiest days of remdesivir’s 
development.388 
All four of the key beneficial features of government patent use 
under § 1498 thus weigh in favor of its use on remdesivir. The end 
result of government patent use on remdesivir would be increased 
competition, greater supply, and lower prices—much lower for 
patients and private payers, who would pay only the price that 
generic makers charge, and substantially lower even for the U.S. 
government, who would pay that price plus court-set compensation 
to Gilead. Given the unique circumstances around remdesivir—not 
 
384 Krellenstein & Morten, supra note 295; see also Dani Kass, Activists Say Gov’t 
Should Have Rights to Remdesivir Patents, LAW360 (May 27, 2020), https://www.
law360.com/ip/articles/1277114/activists-say-gov-t-should-have-rights-to-
remdesivir-patents. 
385 If the U.S. government co-owns these patents, it has a legal right to license 
them as it pleases, including to generic pharmaceutical companies, without 
permission from or payment to Gilead. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of 
any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, 
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the 
patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without 
accounting to the other owners.”). 
386 Krellenstein & Morten, supra note 295, at 15. 
387 See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of 
the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented 
invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the 
United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other 
owners.”). 
388 See supra note 332. 
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least the scale of the public health crisis posed by COVID-19 and 
the deep involvement of HHS scientists in remdesivir’s invention 
and clinical development—HHS should commit now to using this 
policy tool to protect public health. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 1498 has long played and ought to continue playing its 
part in U.S. patent policy. In emergencies past, it has resolved wide-
scale tragedies, and it has clear applications, large and small, in the 
COVID-19 crisis. Section 1498’s long pedigree and theoretical 
advantages dispel the notion that it is antithetical to the modern 
patent system. It is part and parcel of our patent system, and its 
advantageous features recommend its use alongside other policy 
tools for driving innovation and expanding access to patented 
technologies. 
While we conclude that § 1498 has an important role in patent 
policy and thus reject the view that invocation of the statute is 
exceptional, impractical, or extreme, we have not established a 
specific test for when § 1498 should or should not be used, and we 
do not purport to. Instead, we have identified neglected features of 
§ 1498 that make it a valuable policy tool that could be applied more 
widely than it has been in recent decades and yield significant social 
and economic benefits in a wide set of situations, especially—but 
not only—in times of national emergency. An important area of 
further research will be the development of more detailed and 
specific guidance on when invocation of § 1498 is wise as a matter 
of policy, in view of those advantages and disadvantages that we and 
others have identified. 
That the role of § 1498 in the context of national emergencies 
has not been explored in depth to date suggests a larger need for 
research on the relationship of the patent system generally with 
imminent conditions that require federal response. As one of us has 
observed in a study of patents and national security,389 traditional 
narratives of patent policy, though applicable in usual 
circumstances, do not necessarily hold up when there are national-
scale interests at stake. It is our hope that the calamitous 
circumstances that we face today with COVID-19 will encourage 
further research into how a system as complex and broad-reaching 
as U.S. patent law can accommodate the challenges—emergency 
and routine—that may lie ahead. 
 
389 See Duan, supra note 48. 
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V. APPENDIX: MEMORANDUM FROM ALFRED B. ENGELBERG 
TO SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER 
Alfred B. Engelberg 
 INCREASING ACCESS TO CIPRO 
 A Strategy for Rapid Creation of a Government Stockpile 
 October 13, 2001 
 
1. Background Facts 
Panic buying of CIPRO in response to recent threats of bio-
terrorism involving Anthrax has caused massive shortages of this 
antibiotic. The ability to create new supplies is limited by the fact 
that the drug is patented until at least December 2003 and is only 
available from a single source. A challenge to the validity of the 
patent which might have resulted in the widespread availability of a 
low cost generic alternative was settled when the patent owner, 
Bayer Corporation, reportedly paid Barr Laboratories and others in 
excess of $200 million to drop the challenge. The FTC is 
investigating this settlement as a possible anti-trust violation and 
several class action antitrust cases have been commenced on behalf 
of consumers. At the present time at least five generic drug 
manufacturers have been tentatively approved to manufacture 
ciprofloxacin, the generic version of CIPRO but, due to the 
existence of the Bayer patent, they cannot begin the commercial 
manufacture and sale of generic product until the Bayer patent 
expires more than 2 years from now. 
 
2. Current Law Permits the United States to Purchase 
Generic Ciprofloxacin Now 
The United States government and its suppliers are immune 
from suits for patent infringement in the Federal District Courts The 
sole and exclusive remedy for an act of infringement by or for the 
government is a suit against the United States in the Court of Claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a). The statute reads as follows: 
(a) Whenever an invention described in and covered by a 
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the 
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right 
to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by 
action against the United States in the United States Claims Court 
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such 
use and manufacture. 
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For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an 
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States 
by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation 
for the Government and with the authorization or consent of the 
Government, shall be construed as use or manufacture for the 
United States. 
 
No injunction is available under § 1498 and the only remedy is 
reasonable compensation for the unauthorized use of an invention. 
But the government has the right to assert any defense to 
compensation that a private party could assert, namely that the 
patent is invalid, not infringed or unenforceable. Under federal 
procurement regulations, the government is often (although not 
always) indemnified against claims for compensation by its 
suppliers and the suppliers assist in asserting these defenses. 
Accordingly, the government may assert the same challenges to the 
CIPRO patent that have been asserted by Barr and are now being 
asserted by others.390 
There is ample authority for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 
1498(a) prevents a Federal District court from issuing an injunction 
against a government supplier that would interfere with the right of 
that supplier to bid on and participate in the sale of products to the 
government. Gore v. Garlock, 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
In fact, that principle has been applied by the courts even in cases 
where the same supplier was actually enjoined from making 
commercial sales of the same product. As stated by the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Garlock: 
The patentee takes his patent from the United States subject to 
the government’s eminent domain rights to obtain what it needs 
from manufacturers and to use the same. The government has 
graciously consented in the same statute, to be sued in the claims 
court for reasonable and entire compensation, for what would be an 
infringement by a private person. The same principles apply to 
injunctions which are nothing more than the giving of aid of the 
courts to the enforcement of the patentees right to exclude. Though 
injunctions may seem to say that making for and selling to the 
 
390 It is noteworthy that the U.S. government has actually used its authority under 
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to procure a less expensive generic version of a patented drug 
(Miltown) from abroad. See Carter Wallace v. United States, 449 F2d 1374 (U.S. 
Ct. Clms. 1972). 
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government is forbidden, injunctions based on patent rights cannot 
in reality do that because of §1498(a). 
Quoting the foregoing paragraph in Trojan v. Shat-R-Shield, 
885 F.2d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the Federal Circuit further stated: 
In short, a patent owner may not use its patent to cut the 
government off from sources of supply, either at the bid stage or 
during performance of a government contract. 
 
In the face of these overwhelming precedents, Bayer is likely to 
argue that § 1498 is not applicable to generic drug purchases because 
a mere applicant for approval of an ANDA is not yet a legitimate 
competitor for a government contract and, therefore, the act of filing 
and seeking approval for an ANDA does not have the “authorization 
and consent” from the government that is a prerequisite to invoking 
28 U.S.C. § 1498. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a 
similar argument in TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). As the Federal Circuit noted, § 1498 protects government 
procurement activities, including acts required to satisfy 
government procurement requirements and that authorization and 
consent can be implied and need not be expressly stated by the 
government. 
Despite the foregoing precedents, the government could easily 
moot any possibility of protracted litigation by issuing a blanket 
“authorization and consent” for generic manufacturers holding 
tentative ANDA approvals to submit bids to the appropriate 
agencies. Such an authorization, which could be issued by OMB, 
HHS or some other agency with responsibility for drug 
procurement, would eliminate any basis for litigation. At least five 
companies now have tentative approvals to manufacture 
ciprofloxacin and are prevented from full approval solely because 
of the Bayer patents. 
 
3. Generic Versions of Licensed Drugs Can Be Approved 
By the FDA Notwithstanding the Patent Certification 
Procedures Required Under Current Law 
Under current law, the FDA will not approve a generic version 
of a drug for which unexpired patents are listed in the Orange Book 
unless the applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification alleging that 
a patent is invalid, unenforceable or will not be infringed. When 
such a certification is made the FDA is prohibited from approving 
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the generic drug for 30 months unless a court issues a judgment in a 
shorter time. An applicant seeking approval for the purpose of 
marketing a drug solely to the United States government can file a 
paragraph IV certification and state “Applicant will not infringe U.S. 
Patent No. ___ because the product of this application will only be 
sold to the United States.” If a supply agreement has already been 
authorized by a government agency, documentation of the 
authorization and consent should accompany the certification. 
In all likelihood, the patent owner will sue the first generic 
applicant that seeks an approval for the exclusive purpose of making 
sales to the government. Any competent Federal District Court will 
be compelled to summarily dismiss any such lawsuit on the basis of 
the precedents cited in this memo. Indeed, it would be appropriate 
for the ANDA applicant to specifically request and for the court to 
grant, an immediate final judgment compelling the FDA to grant 
approval of any ANDA for the purpose of allowing the applicant to 
sell product to the United States government. At least two generic 
manufacturers with tentatively approved ANDAs for ciprofloxacin 
are already engaged in litigation with respect to the Bayer patents. 
Those parties are in a position to file immediate motions for 
summary judgment of non-infringement based on the legal theory 
outlined herein and to by-pass the loss of time that would occur 
before litigation begins if the normal patent certification process is 
followed. 
 
4. Timetable & Risk 
Assuming that one of the two generic companies now involved 
in litigation with Bayer is willing to proceed, a motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement could be filed, on an expedited or 
emergency basis, in a Federal District Court in a matter of a couple 
of days simply by relying on the legal arguments in this memo. 
There would, however, be no point in doing so without a firm 
commitment of the US government to make a substantial purchase 
at a pre-negotiated price. Obviously that price would be heavily 
discounted as compared to the current wholesale price of the 
patented product. The contract commitment is essential from both 
an incentive standpoint and to eliminate any possibility of a legal 
skirmish on the issue of authorization and consent. 
One significant stumbling block could be the issue of who 
assumes the risk of paying “reasonable compensation” in the event 
Bayer sues the U.S. for patent infringement and the patent is upheld. 
96 Yale Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 23 
 
The generic manufacturers will be highly reluctant to assume any 
portion of that risk since a large award could destroy their business. 
Moreover, the risk may be real. On February 9, 2001, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a motion for 
Summary Judgment by Mylan and Schein to declare the basic Bayer 
patent to be invalid and specifically held the patent valid over the 
challenge asserted in that motion. At this time, it is unknown 
whether there are other grounds for challenging the patent or 
whether the summary judgment decision would be affirmed on 
appeal. Moreover, there is a substantial question as to whether the 
patent will ultimately be enforceable in view of the antitrust issues 
surrounding the settlement with Barr Laboratories. Given the 
significant benefit to the government of assuring the existence of an 
adequate supply of ciprofloxacin and the ability to procure that 
supply at a relatively low cost, the government may wish to consider 
waiving or limiting the usual indemnification provisions in federal 
procurement contracts. 
Preliminary investigation reveals that a supply of bulk active 
ingredient is available from reputable FDA-approved sources 
abroad and that delivery of significant quantities of finished product 
could commence within 60–90 days assuming the legal obstacles 
have been cleared away and FDA approval is in hand. 
 
 
